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INTRODUCTION
Section 12(2)' of the Securities Act of 19332 provides a securi-
ties purchaser with an express cause of action against his seller if
the purchaser can establish that the seller used interstate com-
merce or the mails to offer or sell a security by means of a written
or oral communication which misstated or omitted to state a ma-
terial fact of which the purchaser was unaware.3 Upon proof of
the foregoing, the purchaser is entitled to rescind his purchase or,
in the event he no longer owns the security, to recover equivalent
damages unless the seller sustains the burden of proving that the
seller did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable care could
not have known, of the misstatement or omission. 4
Historically, section 12(2) has been little more than a weak
stepsister to the private cause of action for securities fraud implied
by federal courts under section 10(b)5 of the Securities Exchange
1. Section 12(2) reads:
Any person who-
(2) offers or sells a security (whether or not exempted by the provi-
sions of section 3, other than paragraph (2) of subsection (a) thereof), by
the use of any means or instruments of transportation or communica-
tion in interstate commerce or of the mails, by means of a prospectus or
oral communication, which includes an untrue statement of a material
fact or omits to state a material fact necessary in order to make the
statements, in light of the circumstances under which they were made,
not misleading (the purchaser not knowing of such untruth or omis-
sion), and who shall not sustain the burden of proof that he did not
know, and in the exercise of reasonable care could not have known, of
such untruth or omission, shall be liable to the person purchasing such
security from him, who may sue either at law or in equity in any court
of competent jurisdiction, to recover the consideration paid for such
security with interest thereon, less the amount of any income received
thereon, upon the tender of such security, or for damages if he no
longer owns the security.
Securities Act of 1933 § 12(2), 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1976) [hereinafter referred to as
section 12(2)].
2. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77(a)-(mm) (1976) [hereinafter referred
to as the 1933 Act].
3. See supra note 1.
4. See supra note 1.
5. Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the
use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the
mails, or of any facility of any national securities exchange-
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of
any security registered on a national securities exchange or any security
-not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance
in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may
prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the
protection of investors.
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976) [hereinafter referred to as section 10(b)].
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Act of 19346 and rule lOb-5 7 promulgated thereunder. 8 To the
extent that a purchaser alleges misrepresentations or omissions in
connection with acquisition of a security, section 12(2) and rule
lOb-5 may both provide potential avenues of relief.9 For many
6. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78(a)-(kk) (1976) [hereinafter
referred to as the 1934 Act].
7. Rule lOb-5, promulgated under § 10(b), supra note 5, provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or
of any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to
state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in
light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading,
or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which op-
erates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in con-
nection with the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1983) [hereinafter referred to as rule lob-5.
Unlike § 12(2), § 10(b) and rule lob-5 do not expressly provide for a private right
of action. The district court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania first implied a
private right of action under § 10(b) in Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp.
512, 514 (E.D. Pa. 1946). A majority of lower federal courts followed suit, and by
1969 ten of the eleven courts of appeals recognized the existence of an implied remedy
under § 10(b) and rule lob-5. See 6 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 3871-73
(Supp. to 2d ed. 1969) (collecting cases). The United States Supreme Court confirmed
the existence of an implied cause of action under § 10(b) and rule lob-5 in Superin-
tendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971). The
Supreme Court recently reaffirmed recognition of such a cause of action in Herman &
MacLean v. Huddleston, 103 S. Ct. 683, 687 (1983) ("The existence of this implied
remedy is simply beyond peradventure.").
8. Professor Donald E. Schwartz aptly described the underdeveloped state of
the interpretative history of § 12(2) as follows:
In talking about Section 12(2), I can analogize to the Israeli's revi-
val of the long-dead Hebrew language. Like Hebrew, Section 12(2) was
long neglected and, consequently, it is now in a retarded state of devel-
opment. When David Ratner's casebook came out a couple of years
ago it did not even mention Section 12(2), which seems to me to have
been an appropriate allocation of resources because the vast expansion
of litigation under Rule lOb-5 meant that section was not very impor-
tant. This is a situation that is unlikely to continue.
PLI, NINTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES REGULATION 341, 348 (A. Fleischer,
Jr., M. Lipton, B. Vandegrift eds. 1978). See also Kaminsky, An Anaysis of Securities
Litigation under Section 12(2) and How It Compares with Rule lOb-5, 13 Hous. L.
REV. 231, 231 (1976).
9. In Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 103 S. Ct. 683 (1983), the Supreme
Court held that the availability of an express remedy under § 11 of the 1933 Act, 15
U.S.C. § 77k (1976), does not preclude a defrauded purchaser from maintaining an
implied action under rule lOb-5. Id. at 690. The Court's rationale in Huddleston
supports a cumulative construction of the remedies in § 12(2) and rule lob-5 as well.
The majority of courts which considered this question prior to Huddleston so held.
See generally I A. BROMBERG & L. LOWENFELS, infra note 11, at §§ 2.4 (220), 2.4
(420). For a recent decision prior to Huddleston supporting a cumulative construction
of § 12(2) and rule IOb-5, see Berger v. Bishop Inv. Corp., 695 F.2d 302 (8th Cir.
1982). For two recent decisions subsequent to Huddleston which support a cumula-
tive construction of § 12(2) and rule lOb-5, see Amunrud v. Taurus Drilling Ltd.,
UCLA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:921
years, however, the interpretative history of section 12(2) re-
mained largely in a state of arrest, eclipsed by the ever-burgeoning
volume of litigation brought under rule lOb-5.10 Lower federal
courts became embroiled in the task of delineating the parameters
of the private cause of action which they had judicially created
under the rule. These courts expansively interpreted rule 1Ob-5,
which became the premier weapon in a plaintiff's arsenal.II
In the mid-1970s, however, the Supreme Court began to take
a more restrictive approach towards interpretation of the scope of
coverage and the protection afforded by the federal securities
laws.' 2 In recent securities law opinions the Court has relied on
1983 FED. SEC. L. REP. CCH 99,649, at 97,596 (D. Mont. Dec. 23, 1983); In re
Longhorn Sec. Litig., 1983 FED. SEC. L. REP. CCH 99,630, at 97,481 (W.D. Okla.
Sept. 28, 1983). The decision in Huddleston is further discussed infra note 14 and in
text accompanying notes 402-410.
10. See supra note 8.
11. See generally 1 A. BROMBERG & L. LOWENFELS, SECURITIES FRAUD AND
COMMODITIEs FRAUD § 2.2 (462) (1983) (tracing chronologically from the 1940s to
the mid-1970s the most significant lower federal court opinions, administrative deci-
sions of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and United States Supreme
Court opinions expansively interpreting rule lOb-5).
As noted therein, the bulk of expansionist activity during this period occurred at
the lower federal court level. However, the only two Supreme Court decisions which
addressed the parameters of the implied remedy under rule lOb-5 during this period
took a similarly expansive approach. See Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406
U.S. 128 (1972) (relaxing the reliance requirement in cases of nondisclosure under
§ 10(b)); Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971)
(recognizing the existence of an implied remedy under § 10(b) and finding under
somewhat tenuous circumstances that a complaint sufficiently alleged an adequate
connection between the alleged fraudulent activity and the sales transaction for pur-
poses of withstanding a motion to dismiss).
The Supreme Court's securities law opinions outside the area of the implied rem-
edy under rule lOb-5 also exhibited expansionist tendencies during this period. See,
e.g., Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970) (causation requirement in an
implied private cause of action under rule 14a-9, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1983), is
satisfied if the proxy solicitation itself, rather than the particular defect, is an essential
link in the accomplishment of the transaction); SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S.
453 (1969) (confirming SEC's power to regulate the activities of insurance compa-
nies); J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964) (recognizing implied private cause of
action for damages under § 14(a) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1976)); SEC v.
Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180 (1963) (upholding requirement
that registered investment advisers disclose personal financial interest in recom-
mended securities under Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-l-80b-21
(1976)).
12. See, e.g., Dirks v. SEC, 103 S. Ct. 3255 (1983) (reaffirming and delineating in
the context of a tipping situation the holding in Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S.
222 (1980), that silence is actionable under § 10(b) only in the presence of a duty to
disclose); Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680 (1980) (proof of scienter is required in an in-
junctive action by the SEC under § 10(b) of the 1934 Act and under § 17(a)(l) of the
1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(1) (1976)); Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222
(1980) (silence is actionable under § 10(b) only in the presence of a duty to disclose);
Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979) (no implied pri-
vate cause of action for damages under § 206 of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940,
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precise statutory language. It has refrained from engaging in ex-
pansive interpretation of statutory provisions without evidence of
specific legislative intent. Moreover, it has exhibited a concern for
interpreting statutory provisions in the context of the total statu-
tory scheme of which they are a part. 13 In the area of rule lob-5
15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (1976)); limited implied private cause of action to void an invest-
ment adviser's contract under § 215 of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C.
§ 80b-15 (1976)); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979) (no implied
private cause of action under § 17(a) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78q(a) (1976));
Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471 (1979) (state corporate law may give independent direc-
tors of an investment company power to terminate a shareholder derivative suit
against the company's other directors to the extent such law is consistent with the
policies of the Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-l-80a-64 (1976)
and the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-l-80b-21 (1976)); Interna-
tional Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551 (1979) (employee interest in a com-
pulsory, noncontributory pension plan is not a "security" within the contemplation of
the 1933 or 1934 Acts); SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103 (1978) (under § 12(k) of the 1934
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 781(k) (1976), SEC is limited to one ten-day summary suspension of
trading in a security based upon a single set of circumstances); Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v.
Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977) (absent fraud, misrepresentation, or deception, a breach of
fiduciary duty is not actionable under § 10(b)); Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430
U.S. 1 (1977) (defeated tender offeror lacks standing to bring a private cause of action
for damages under § 14(e) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1976)); TSC Indus.,
Inc., v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976) (standard of proof of materiality is
heightened in the context of a private cause of action under rule 14a-9 of the 1934
Act, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1983), to require a showing of substantial likelihood that
a reasonable shareholder would consider the disputed information important in de-
termining how to vote); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976) (scienter
required in implied private cause of action under § 10(b) and rule 1Ob-5); Rondeau v.
Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49 (1975) (proof of irreparable harm required for
issuance of an injunction against violation of § 13(d)(1) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78m(d)(1) (1976)); United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975)
(shares of stock in a nonprofit housing cooperative are not "securities" within the
1933 or 1934 Acts); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975)
(plaintiff must be a purchaser or seller of securities in order to bring an implied pri-
vate cause of action for damages under § 10(b)); Securities Investor Protection Corp.
v. Barbour, 421 U.S. 412 (1975) (no implied private cause of action under the Securi-
ties Investor Protection Act of 1970, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78aaa-78111 (1976)).
There have been a few aberrations in this relatively steady stream of opinions
restricting the scope and effect of the federal securities laws. See, e.g., Herman &
MacLean v. Huddleston, 103 S. Ct. 683 (1983) (availability of an express remedy
under § 11 of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1976), does not preclude implied private
cause of action under rule lOb-5; defrauded purchasers bringing an implied private
cause of action under rule lOb-5 need prove their claim only by a preponderance of
the evidence); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353
(1982) (implied private right of action recognized under Commodity Exchange Act, 7
U.S.C. §§ 1-26 (1976)); Rubin v. United States, 449 U.S. 424 (1981) (pledge of stock
as collateral for loan is "offer or sale" of security under § 17(a) of the 1933 Act, 15
U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1976)); United States v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768 (1979) (section 17(a)
of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1976), applies to a short seller's fraud against
brokers and is not limited to new offerings of securities).
13. See cases restricting the scope and effect of the federal securities laws cited
supra note 12; see also Freeman, .4 Study in Contrasts: The Warren and Burger
Courts'Approach to the Securities Laws, 83 DICK. L. REV. 183, 198 (1979); Lowenfels,
Recent Supreme Court Decisions Under the Federal Securities Laws.- The Pendulum
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this penchant towards retrenchment has resulted in a series of
opinions from the Supreme Court which have consistently tight-
ened the requirements for a prima facie claim under the rule. 14
Swings, 65 GEO. L.J. 891 (1977); Note, The Supreme Court's Trimming of the Section
10(b) Tree. The Cultivation of a New Securities Law Perspective, 3 J. CORP. L. 112,
132 (1977).
14. See Dirks v. SEC, 103 S. Ct. 3255 (1983) (reaffirming and delineating in the
context of a tipping situation the holding in Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222
(1980), that silence is actionable under § 10(b) only in the presence of a duty to dis-
close); Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680 (1980) (proof of scienter is required in an injunc-
tive action by the SEC under § 10(b) of the 1934 Act and under § 17(a)(1) of the 1933
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(1) (1976)); Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980)
(silence is actionable under § 10(b) only in the presence of a duty to disclose); Santa
Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977) (absent fraud, misrepresentation, or
deception, a breach of fiduciary duty is not actionable under § 10(b)); Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976) (scienter required in implied private cause of action
under § 10(b) and rule lOb-5); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723
(1975) (plaintiff must be a purchaser or seller of securities in order to bring an implied
private cause of action for damages under § 10(b)).
At first blush, the opinion of the Supreme Court in Herman & MacLean v. Hud-
dleston, 103 S. Ct. 683 (1983), may seem to fall somewhat outside the mainstream of
recent restrictive opinions in the area of rule lOb-5. Huddleston involved the relation-
ship between the implied remedy under rule lob-5 and the express remedies under
the 1933 Act, a somewhat different question than that posed in the restrictive opinions
cited above, each of which addressed the substantive scope or the requisite elements
of a rule lOb-5 claim. The Court held in Huddleston that the availability of a private
express remedy under § 11 of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1976), does not bar
availability of an implied private right of action under rule lOb-5. id. at 690.
However, on further analysis, the Court's conclusion in Huddleston is not neces-
sarily inconsistent with its recent restrictive rule lob-5 decisions. In concluding that
the remedies in the 1933 and 1934 Acts should be construed cumulatively, the Court
relied heavily upon the differences in scope and burden of proof under § 11 of the
1933 Act and rule lOb-5. The Court noted that in the wake of such opinions as Ernst
& Ernst v. Hochfelder, a plaintiff suing under rule lOb-5 bears a heavier burden of
proof than a plaintiff suing under § 11. Id. at 687-88. In light of such differences, the
Court reasoned that a cumulative construction of the remedies under § 11 and rule
lOb-5 does not present nullification problems. Id. at 688-89.
See infra text accompanying notes 402-418 for a discussion of why the Court's
analysis in Huddleston argues against the expanded seller cases examined in this Arti-
cle, which relax the privity requirement in § 12(2) while still allowing the plaintiff to
enjoy the reduced burden of proof available under that section.
The analysis in Huddleston can be reconciled with the Supreme Court's other-
wise restrictive rule lOb-5 opinions, on the ground that it is the increased burden of
proof on a plaintiff under rule lOb-5 which permits a cumulative construction. It is
nonetheless true that the language of the Court in Huddleston is at times reminiscent
of the Court's more expansionist days:
A cumulative construction of the securities laws also furthers their
broad remedial purposes. . . . The effectiveness of the broad proscrip-
tion against fraud in Section 10(b) would be undermined if its scope
were restricted by the existence of an express remedy under Section 11.
Yet we have repeatedly recognized that securities laws combating fraud
should be construed "not technically and restrictively, but flexibly to
effectuate their remedial purposes." We therefore reject an interpreta-
tion of the securities laws that displaces an action under Section 10(b).
103 S. Ct. at 689-90 (1983) (citations and footnotes omitted). See also id. at 690 n.23
(rejecting the maxim of statutory construction, expressio unius est exclusio alterius).
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In the wake of the Court's restrictive opinions on the scope of
rule 1Ob-5, section 12(2) merits new attention.' 5 The weak stepsis-
ter may prove to be a potential Cinderella for defrauded purchas-
ers. When the proof required under section 12(2)16 is compared
with the proof now required under rule 1Ob-5,1 7 it becomes appar-
ent that in those factual situations in which either provision may
15. See generally Kaminsky, supra note 8.
16. The elements of an express action under § 12(2) arise from the face of the
statute. See supra note I and accompanying text. In summary, a purchaser is entitled
to rescission from his seller (or in the event the purchaser no longer owns the security,
to a measure of damages equivalent to rescission) if the purchaser can establish that
(1) the seller used interstate commerce or the mails, (2) to offer or sell a security to the
purchaser, (3) by means of a prospectus or oral communication which misstated or
omitted to state a material fact, (4) of which the purchaser did not have knowledge,
unless (5) the seller establishes that he did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable
care could not have known, of the misstatement or omission. See generally Kamin-
sky, supra note 8.
17. In contrast to the express action under § 12(2), the elements of an implied
claim under § 10(b) and rule lOb-5 do not all arise from the face of the statute or the
text of the rule. They are in large part a product of judicial development and thus
have changed over time. After characterizing implied private actions under rule lOb-
5 as "a judicial oak which has grown from little more than a legislative acorn," Blue
Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975), Justice Rehnquist went
on to note:
[A]s we have pointed out, we are not dealing here with any private right
created by the express language of section 10(b) or of Rule lob-5. No
language in either of those provisions speaks at all to the contours of a
private cause of action for their violation. . . . We are dealing with a
private cause of action which has been judicially found to exist, and
which will have to be judicially delimited one way or another unless
and until Congress addresses the question.
Id. at 748-49.
Volumes have been written on the elements, defenses, and measure of damages
applicable to an implied action under rule lob-5. See generally 3 L. Loss, SECURI-
TIES REGULATION 1448-74, 1763-97 (2d ed. 1961); 3 A. BROMBERG & L. LOWENFELS,
supra note 11, at §§ 8.1-8.9; 4 id. §§ 9.1-9.3, 11.2, 11.5; 5 A. JACOBS, LITIGATION AND
PRACTICE UNDER RULE lob-5 §§ 36-40.09 (2d ed. revised 1983).
However, stripped to bare essentials, the requirements most frequently men-
tioned for proof of an implied claim under rule lob-5 include the following:
(1) Plaintiff must be a purchaser or seller of a security. See Blue Chip Stamps v.
Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 733-34 (1975);
(2) While some early decisions limited the scope of parties defendant by a priv-
ity requirement, privity is no longer required. See 3 A. BROMBERG & L. LOWENFELS,
supra note 11, at § 8.5(511). Primary liability extends to violative conduct by "any
person." See text of rule lOb-5, supra note 7. Additionally, a plaintiff can sue persons
whose involvement in the violative conduct is only secondary under principles of aid-
ing and abetting or conspiracy. See generally Ruder, Multiple Defendants in Securities
Law Fraud Cases.- Aiding and Abetting, Conspiracy, In Pari Delicto, Indemnification,
and Contribution, 120 U. PA. L. REV. 597 (1972) (distinguishing primary and secon-
dary liability and discussing the elements of an aiding and abetting and conspiracy
claim); see also infra notes 318-320 and accompanying text. But see Fischel, Secon-
dary Liability Under Section 10(b) of the Securities Act of 1934, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 80
(1981) (rejecting the viability of secondary liability theories in light of recent Supreme
Court decisions strictly interpreting the federal securities laws); Comment, Rule 10b-5
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be used,'8 section 12(2) offers certain decided advantages to a dis-
Liability after Hochfelder." Abandoning the Concept ofAiding andAbetting, 45 U. CHI.
L. REV. 218 (1977);
(3) Plaintiff must establish a violation of one of the three prohibitory subsections
of the rule. See text of rule I Ob-5, supra note 7. This most typically takes the form of
an allegation that the defendant misstated or omitted to state a material fact. Where
plaintiff alleges an omission, silence on the part of the defendant is only actionable if
the defendant is under a duty to disclose. See Dirks v. SEC, 102 S. Ct. 3255, 3261
(1983); Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 230 (1980). Materiality of the mis-
stated or omitted information is tested according to whether there is a substantial
likelihood that a reasonable investor or shareholder would consider the information
important in deciding to purchase or sell. See TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426
U.S. 438, 449 (1976);
(4) Plaintiff must establish use of interstate commerce, the mails or a facility of a
national securities exchange in some part of the transaction. See text of rule lOb-5,
supra note 7;
(5) Plaintiff must establish that the violation of the substantive prohibition of
rule lob-5 was "in connection with the purchase or sale of a security." See text of
rule lOb-5, supra note 7. This "in connection with" language was given its broadest
scope during the era of expansive interpretation of rule lob-5 in Superintendent of
Ins. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12-13 (1971);
(6) Plaintiff must establish reliance. See 3 A. BROMBERG & L. LOWENFELS,
supra note 11, at § 8.6(1). This requirement is relaxed in cases involving omissions by
a presumption in favor of reliance upon proof of materiality and a duty to disclose.
See Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 154 (1972). Some courts
have also relaxed the reliance requirement by allowing a plaintiff to establish reliance
on the integrity of the market, as opposed to reliance on the disputed information.
See Shores v. Sklar, 610 F.2d 235 (5th Cir. 1980),petition for reh'g en banc granted,
617 F.2d 441 (5th Cir. 1980), vacated and remanded, 647 F.2d 462, 469-70 (5th Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 936 (1983); Panzirer v. Wolf, 663 F.2d 365 (2d Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1107 (1982); Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891 (9th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 816 (1976). See generally Rapp, Rule 10b-5 and "Fraud-on-the-
Market"--Heavy Seas Meet Tranquil Shores, 39 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 861 (1982);
Note, The Fraud-on-the-Market Theory, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1143 (1982);
(7) Plaintiff must establish scienter on the part of the defendant, i.e., a mental
state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud. A showing of negligence is
insufficient. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976). The Supreme
Court left open the question of whether reckless conduct may subject a defendant to
liability in this context. Id. at 193-94 n.12. In the wake of Hochfelder, numerous
courts have held that reckless behavior is sufficient for liability. See 3B H.S. BLOO-
MENTHAL, SECURITIES AND FEDERAL CORPORATE LAW § 9.21 [4][f] (1983).
18. Section 10(b) applies on its face to the purchase or sale of any security
whether or not registered on a national securities exchange. See text of § 10(b), supra
note 5. This would encompass securities sold by an issuer in a primary distribution,
whether or not such securities are registered under the 1933 Act. See, e.g., Herman &
MacLean v. Huddleston, 103 S. Ct. 683 (1983), which upheld the existence of an im-
plied claim under rule lOb-5 for alleged fraud in a registration statement, notwith-
standing the express remedy for fraud in registration statements provided by § 11 of
the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1976). Section 10(b) and rule lob-5 also encompass
secondary resales of securities, whether traded on a national securities exchange, in
the over-the-counter securities market, or in a private transaction involving the secur-
ities of a closely-held corporation. See generally R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, SECURI-
TIES REGULATION 809-10 (5th ed. 1982).
Except for securities covered by § 3(a)(2) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(2)
(1976), which are specifically exempted from the reach of § 12(2), § 12(2) on its face
applies to the offer or sale of any security. See text of § 12(2), supra note 1. Thus,
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satisfied purchaser.'9
In contrast to rule lOb-5, a purchaser in a section 12(2) action
does not have to prove that he relied upon the misstatement or
omission in question in making his purchase. 20 A section 12(2)
plaintiff is only required to establish that he lacked actual knowl-
edge of the misstatement or omission.2'
Perhaps more significantly, a plaintiff in an action under sec-
tion 12(2) does not bear the onus of establishing scienter on the
part of the defendant as is now required for a successful lOb-5
claim. 22 The purchaser in a section 12(2) action is relieved of any
subject to this exception and limited to the sales side of a transaction, § 12(2) is coex-
tensive in coverage with rule lOb-5 in terms of applying to both primary distributions
of securities, whether or not registered under the 1933 Act, and secondary resales of
securities, whether traded on a national securities exchange, in the over-the-counter
securities market, or in a private transaction involving the securities of a closely held
corporation.
At least one commentator, however, has questioned whether § 12(2) does in fact
cover the aftermarket. See Steinberg, The Propriety and Scope of Cumulative Reme-dies under the Federal Securities Laws, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 557, 585 n.179 (1982);Steinberg, Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 after Naftalin and Redington, 68GEO. L. J. 163, 180 (1979). Pointing to the holding in United States v. Naftalin, 441U.S. 768 (1979) (§ 17(a) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1976), applies to
aftermarket trading), Steinberg queries whether or not the Supreme Court's charac-
terization of § 17(a) as a major departure from the 1933 Act's regulation of initial
offerings suggests that § 12(2) applies only to initial distributions. However, the com-
mentator ultimately concludes that the plain language of the statute, coupled with the
weight of judicial and scholarly authority, argues against such a construction.
While § 12(2), like § 10(b) and rule 1Ob-5, potentially applies to both primary
distributions and secondary resales, this Article advocates a return to a relatively strictprivity requirement for § 12(2), and therefore impacts on the ultimate availability of§ 12(2), as compared with rule lOb-5, which does not require privity. For example, in
a primary distribution undertaken through a firm commitment underwriting, a strictprivity approach to § 12(2) limits each link in the distributive chain to a § 12(2) claim
only against his immediate seller. See 3 L. Loss, supra note 17, at 1719-20. See, e.g.,Unicorn Field, Inc. v. Cannon Group, Inc., 60 F.R.D. 217, 222-23 (S.D.N.Y. 1973);Kramer v. Scientific Control Corp., 365 F. Supp. 780, 791 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Dorfman
v. First Boston Corp., 336 F. Supp. 1089, 1091-93 (E.D. Pa. 1972). Similarly, while§ 12(2) can reach a secondary resale, the privity requirement would undercut its
availability in open market purchases since it is usually impossible to trace the actual
seller in such transactions. See Hazen, A Look Beyond the Pruning of Rule lob-5:
Implied Remedies and Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, 64 VA. L. REV. 641,664 (1978). See, e.g., DuPont v. Wyly, 61 F.R.D. 615, 625 (D. Del. 1973).
19. See infra text accompanying notes 20-25.
20. See, e.g., Wigand v. Flo-Tek, Inc., 609 F.2d 1028, 1034 (2d Cir. 1980); Alton
Box Bd. Co. v. Goldman, Sachs, & Co., 560 F.2d 916, 923 (8th Cir. 1977); Woodward
v. Wright, 266 F.2d 108, 116 (10th Cir. 1959). See generally 3 L. Loss, supra note 17,
at 1702-04; id. at 3832; Kaminsky, supra note 8, at 264-66.
21. See text of § 12(2), supra note 1. See generally Kaminsky, supra note 8, at
266-74.
22. See, e.g., Franklin Sav. Bank of New York v. Levy, 551 F.2d 521, 526-27, 529(2d Cir. 1977); Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Hutton, 297 F. Supp. 1165, 1219 (D. Md.
1968), afl'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 422 F.2d 1124 (4th Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 416 U.S. 916 (1974).
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burden of introducing evidence regarding the seller's state of
mind.23 Rather, this burden is allocated to the defendant seller
who will be held liable unless he establishes by way of affirmative
defense that he did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable
care could not have known, of the misstatement or omission.
24
Section 12(2) thus imposes liability on a seller for negligence, a
clearly insufficient degree of culpability for liability under rule
lOb-5 after the Supreme Court's decision in Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder.25
A defrauded purchaser in a section 12(2) action does face one
substantive hurdle not present in a rule lOb-5 claim.26 This hur-
dle is the privity requirement arising from the express language of
section 12(2), which on its face significantly limits the reach of the
statute with respect to potential defendants.
2 7
In pertinent part section 12(2) provides as follows:
Sec. 12 Any person who-
(2) offers or sells a security . . . shall be liable to the per-
son purchasing such security from him, who may sue either at
law or in equity in any court of competent jurisdiction, to re-
cover the consideration paid for such security with interest
thereon, upon the tender of such security, or for damages if he
no longer owns the security. 28
23. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 431 (1953).
24. See, e.g., Woodward v. Wright, 266 F.2d 108, 116 (10th Cir. 1959); Johns
Hopkins Univ. v. Hutton, 297 F. Supp. 1165, 1219 (D. Md. 1968), qfl'd in part and
rev'd in part on other grounds, 422 F.2d 1124 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 916
(1974); Gould v. Tricon, 272 F. Supp. 385, 392-93 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). See generally,
Kaminsky, supra note 8, at 275-78.
25. 425 U.S. 185 (1976). See supra note 17 for a discussion of the holding in
Hochfelder.
26. In addition to the substantive hurdle of privity with which this Article deals,
a plaintiff in a § 12(2) action encounters two procedural requirements not encoun-
tered in a rule lOb-5 claim. First, a § 12(2) plaintiff is subject to the statute of limita-
tions found in § 13 of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77m (1976) (action must be brought
within one year of discovery of the false statement or omission or after discovery
should have been made, but in no event more than three years after the sale). This
imposes a shorter period of time in many cases than the periods adopted by courts
under state statutes of limitation for purposes of implied private actions under rule
lOb-5. For a discussion of applicable statutes of limitation in the context of implied
actions under rule lOb-5, see 5C A. JAcoBs, supra note 17, at § 235.02. Second, a
§ 12(2) plaintiff is subject to the provision in § I I(e) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 77k(e) (1976), under which a court may require an undertaking for the payment of
costs, including attorney's fees, or may award such costs to a successful litigant in the
event the suit or defense is found to be without merit. Section 1 (e) does not relate to
implied claims under rule lOb-5. See generally 5C A. JACOBS, supra note 17, at
§§ 293-94, 302.02, regarding security for expenses and costs and availability of attor-
ney's fees in implied actions under rule lOb-5.
27. 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1976). For the full text of § 12(2), see supra note 1.
28. Id.
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Except as expanded by the controlling persons provision in section
15,29 the language of section 12(2) and the rescissory nature of the
remedy which it affords seem to contemplate recovery by a pur-
chaser only from his immediate seller.30
Under a variety of rationales, a significant number of lower
federal court opinions have eroded this privity requirement. 31
Faced with conceptual barriers to the development of secondary
liability theories such as are used in the context of rule lOb-5, nu-
merous federal courts have expanded the concept of who may be
primarily liable as a seller under section 12(2) to include not only
the plaintiffs immediate vendor, but also various collateral par-
ticipants in a sale.32
29. 15 U.S.C. § 77o (1976) [hereinafter cited as section 15]. Section 15 reads:
Every person who, by or through stock ownership, agency, or
otherwise, or who, pursuant to or in connection with an agreement or
understanding with one or more other persons by or through stock
ownership, agency, or otherwise, controls any person liable under sec-
tions 77k or 77/ of this title, shall also be liable jointly and severally
with and to the same extent as such controlled person to any person to
whom such controlled person is liable, unless the controlling person
had no knowledge of or reasonable ground to believe in the existence of
the facts by reason of which the liability of the controlled person is
alleged to exist.
Id.
Section 15 as originally enacted contained no defense. H.R. Rep. No. 152, 73d
Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1933). When the 1934 Act was passed, an amendment to § 15
added the defense. Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 908 (1934).
30. See text of § 12(2), supra note 1. Cases which support this strict interpreta-
tion of the privity requirement include Collins v. Signetic Corp., 605 F.2d 110, 113-14
(3d Cir. 1979); Benoay v. Decker, 517 F. Supp. 490, 494 (E.D. Mich. 1981); Kramer v.
Scientific Control Corp., 452 F. Supp. 812, 814 (E.D. Pa. 1978); Federman v. Empire
Fire and Marine Ins. Co., [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. [CCH]
94,822 at 96,751 (S.D.N.Y. Oct, 17, 1974); Kramer v. Scientific Control Corp., 365 F.
Supp. 780, 791 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Unicorn Field, Inc. v. Cannon Group, Inc., 60 F.R.D.
217, 222 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Dorfman v. First Boston Corp., 336 F. Supp. 1089, 1091-93
(E.D. Pa. 1972); American Bank & Trust Co. v. Joste, 323 F. Supp. 843, 846 (W.D.
La. 1970); Barlas v. Bear, Stearns & Co., [1964-1966 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 91,674 at 95,477 (N.D. Ill. March 31, 1966); Winter v. D.J. & M. Inv.
and Constr. Corp., 185 F. Supp. 943, 946-47 (S.D. Cal. 1960).
31. See generally Phillips and Hanback, Remediesfor Defrauded Purchasers, 12
REV. SEC. REG. 953 (1979); Rapp, Expanded Liability under Section 12 ofthe Securi-
ties Act. When Is a Seller Not a Seller?, 27 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 445 (1977); Com-
ment, Secondary Liability under Section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933, 78 Nw.
U.L. REV. 832 (1983); Note, Seller Liability Under Section 12(2) ofthe Securities Act of
1933. 4 Proximate Cause-Substantial Factor Approach Limited by a Duty of Inquiry,
36 VAND. L. REV. 361 (1983); Comment, Attorneys and Participant Liability under
§ 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933, 1982 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 529 (1982); Note, Securities
Regulation-Corporate Attorney Who Actively Negotiated Merger Transaction Held a
"Seller" Within Scope oSection 12(2) ofthe Securities Act o/1933- Junker v. Crory,
650 F2d 1349 (5th Cir. 1981), 55 TEMP. L.Q. 528 (1982); Note, An Expanded View of
Section 12(2) Liability: Junker v. Crory, 1982 B.Y.U. L. REV. 991 (1982).
32. The cases which relax the privity requirement by expanding the concept of
who besides the immediate vendor may be deemed a seller for purposes of primary
liability under § 12(2) are treated infra in Sections I and II of this Article, and are
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The earliest decisions in this vein held that brokers acting on
behalf of principals could be liable as sellers because the statutory
definition of the operative term "sell" encompassed actions which
could be taken by someone other than the vendor of the security.
33
Later decisions abandon any pretext of statutory definition as the
touchstone of their analysis and develop a number of different
tests for holding collateral participants primarily liable as section
12(2) sellers. While these tests vary in formulation, each test fo-
cuses in some way on the role of the collateral participant in facili-
tating the sales transactions. 34 Moving full circle, a number of
recent opinions, instead of expanding the definition of who may
be primarily liable as a section 12(2) seller, use secondary liability
theories of aiding and abetting and conspiracy in a section 12(2)
action to reach collateral participants in a sale.35
The cases expanding the concept of who may be primarily
liable as a section 12(2) seller and the cases embracing theories of
secondary liability significantly broaden the potential reach of sec-
tion 12(2). Both lines of authority circumvent the privity require-
ment and widen the circle of potential defendants in a section
12(2) action. They thus sidestep the principal substantive restric-
tion which constrains the scope of section 12(2) as compared with
rule lOb-5. Moreover, the expanded seller decisions accomplish
sometimes collectively referred to herein as the "expanded seller cases" or the "ex-
panded seller decisions."
33. See infra notes 36-100 and accompanying text (the brokerage cases).
34. See infra notes 113-185 and accompanying text (the participation theory);
notes 186-290 and accompanying text (the proximate cause theory); notes 291-314
and accompanying text (the Eighth Circuit theory). The cases decided under these
three theories are sometimes collectively referred to in this Article as the "facilitation
cases" or the "later expanded seller decisions," as distinct from the brokerage cases.
35. See infra notes 318-350 and accompanying text. A helpful definitional dis-
tinction between primary and secondary liability is offered in Ruder, supra note 17, at
600:
In most multiple defendant securities law suits some of the defend-
ants will be primarily engaged in the wrongdoing, while others will be
engaged only in a secondary fashion . . . . [P]ersons owing direct du-
ties to the public will be classified as primary wrongdoers. Those whose
liabilities arise only because another has violated the law will be called
secondary wrongdoers.
Id.
"Secondary liability" is used throughout this Article to refer to judicially-implied
civil liability imposed under theories of aiding and abetting and conspiracy upon sec-
ondary wrongdoers, as distinct from the statutory secondary liability expressly im-
posed on controlling persons under § 15 of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77o (1976), and
§ 20(a) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77t(a) (1976). See Fischel, supra note 17, at 80
n.4.
The cases which relax the privity requirement in § 12(2) by embracing theories of
secondary liability are discussed infra in Section III of this Article and are sometimes
collectively referred to herein as the "secondary liability opinions," in contrast to the
expanded seller cases. See supra note 32.
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this while at the same time allowing the plaintiff to enjoy the re-
duced burden of proof available under section 12(2).
With the possible exception of the early brokerage decisions,
however, the analysis of section 12(2) contained in the expanded
seller cases and secondary liability opinions fails when examined
under the tenets of statutory construction used by the present
Supreme Court. The precise statutory language of section 12(2)
and the rescissory nature of the remedy provided therein support
a relatively strict privity requirement. There is no evidence of spe-
cific legislative intent to argue for a more expansive approach.
Moreover, an expansive approach does not support a construction
of section 12(2) consistent with its place in the statutory frame-
work of antifraud provisions.
This Article examines the origin, development, and varying
rationales of the expanded seller cases and the secondary liability
opinions under section 12(2). It then analyzes these decisions
under the principles of statutory interpretation used by the present
Supreme Court. It concludes that while it may be tempting to
relax the privity requirement of section 12(2) in order to recoup
for purchasers some of the ground lost under the now tightened
rule lOb-5, such an approach is an unwarranted extension of the
statute.
I. EARLY INROADS ON THE PRIVITY REQUIREMENT: THE
BROKERAGE DECISIONS
The first incursion on the section 12(2) privity requirement
came in cases in which a dissatisfied purchaser sued a broker or
other selling agent in lieu of, or in addition to, suing the actual
principal. 36 These cases rejected contentions on the part of the
36. See, e.g., Katz v. Amos Treat & Co., 411 F.2d 1046, 1052-53 (2d Cir. 1969)
(judgment dismissing complaint under § 12(1) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 771(1)
(1976) and under § 12(2) reversed; claim stated against brokerage firm and the indi-
vidual defendants affiliated with the firm under the analysis of Cady v. Murphy, 30 F.
Supp. 466 (D. Me. 1939), aft'd, 113 F.2d 988 (ist Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 705
(1940), infra notes 39-61 and accompanying text; claim stated against defendant at-
torney under participation theory, infra notes 154-172 and accompanying text); Johns
Hopkins Univ. v. Hutton, 297 F. Supp. 1165, 1209 (D. Md. 1968), ajfd in part, rev'din
part on other grounds, 422 F.2d 1124 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 916 (1974)
(summary judgment under § 12(2) entered against brokerage firm under analysis of
Cady v. Murphy, 30 F. Supp. 466 (D. Me. 1939), aft'd, 113 F.2d 988 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 311 U.S. 705 (1940), discussed infra notes 39-61 and accompanying text); Wall
v. Wagner, 125 F. Supp. 854 (D. Neb. 1954), af'd sub nom. Whittaker v. Wall, 226
F.2d 868 (8th Cir. 1955) (judgment under § 12(1) of the 1933 Act entered against
selling corporation as principal and against corporate president and a selling agent of
the corporation as agents of the seller under analysis of Cady v. Murphy, infra notes
39-61 and accompanying text; however, in Whittaker, liability of the corporate presi-
dent is discussed at the appellate level in terms of his status as a control person under
§ 15 of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77o (1976), rather than in terms of his status as the
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broker-agents that they could not be liable under section 12 be-
cause they had not functioned as principals selling for their own
accounts. 37 While several courts have reached this result,38 the
first case to consider the question offers the most extensive exposi-
tion of the analysis involved.
In Cady v. Murphy39 the plaintiff, Murphy, was a small secur-
ities broker in Maine. Rhoades & Company, a brokerage firm
with whom Murphy had dealt extensively in the past, contacted
Murphy. The head trader, Lynch, knew that Murphy was inter-
ested in a stock with some speculative possibilities. Lynch ap-
prised Murphy of an investment opportunity in South American
Utilities Corporation. During several telephone conversations,
Lynch made a number of favorable but false statements about the
company to Murphy.40
Following these conversations, Murphy purchased voting
trust certificates for common stock in South American Utilities
Corporation from E.E. Smith & Company, a small unlisted dealer
in New York. The purchase was effected through Rhoades &
Company, which collected a brokerage commission on the
transaction.4'
The certificates proved to be without substantial value, and
seller's agent); Cady v. Murphy, 30 F. Supp. 466 (D. Me. 1939), aft'd, 113 F.2d 988
(1st Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 705 (1940).
37. See supra note 36.
38. See supra note 36.
39. 30 F. Supp. 466 (D. Me. 1939), a9'd, 113 F.2d 988 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 311
U.S. 705 (1940).
40. 113 F.2d at 989-90.
41. 30 F. Supp. at 467-68, 113 F.2d at 989-90. There was some conflict in the
testimony with respect to whether or not Rhoades & Company functioned as a princi-
pal in the transaction, as agent for the seller E.E. Smith & Company, as agent for the
buyer Murphy, or as a dual agent. Murphy sought to prove that Rhoades & Com-
pany purchased the shares in issue for its own account from E.E. Smith & Company
and then resold the shares to him as principal. In contrast, Lynch testified that E.E.
Smith & Company contacted him and asked him if he could find a buyer for the
stock. He in turn contacted Murphy and quoted to Murphy the market price of the
stock. Murphy asked if the stock could be obtained any cheaper, and Lynch indi-
cated that he would try. Lynch testified that he told Murphy that if he was going to
buy the stock for Murphy, he would act as an agent in the transaction. The two then
agreed upon a commission. 113 F.2d at 990.
The district court chose not to resolve the conflict in evidence, finding that the
stock was sold to Murphy by Rhoades & Company either as owner or as broker. 30 F.
Supp. at 467. The court found the evidence insufficient to establish that Rhoades &
Company sold the stock as principal, and stated that Murphy could only recover if
§ 12 also applied to brokers when selling securities owned by others. Id. at 469. This
statement suggested that the court would expand the concept of seller to include a
seller's agent, or perhaps a dual agent, but not the buyer's broker. However, the court
went on to state that it was immaterial whether a broker functioned as a principal, as
an agent for the owner, as an agent for the purchaser, or as a dual agent. If, in the
course of soliciting an offer to buy, the broker made a false statement under the cir-
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Murphy attempted to tender them back to Rhoades & Company.
When the firm refused the tender, Murphy sold the securities at a
loss. Murphy sued Rhoades & Company and included a section
12(2) count in his complaint.42
The district court found that Lynch had effected the sale by
misrepresentation of material facts. It further found that Rhoades
& Company had not sustained the burden of proving that Lynch
did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable care could not
have known, of the falsity. 43 The court then focused on the con-
tentions of Rhoades & Company with respect to the privity
requirement.
The brokerage firm argued that section 12(2) applied only to
principals selling their own property and that Rhoades & Com-
pany did not fall within this category. 4 The firm contended that
cumstances described in § 12, the district court felt the purchaser had a right to re-
cover. Id. See infra text accompanying note 51.
At the appellate level the majority opinion noted the conflict in evidence but
found the district court's opinion broader than necessary to support the judgment.
The appellate court stated that even in Lynch's version of the transaction, Rhoades &
Company was either an agent for the seller or a dual agent. The court concluded that
in either case § 12(2) was applicable. 113 F.2d at 991. However, the appellate court
found extraneous the reference in the district court opinion to liability of a broker
acting solely for a purchaser. It chose not to address whether § 12(2) would be appli-
cable to such a broker if the broker made a misrepresentation in the course of solicit-
ing an order to buy from the purchaser. Id. The dissenting opinion argued that the
evidence supported a finding that the brokerage firm had functioned solely as an
agent for the buyer and, as such, was not a "seller" for purposes of § 12(2). Id.
Relying on the district court opinion in Cady, a state court has held that a buyer's
broker could be liable under § 12(2) for misrepresentations in solicitation of an order
to buy. Boehm v. Granger, 181 Misc. 680, 42 N.Y.S.2d 246 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1943), affd
mem., 268 A.D. 855, 50 N.Y.S.2d 845 (N.Y. App. Div. 1944).
42. 30 F. Supp. at 467, 113 F.2d at 990. Murphy's complaint also included a
common law count for deceit. The district court found that this count was not sus-
tained by the evidence since Murphy failed to establish that he could not have discov-
ered the falsity of the representations by the exercise of reasonable care. 30 F. Supp.
at 468. Such proof is not required for recovery under § 12(2). See Kaminsky, supra
note 8, at 266.
For a discussion of these and other differences between § 12(2) and the common
law remedies of deceit and rescission, see generally 3 L. Loss, supra note 17, at
1626-28, 1700-05.
43. 30 F. Supp. at 468. There is some ambiguity in the district court's opinion as
to Lynch's state of mind with respect to the statements made. Lynch testified that he
believed the favorable statements were true when ]he made them. However, the court
did note that another member of the firm referred to the stock as "junk" at about the
same time as it was sold. Id.
The court pointed out that it was not necessary to prove knowing falsity to sus-
tain an action for fraud. Recklessness would suffice. In any event, the court noted
that with respect to the § 12(2) count, the seller bears the burden of establishing that
in the exercise of due care he could not have known of the falsity. This the brokerage
firm failed to do. Id. Thus, it appears that at a minimum the district court found
Lynch negligent.
44. 30 F. Supp. at 469.
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the express language of section 12(2) mandated this construction.
It argued that the term "selling" imports ownership and that the
language in section 12(2), imposing a liability upon the seller "to
the person purchasing such security from him," referred to "a
transaction involving a transfer of title from one person to
another." 45
Noting that the question was one of first impression, the dis-
trict court conceded that it could find nothing in the legislative
history of section 12(2) which addressed this issue. 46 However, it
felt that a consideration of the language in other sections of the
1933 Act, coupled with the known purpose of Congress in passing
the 1933 Act, dictated against the narrow construction proferred
by the brokerage firm.47
In determining whether Rhoades & Company had sold the
securities in question to Murphy, the district court said that it was
not helpful to focus on the ordinary meaning of the term "sell."
Rather, it was necessary to focus on the definition and special sig-
nificance ascribed to that term in section 2(3) of the 1933 Act. 48
The court noted that this definition then included "every. . .at-
tempt or offer to dispose of, or solicitation of an offer to buy, a
security or interest in a security, for value.' '4 9 The court reasoned




48. Id. In pertinent part § 2(3) provides:
Sec. 2. When used in this subchapter, unless the context other-
wise requires...
(3) The term "sale" or "sell" shall include every contract of sale or dis-
position of a security or interest in a security, for value. The term "offer
to sell," "offer for sale," or "offer" shall include every attempt or offer
to dispose of, or solicitation of an offer to buy, a security or interest in a
security, for value.
15 U.S.C. § 77b(3) (1976) [hereinafter referred to as section 2(3)].
49. 30 F. Supp. at 469. At the time § 12(2) was originally enacted and at the time
Cady was decided, § 12(2) was prefaced "[alny person who ...sells" and § 2(3)
defined "sell" in the aggregate to include both offers and sales ("The terms 'sale,' or
'sell,' 'offer to sell' or 'offer for sale' shall include every contract of sale or disposition
of, attempt or offer to dispose of, or solicitation of an offer to buy a security or interest
in a security for value." 15 U.S.C. § 77b(3) (1934)).
In 1954, § 2(3) was amended to its current form to redefine the term "sell" so as
to distinguish between offers and sales. Act of Aug. 10, 1954, Pub. L. No. 577, § 1, 68
Stat. 687 (1954). See current text of § 2(3), supra note 48. This was done to comple-
ment changes made in § 5 of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1976), permitting certain
offers to be made after a registration statement has been filed but before it becomes
effective. Since the term "sell" was redefined in § 2(3) to separate offers from sales,
the prefatory language of § 12(2) was amended at the same time to its current form to
insert the words "offers or" before the word "sells." Act of Aug. 10, 1954, Pub. L. No.
577, § 9, 68 Stat. 687 (1954). See current text of§ 12(2),supra note 1. The committee
reports commenting on the 1954 amendments indicate that this change in § 12(2) was
merely a formal amendment to preserve existing law in light of the restructuring of
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which may be carried on by persons other than the owner of the
security itself.50
Reading the definition of "sell" in section 2(3) back into sec-
tion 12(2), the court concluded:
Whether the seller, being a broker, himself owns the secur-
ity, or whether he is acting as the agent for the owner, or for the
purchaser, or for both, is immaterial. If, in the course of an
attempt to dispose of, or solicitation of an offer to buy a secur-
ity, he makes false statements under circumstances referred to
in Section 12, the purchaser is given a right of action to recover
any damages he has suffered on account of the false
representations.
The ordinary brokerage transaction, merely the execution
of orders to buy or sell, does not appear to be affected by Sec-
tion 12. It is the extra-brokerage activity-solicitations accom-
panied by false statements-which are made the basis for a
cause of action if damage is caused thereby. 51
In affirming the decision of the district court, the First Circuit
stated that it agreed with the trial court's conclusion that section
12(2) could be interpreted as imposing liability for misrepresenta-
tions not only upon principals, but also upon brokers selling se-
curities owned by others.52 It accepted the district court's analysis
that in view of the broad definition of "sell" in section 2(3), the
solicitation by Rhoades & Company of an offer to buy from Mur-
phy brought the brokerage firm within the meaning of "person
who sells a security" for purposes of section 12(2).53 Moreover, it
stated that if Rhoades & Company, though not selling its own
property, was a "person who sells a security," it necessarily fol-
lowed that Murphy was the "person purchasing such security
from him" for purposes of the corresponding phrase in section
12(2).54
Unlike the district court, the First Circuit found it appropri-
ate to give some consideration to the ordinary meaning of the
word "sell."' 55 The court reasoned that its conclusion that a broker
acting for a principal could be a statutory seller for purposes of
section 12(2) did not strain interpretation of the statute since in
common parlance a selling agent would describe himself as a
"person who sells" even though the principal conveys legal title.56
the definition of "sell" in § 2(3). See H.R. Rep. No. 1542, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 26
(1954); S. Rep. No. 1036, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1954).
50. 30 F. Supp. at 469.
51. Id. at 469-70.
52. 113 F.2d at 990.
53. Id. at 990-91.
54. Id. at 990.
55. Id.
56. Id. The court also felt that a comparison of § 12(1) of the 1933 Act, 15
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In a final effort to escape liability through a privity argument,
Rhoades & Company argued before the court of appeals that the
nature of the remedy provided by section 12(2) limited the scope
of liability to principals and precluded recovery against an
agent. 57 The brokerage firm pointed out that the relief provided
by section 12(2) is essentially rescissory in nature. Since rescission
contemplates restoration of the status quo between principals to a
transaction, the firm contended that Congress could not have in-
tended to provide such relief against an agent of the seller.58
The First Circuit rejected this argument.5 9 The court noted
that the statute neither used the word "rescission" per se nor indi-
cated that the remedy was limited to rescission in the strict sense
of recovery between principals.60 The court saw no difficulty in
applying the statutory remedy to an agent. The court simply
stated that having effected a sale by misrepresentations, the agent
was required to take the securities from the defrauded buyer and
restore the buyer's consideration. 6'
U.S.C. § 771(1) (1976), with § 12(2) reinforced its conclusion that a broker could be
liable as a "seller" when selling securities owned by others. Id. at 990-91. Section
12(1) provides a purchaser with a rescissory remedy against a seller for securities sold
in violation of the registration requirements in § 5 of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77e
(1976). Section 12(1) has the same prefatory language with respect to scope of parties
defendant, and the same concluding language making the seller liable to the person
purchasing from him for a rescissory measure of relief, as does § 12(2).
The court hypothesized that if Rhoades & Company had sold the securities at
issue to Murphy without a registration statement, the firm would have been guilty of
selling securities in violation of § 5. The court then reasoned that Rhoades & Com-
pany, as a person who sold a security in violation of § 5, would be liable to Murphy
under § 12(1). Since the operative prefatory language with respect to the scope of
parties defendant in both § 12(1) and § 12(2) is the same, the court concluded that if
Rhoades & Company could be liable as a seller under § 12(1), that language must
mean the same thing in § 12(2). 113 F.2d at 990-91.
However, the court's reasoning in this regard is circular. The court's analogy to
§ 12(l) assumes as its premise, without authority, the very question in issue-i.e.,
whether Rhoades & Company would be deemed to have "sold" the securities in vio-
lation of § 5 for purposes of liability under § 12(1) where it acted as a broker rather
than as a principal.
Admittedly, a broker may be liable in an enforcement context for offering or
selling a security in violation of § 5. However, it does not automatically follow that a
broker should therefore be liable in an express cause of action under § 12(1). The
concluding language in both subsections of § 12 makes the person who offers or sells
the security in issue liable to the person purchasing such security from him for a
rescissory measure of relief. This language, which is not present in violation provi-
sions such as § 5, arguably establishes a context which circumscribes the terms "offer"
and "sell" as used in § 12 to the immediate vendor. See infra notes 63-92 and accom-
panying text.




61. Id. The court noted that even apart from the statute there was some common
law authority for granting rescission against the agent of a vendor. Id., citing Peter-
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Cady v. Murphy is a seminal opinion with respect to the priv-
ity requirement in section 12(2). In concluding that brokers func-
tioning as agents may be liable as sellers under section 12(2), the
decision carves out a small exception to the general rule that sec-
tion 12 contemplates an action by a purchaser only against his
immediate seller. 62 However, even the relatively narrow confines
of the opinion are not without some analytical problems.
No one would quarrel with the conclusion of the trial and
appellate courts in Cady that a broker who solicits an offer to buy
engages in an activity which falls within section 2(3). The defini-
tion of "offer" now set forth in section 2(3) admittedly includes
solicitation, which is an activity not inherently confined to the ac-
tual owner of a security.63
However, determining that the activity in question falls
within the definition of "offer" or "sell" in section 2(3) is only half
of the necessary analysis. The definitions in section 2 of the 1933
Act are preceded by the proviso "unless the context otherwise re-
quires". 64 Thus, courts must apply the definition to the defined
term and then examine the defined term in the context in which it
appears within a particular provision.65
For example, section 5 of the 1933 Act66 bars any person
from offering or selling a security except in compliance with the
registration requirements of the 1933 Act.67 Applying the defini-
son v. McManus, 187 Iowa 522, 525, 172 N.W. 460 (Iowa 1919). But see infra notes
79-92 and accompanying text.
62. See cases cited supra note 30 supporting the strict privity approach.
63. See text of § 2(3), supra note 48.
64. 15 U.S.C. § 77b (1976). Professor Loss characterizes this prefatory phrase as
an explicit reminder of a tenet of statutory construction which should always be im-
plicit in any event. 4 L. Loss, supra note 7, at 2485 (Supp. to 2d ed. 1969).
65. See generally id.:
It is no new idea that "[tihe same words may have different mean-
ings in different parts of the same act .... " Holmes, J. in Lamar v.
United States, 240 U.S. 60, 65 (1916). "It is not unusual for the same
word to be used with different meanings in the same act, and there is no
rule of statutory construction which precludes the courts from giving to
the word the meaning which the legislature intended it should have in
each instance." Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v. United States, 286
U.S. 427, 433 (1932).
66. 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1976) [hereinafter referred to as section 5].
67. Section 5(a)(l), 15 U.S.C. § 77e(a)(1) (1976), prohibits any person from using
interstate commerce or the mails to sell a security by prospectus or otherwise unless a
registration statement is effective. Section 5(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77e(a)(2) (1976), pro-
hibits any person from carrying a security through interstate commerce or the mails
for the purpose of sale or delivery unless a registration statement is effective. Section
5(b)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77e (b)(l) (1976), prohibits any person from using interstate com-
merce or the mails to carry a prospectus relating to a security with respect to which a
registration statement has been filed, unless the prospectus meets the requirements of
§ 10, 15 U.S.C. § 77j (1976). Section 5(b)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77e(b)(2) (1976), prohibits
any person from carrying a security through interstate commerce or the mails for sale
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tions in section 2(3) to section 5, it is clear that brokers and others
besides the actual vendor of a security may violate the prohibi-
tions against offers and sales in section 5 if they engage in solicita-
tion activities which do not comply with the registration process
and if they do not have an applicable exemption.68 To the extent
they commit such violations, they may be subject to enforcement
action by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) or to
criminal prosecution by the Justice Department under other pro-
visions of the 1933 and 1934 Acts. 69
Three factors support this conclusion: (1) section 5 prohibits
any person from offering or selling a security except in compliance
with the registration requirements of the 1933 Act; (2) unless the
context otherwise requires, section 2(3) defines "offer" to include
any solicitation of an offer to buy; and (3) no other language in
section 5 establishes a context limiting the manner in which "of-
fer" or "sell" is used so as to exclude solicitation by any person.
However, when applying the statutory definitions in section
2(3) within the context of the express cause of action in section 12,
certain operative language appears which is not present in viola-
tion provisions such as section 5.70 This language modifies the
words "[a]ny person who . ..offers or sells" as used in section
12(2) and may well limit the context in which those terms are
used.
Stripped to its essentials, section 12(2) makes "[a]ny person
who offers or sells a security" under the circumstances de-
scribed therein liable to the "person purchasing such security from
him, who may sue. . . to recover the consideration paid. .... ,7.
unless it is preceded or accompanied by a § 10(a) prospectus. Finally, section 5(c), 15
U.S.C. § 77e(c) (1976), prohibits any person from using interstate commerce or the
mails to offer to sell or to offer to buy any security by prospectus or otherwise, unless a
registration statement has been filed.
68. See, e.g., Ned J. Bowman Co., 39 S.E.C. 879 (1960). In Bowman the SEC
obtained a civil injunction against a broker-dealer firm and subsequently revoked its
registration for willful violation of § 5. The broker-dealer firm functioned as best
efforts underwriter in an unregistered public offering, for which the broker-dealer
firm was unable to establish availability of an intrastate offering exemption under
§ 3(a)(1 1) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(1 1) (1976).
69. Id. Section 24 of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77x (1976), imposes criminal
penalties upon any person convicted of willfully violating any provision of the 1933
Act. The SEC has authority under § 20(b) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77t(b) (1976),
to commence an action in the appropriate district court to enjoin any person engaged
in or about to engage in any act or practice which constitutes a violation of the 1933
Act. Finally, pursuant to §§ 15(b)(1) and 15(b)(4) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 78o(b)(l)-(4) (1976), the SEC is empowered after an appropriate hearing to deny
or revoke registration of a broker or dealer for willful violation of any provision of
the 1933 or 1934 Acts. See generally 3A H. BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 17, at
§§ 8.01-8.03.
70. Compare text of § 12(2), supra note 1, with summary of § 5, supra note 67.
71. See text of § 12(2), supra note 1.
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When the defined terms "offer" and "sell" are examined in the
context in which they appear in section 12(2), this latter modifying
language, which is not present in violation provisions such as sec-
tion 5, can be interpreted as circumscribing the term "[a]ny person
who . . . offers or sells" as used in section 12(2) to the plaintiffs
immediate vendor.72
Admittedly, section 12(2) begins with language encompassing
any person who either offers or sells, and unless the context other-
wise requires, section 2(3) defines "offer" to include solicitation of
an offer to buy and other attempts at disposition which can be
performed by non-vendors. The point is that the language of sec-
tion 12(2) taken in its entirety establishes a "context which other-
wise requires." The closing language of section 12(2) rendering
the defendant liable to the "person purchasing such security from
him" for a rescissory measure of relief limits the breadth of the
opening language "[a]ny person who. . . offers or sells" to those
situations in which a sale has taken place and confines the scope
of parties defendant to the plaintiffs immediate vendor.73 So con-
strued, only the immediate vendor falls within the reach of a pri-
vate express action under section 12(2), in contrast to the broader
reach of an enforcement or criminal action for violation of a sec-
tion in which "[a]ny person who. . . offers or sells" is used with-
out the remaining language of section 12(2). 74
72. See supra note 56.
73. See supra note 56. Admittedly, the fact that the opening language of § 12(2)
reads disjunctively, "Any person who ... offers or sells" (emphasis added), presents
a problem to this interpretation. However, the closing language of § 12(2) clearly
supports such a construction.
Commenting on this problem, one commentator has remarked:
[W]hile the statute expressly includes either an offer or sale, there
appears to be no case involving a mere offer . . . . The fact that the
statute then goes'on to talk of liability "to the person purchasing such
security," and especially that it provides only a rescission remedy,
would appear to indicate that Congress intended that a sale must have
taken place . . . . Nevertheless, the statute does say "offer."
Kaminsky, supra note 8, at 253-54.
See also Comment, Attorneys and Particpant Liability under § 12(2) of the Securi-
ties Act of1933, supra note 31, at 533-34, in which the student author argues from the
legislative history that the term "offer" is intended to bring pre-sale activities of the
seller within the scope of the statute, and is not intended to expand the class of per-
sons considered sellers as interpreted by the Cady court.
74. The thesis that the phrase "Any person who ... offers or sells" may be con-
strued differently within different sections of the 1933 Act finds some general support
in the language of the Supreme Court in SEC v. National Securities, Inc., 393 U.S.
453, 465-68 (1969). In that case the Supreme Court rejected the defendants' conten-
tion in an SEC enforcement action that because a merger at that time was not deemed
a sale for purposes of § 5 of the 1933 Act, it could not be a purchase or sale for
purposes of § 10(b) of the 1934 Act. The Court noted:
Although the interdependence of the various sections of the securi-
ties laws is certainly a relevant factor in any interpretation of the lan-
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The district court in Cady focused on the statutory definition
guage Congress has chosen, ordinary rules of statutory construction still
apply. The meaning of particular phrases must be determined in con-
text. Congress itself has cautioned that the same words may take on a
different coloration in different sections of the securities laws; both the
1933 and the 1934 Acts preface their lists of general definitions with the
phrase "unless the context otherwise requires." We must therefore ad-
dress ourselves to the meaning of the words "purchase or sale" in the
context of § 10(b). Whatever these or similar words may mean in the
numerous other contexts in which they appear in the securities laws,
only this one narrow question is presented here.
Id. at 466 (citations omitted).
The Court concluded that for purposes of an SEC enforcement action, which
does not raise the standing problems involved in an implied claim under § 10(b),
deception in a merger impacts on a shareholder's decision in a manner not unlike that
involved in a typical cash sale or share exchange. Id. at 467. Thus, the Court held
that in light of the broad antifraud purposes of § 10(b), the shareholders of the
merged company "purchased" shares in the survivor within the meaning of the statu-
tory language. Id. at 467. In 1972 the SEC rescinded the 1933 Act's Rule 133, 17
C.F.R. § 230.133 (1983), which had provided that mergers did not involve offers or
sales for purposes of § 5.
But see International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 567 n.22 (1979),
in which the Supreme Court noted that while the SEC has sometimes taken the posi-
tion that the term "sale" can have different meanings in different sections of the 1933
Act, as in SEC v. National Securities, Inc., 393 U.S. 453 (1969), it has on other occa-
sions apparently taken a contrary position. The Court further noted the rescission of
Rule 133, the context in which the SEC originally developed its theory as to the bifur-
cated definition of sale. The Court chose not to resolve the divergent views on this
issue. 439 U.S. at 568-71.
See also SEC v. Murphy, 626 F.2d 633, 649-52 (9th Cir. 1980), in which the court
discussed the fact that the doctrine of participant liability for registration violations
has developed separately in the context of § 12 cases (discussing principally the proxi-
mate cause test, see infra notes 186-290 and accompanying text) from its development
in the context of SEC injunctive actions for violation of § 5. The court noted that
while it may seem anomalous to suggest that "sell" may mean different things in
different sections of the 1933 Act, in other contexts some courts have persuasively
suggested that the standard of liability should be broader in SEC enforcement ac-
tions. Id. at 649 n. 17. The court concluded that the standard of participant liability
for violation of § 5 in SEC injunctive actions is theoretically broader than the proxi-
mate cause test used in § 12 cases. However, the court felt that in practice the two
standards differ little and held that the defendant would be liable under either stan-
dard. Id. at 652.
SEC v. Murphy obviously does not directly support the thesis of this Article since
the court appeared to endorse the approach of the proximate cause cases holding
collateral participants liable under § 12. However, the court did recognize the possi-
bility that "offer or sell" may be construed differently in § 12 than in § 5, and that
construction for purposes of enforcement of a violation of § 5 may be broader than
for purposes of the express action in § 12.
But see Schillner v. H. Vaughan Clarke & Co., 134 F.2d 875 (2d Cir. 1943). In
that case the defendant argued that the court lacked jurisdiction over an action under
§ 12(2) because the alleged misrepresentation did not involve interstate commerce.
Id. at 877. The first use of interstate commerce occurred when the mails were used to
deliver the securities sold. In holding that this delivery was sufficient to invoke the
Act, the court rejected the defendant's argument that because the prohibitions of § 5
differentiate in § 5(a)(l) and § 5(a)(2) between sale and delivery after sale, the word
"sell" as used in § 12 should be interpreted as not including delivery after sale. The
court used the § 2 "unless the context otherwise requires" prefatory language to con-
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of "sell" in section 2(3) without considering the context which the
remaining language in section 12(2) might lend to this term.75
The First Circuit did consider the textual context of the remaining
language, but did so in a rather conclusory fashion.76
Without analysis or authority the First Circuit assumed that
if a broker could be a "person who sells" even though he was not
selling his own property when he engaged in solicitation activities
which fell within the definition of "sell" in section 2(3), it neces-
sarily followed that the plaintiff must be deemed to have
"purchased from him" within the meaning of the corresponding
phrase in the statute. 77 However, "purchase" is not a term defined
in the statute.78 There is nothing in the legislation which dictates
that it be interpreted as correlative with the broad definition of
"offer" in section 2(3), nor does the ordinary meaning of the
phrase necessarily support such a construction in every setting. As
discussed above, the phrase "liable to the person purchasing such
security from him" may narrow the context in which "[a]ny per-
son who . . . offers or sells" is being used in section 12(2).
In addition, the defendant was unable to convince the First
Circuit that the rescissory nature of the remedy provided in sec-
tion 12(2) limits the scope of liability to the actual vendor. Noting
that the statute does not use the word "rescission," the court saw
no reason not to read the statute in a manner which would force
the broker to assume ownership of the securities for the first
time. 79
However, section 12(2) was adapted from the common law
action for rescission,80 which does limit recovery to the principals
of the transaction.81 While numerous modifications were made to
the common law action in the process of shaping the statutory
right, 82 section 12(2) has always been recognized as according a
rescissory measure of relief.8 3 Recovery is effected either through
the mechanics of an actual rescission or, in the event the security
clude that the word "sell" has a narrower meaning in § 5 than in § 12 with respect to
this issue. Id.
75. 30 F. Supp. at 469.
76. 113 F.2d at 990-91.
77. Id. at 990.
78. Section 2 of the 1933 Act, the definition section, makes no specific reference
to the meaning of the word "purchase." 15 U.S.C. § 77b (1976).
79. 113 F.2d at 991.
80. See 3 L. Loss, supra note 17, at 1700.
81. Id. at 1627 (prerequisite of rescission action is "privity" between the parties).
82. Id. at 1700-05, comparing and contrasting § 12(2) with common law rescis-
sion. See also Peterson, Recent Developments in Civil Liability under Section 12(2) of
the Securities Act of 1933, 5 Hous. L. REV. 274, 274-76 (1967).
83. See generally 3 L. Loss, supra note 17, at 1720-2 1; Kaminsky, supra note 8, at
280-85; Peterson, supra note 82, at 284-85, 293.
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in question has been sold by the plaintiff, through award of a
measure of damages equivalent to a rescission. 84
This form of relief presents conceptual problems when im-
posed upon a defendant who was not the actual vendor and who
did not beneficially receive the original sale proceeds.85 As noted
above, rescission at common law is generally only available
against parties to the transaction.86 There are some common law
cases in which rescission has been granted against an agent who
was not privy to the contract and who did not beneficially receive
the sale proceeds. In these cases the courts characterized the ac-
tion for rescission as sounding in fraud rather than in contract.
87
Indeed, the First Circuit in Cady relied on one such case. 88
However, several other common law cases have refused re-
scission in these circumstances. 89 These latter decisions rely on
the general rule limiting rescission to the parties to a contract and
point out that the purchaser's recourse against the agent in such
circumstances is an action for damages for common law deceit.90
84. See supra note 83.
85. See Myers v. Da Silva, 1983 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 99,166, at 95,627
(E.D. Cal. March 14, 1983), in which that portion of a plaintiffs complaint which
alleged a § 12 action against a corporation and various individual defendants was
stayed by the corporation's bankruptcy. Since the consideration had been paid to the
corporation, the court held that the rescissory relief called for in § 12 could only come
from the corporation. Thus, the corporation's bankruptcy stayed the § 12 claim be-
cause the corporation was the only proper defendant.
86. See supra note 81.
87. See, e.g., Peterson v. McManus, 187 Iowa 522, 545-47, 172 N.W. 460, 468-70
(1919); Pridmore v. Steneck, 120 N.J. Eq. 567, 572-73, 186 A. 513, 516 (Ch. 1936),
aff'd without consideration of the point, 122 N.J. Eq. 35, 191 A. 861 (1937); Loud v.
Clifford, 254 N.Y'216, 172 N.E. 475 (1930); Mack v. Latta, 178 N.Y. 525, 71 N.E. 97
(1904). See also Gordon v. Burr, 506 F.2d 1080, 1083-85 (2d Cir. 1974) (citing com-
mon law cases as authority for availability of rescission against brokerage firm and
broker in rule lOb-5 action). See generally 3 L. Loss, supra note 17, at 1715 & n. 100;
W. SEAVEY, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF AGENCY § 130(B) (1964).
For a discussion of the duty of an agent to return property to a third party when
the agent receives possession of, or title to, the property on behalf of a principal and
the third party rescinds the transaction while the agent still holds the property, see
Seavey, supra, § 127.
88. 113 F.2d at 991 (citing Peterson v. McManus, 187 Iowa 522, 545, 172 N.W.
460 (1919)).
89. See, e.g., Van Looyengoed v. Allencrest Gardens Corp., 265 Mich. 182,
186-87, 251 N.W. 317, 318 (1933); Hafner v. A.J. Stuart Land Co., 246 Mich. 465,
470-72, 224 N.W. 630, 632 (1929); Huffman v. Bankers Auto. Ins. Co., 112 Neb. 277,
284-86, 200 N.W. 994-95 (1924) (on motion for rehearing); Nash v. Minnesota Title
Ins. & Trust Co., 163 Mass. 574, 582-83, 40 N.E. 1039, 1041-42 (1895).
90. See supra note 89. The rationale of these common law decisions denying
rescission against an agent not privy to the contract supports by analogy the premise
of this Article. Section 12(2), adapted from common law rescission, makes a seller
liable to the person purchasing from him for a rescissory measure of relief. Given the
plain language of the statute and the nature of the relief afforded, the term "seller"
should be confined to the immediate vendor. A purchaser's recourse against a collat-
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Even in those common law cases in which an agent not privy
to the contract has been required to account for what the principal
received, the courts have granted rescission only after emphasiz-
ing that the agent acted with scienter with respect to the misrepre-
sentations involved.91 As discussed earlier, such state of mind is
not necessarily required under section 12(2), which imposes liabil-
ity upon the seller if he fails to establish his own due care. 92
While Cady v. Murphy does present the analytical difficulties
discussed above, the opinion is defensible for the most part if con-
fined to the brokerage situation which it addressed. In holding
that the concept of "seller" could be broadened to encompass a
vendor's agent or a dual agent who engaged in solicitation of an
offer to buy, the court relied on the statutory definition of the key
operative term, "sell." It found this interpretation of the statute
acceptable in the brokerage context since common parlance would
describe a selling agent as a "person who sells," even though the
agent is not the vendor in the sense of passing title. Its interpreta-
tion of the language in section 12(2) making the seller liable "to
the person purchasing such security from him" as correlative with
its interpretation of the statutory definition of "sell" is not com-
pletely unreasonable. Moreover, when viewed from the stand-
point of ordinary usage, the interpretation is easier to accept in the
brokerage situation than might be the case in other settings.93 Fi-
nally, the court at least addressed the question of whether section
12(2) could support imposition of a kind of "constructive rescis-
sion" on an agent who was not a party to the original sales con-
tract and relied upon some common law authority for doing so in
an agency setting. Once again its holding in this regard presents
fewer problems than might be the case outside an agency setting.
If the broker lacks scienter, he may be able to seek recourse
against his principal for indemnification under normal principles
of agency. 94
eral participant to the sale should be an action under rule 10b-5, the contours of
which have been in part shaped by common law deceit.
91. See supra note 89.
92. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
93. See 3 L. Loss, supra note 17, at 1716:
[Section] 12 makes the seller liable "to the person purchasing such se-
curity from him," a phrase which it is perhaps easier to square with the
imposition of liability upon a broker (even the buyer's broker) than it is
with the imposition of liability upon officers or directors (or other per-
sons connected with the seller) who actively participate in the sale.
Id.
94. See id. at 1718-19: "When the broker is the innocent party as between him-
self and the selling principal, presumably he has a right to be indemnified by the
principal under common law agency concepts."
See also Whittaker v. Wall, 226 F.2d 868, 872-73 (8th Cir. 1955). Whittaker
involved a claim under § 12(1) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 771(1) (1976), which con-
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Virtually all that can be said in defense of the analysis in
Cady v. Murphy is abandoned in the later expanded seller cases. 95
These opinions formulate a variety of tests for determining who
can be a seller,96 none of which is premised on the statutory defi-
nitions of the terms "offer" or "sell," much less on any considera-
tion of the application of these definitions in the context of section
12(2).9 7 Uncertain in application, these tests have sometimes re-
sulted in the imposition of liability on participants relatively at-
tenuated to the sales transaction, whose activities do not always
amount to solicitation within the meaning of section 2(3) and who
certainly would not be denominated as sellers in common par-
lance.98 Moreover, the opinions do not analyze the propriety of
imposing an essentially rescissory judgment on a collateral partici-
pant not privy to the original sales transaction in a context other
than an agency setting.99 They thus raise problems regarding the
rights of a collateral participant found liable to the plaintiff vis-A-
vis the actual vendor. 00
III. THE EXPANDED SELLER CONCEPT UNBRIDLED: THE
FACILITATION CASES
Following the circumvention of the privity requirement in the
brokerage cases, further inroads on the literal language of section
12(2) occurred in non-brokerage contexts. From the conclusion in
Cady that the language of section 12(2) was broad enough to en-
tains prefatory and concluding language identical to § 12(2) making a seller liable to
the person purchasing the security from him for a rescissory measure of relief. Under
the rationale of Cady, the trial court granted the purchasers a rescissory judgment not
only against the corporation which issued and sold the security, but also against the
corporate president and a selling agent. In addition, the trial court granted the pur-
chasers a lien against certain properties to insure payment of the judgment and
granted a similar lien to the selling agent in the event he should pay all or any part of
the judgment. Commenting on the propriety of the lien granted to the selling agent,
the appellate court noted: "There is, to us, no incongruity in thus enforcing the in-
stant judgment. Wagner is liable as agent and as agent may recover from his princi-
pal. Restatement of Agency § 438. The court may use suitable means to insure the
reimbursement." 226 F.2d at 873.
See generally W. SEAVEY, supra note 87, at § 168 regarding an agent's right to
indemnification. But see Kennedy v. Josephthal & Co., Inc., 1983 FED. SEC. L. REP.
99,204 (D. Mass. May 9, 1983). In that case the court denied indemnification to a
brokerage firm which acted as a placement agent in connection with an offering of
limited partnership interests but allowed the firm contribution from other third-party
defendants.
95. See infra notes 101-317 and accompanying text.
96. See infra notes 113-185 and accompanying text for the participation test; in-
fra notes 186-290 and accompanying text for the proximate cause test; and infra notes
291-314 and accompanying text for the 8th Circuit test.
97. See infra notes 367-369 and accompanying text.
98. See infra note 369 and accompanying text.
99. See infra notes 370-375 and accompanying text.
100. See infra notes 370-375 and accompanying text.
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compass a broker or agent who solicits an offer-to buy, courts
progressed to holding a variety of parties ancillary to a sales trans-
action liable as sellers under section 12(2).
Three different lines of authority emerge in these later ex-
panded seller cases. In defining the parameters of who may be
primarily liable as a seller under section 12(2), some courts adopt
a rather ambiguous test geared to a collateral party's participation
in the events leading up to the sale in question.10 The Fifth Cir-
cuit has rejected this participation test as overly broad and has
developed a proximate cause analysis. 10 2 Under this theory only
those collateral parties whose participation is a substantial factor
in causing a transaction to take place may be liable as sellers
under section 12(2).103 The Eighth Circuit has rejected the proxi-
mate cause analysis and developed a third approach. 10 4 Stating
that the Fifth Circuit's test fails to adequately implement the un-
derlying policies of the Securities Act, the Eighth Circuit held in
Wasson v. SEC10 5 that the pivotal consideration should be
"whether the defendant was uniquely positioned to ask relevant
questions, acquire material information, or disclose his
findings." 0 6
Each of these tests grapples with the problem of determining
what relationship a collateral participant must bear to the sales
transaction in order to justify imposing primary liability under
section 12.107 While there are important differences in formula-
tion, each of them ultimately resolves this question in favor of a
101. See infra notes 113-185 and accompanying text for a discussion of the partici-
pation test.
102. See infra notes 186-290 and accompanying text for a discussion of the 5th
Circuit's proximate cause analysis.
103. See infra notes 186-290 and accompanying text.
104. See infra notes 291-314 and accompanying text for a discussion of the 8th
Circuit test.
105. 558 F.2d 879 (8th Cir. 1977). See infra notes 291-314 and accompanying text.
106. Id. at 886.
107. See Rapp, supra note 31, at 466-67. In discussing the participation and prox-
imate cause tests, Mr. Rapp refers to the focus of such tests on the relationship of the
defendant to the sales transaction as creating a kind of transactional privity, which the
courts use as a substitute for the traditional privity between parties to the transaction:
The foregoing review of the cases expanding the scope of section
12 supports some generalizations. . . . [Pirimary liability will extend
to all persons who play a direct and meaningful role in the circum-
stances surrounding a sale of securities. As to what constitutes a
"meaningful role," these cases suggest that it is direct facilitation of the
transaction, and it is this relationship-role to transaction-which has
generally replaced the traditional contractual privity relationship that
would otherwise operate to limit the scope of permissible defendants.
Id.
In contrast to the thesis of this Article, Mr. Rapp feels that expanding the concept
of seller to impose primary liability on some collateral participants involved in the
sales transaction may be consistent with the focus of § 12(2).
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test designed to measure in some manner the degree to which the
collateral participant facilitated the transaction. 0 8 All three tests,
however, address the question of who may be a seller for purposes
of section 12(2) quite apart from the relatively clear language of
the statute and without any consideration of the place of section
12(2) in the overall statutory scheme of antifraud provisions. 0 9
Unlike Cady v. Murphy, these later expanded seller cases do
not take their focus from the statutory definitions of "offer" and
"sell" in section 2(3).11° Moreover, they are not confined to the
agency setting which was so instrumental in reconciling the hold-
ing in Cady with the language of the statute."' While these tests
sometimes result in imposition of liability on a collateral partici-
pant who would also fit within the Cady mode of analysis, their
sweep is frequently much broader. 1 2 To this extent, they are far
more problematic than Cady.
A. The Particiation Test
After the holding in Cady, the next foray against the privity
requirement in section 12(2) came in cases in which purchasers
argued that those who participate in sales transactions should be
primarily liable as sellers. 113 For example, in Zachman v. Er-
108. See infra notes 113-317 and accompanying text.
109. See infra notes 367-379, 391-418 and accompanying text.
110. See infra notes 367-368 and accompanying text. See also supra note 48 for
text of § 2(3).
111. See infra notes 370-375 and accompanying text.
112. Compare, e.g., Lewis v. Walston & Co., Inc., 487 F.2d 617 (5th Cir. 1973),
discussed infra text accompanying notes 223-227, with Plunkett v. Francisco, 430 F.
Supp. 235 (N.D. Ga. 1977). In Lewis the court used a proximate cause theory to
affirm a finding of liability under § 12(2) against a broker who could also have been
reached under a Cady analysis. In Plunkett plaintiffs purchased a cattle lease and calf
maintenance agreement from a corporation through a selling agent. The selling agent
showed the plaintiffs a so-called warranty letter executed by the president of the cor-
poration and a certain farmer as principals. The letter represented that they had suffi-
cient facilities, personnel, and capital to attain current objectives of management.
The court granted summary judgment under § 12(2) against the selling agent, who
could have been reached under a Cady analysis. Employing a proximate cause analy-
sis, however, the Plunkett court also granted summary judgment against the farmer.
The court found the farmer's participation in signing the warranty letter sufficient to
bring him within § 12 even though he apparently had no personal contact with the
plaintiffs prior to their purchase.
113. See infra notes 114-181 and accompanying text. See also the following cases
in which allegations of participation withstood a motion to dismiss: In re Home-
Stake Production Co. Sec. Litig., 76 F.R.D. 337, 349 (N.D. Okla. 1975); Mincolla v.
Arthur Hardgrove Co., [1964-1966 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
91,608, at 95,283 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 1965); Bailey v. Huntington Sec. Co., 35 F.R.D.
169, 175 (S.D.N.Y. 1963). But see also, e.g., the following cases in which allegations
of participation were held insufficient: Katz v. David W. Katz & Co., 1984 FED. SEC.
L. REP. CCH 99,669, at 97,687-90 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 14, 1984) (motion for summary
judgment granted); Aid Auto Stores, Inc. v. Cannon, 525 F.2d. 468, 471 (2d Cir. 1975)
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win 114 the plaintiffs brought an action under section 12(2) for se-
curities purchased in certain primary distributions floated by two
insurance companies and their common successor. Plaintiffs al-
leged that numerous material misrepresentations had been made
to them in connection with their purchase. In particular, they al-
leged the use of false financial statements which concealed the in-
solvency of the insurance companies. 115
At the time of the suit, the successor corporation was in re-
ceivership in a Texas state court."16 Presumably for this reason,
the plaintiffs named a variety of persons tangential to the sales as
defendants in their federal court action under section 12(2).
Plaintiffs sued: (1) the officers and directors of the insurance com-
panies involved;' 17 (2) certain other corporations which the plain-
tiffs alleged had a role in falsification of the financial statements;
(3) the securities dealer who put the sales force in the field; (4) an
insurance reporting firm which had issued trade reports on the
insurance companies that were subsequently shown to the plain-
tiffs; 118 (5) members of an advisory board to the insurance compa-
nies who were neither officers or directors of the companies; 19 (6)
examiners of the Texas Board of Insurance Commissioners; 20
and (7) an attorney who represented the successor corporation
before the Texas Board of Insurance Commissioners.' 2 1
With the exception of the examiners at the Texas Board of
Insurance Commissioners 122 and the attorney who had appeared
(directed verdict granted in favor of defendants); Grimm v. Whitney-Fidalgo Sea-
foods, Inc., [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,029, at 91,609
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 4, 1973) (motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim granted).
114. 186 F. Supp. 681 (S.D. Tex. 1959) (rulings on motion); 186 F. Supp. 691 (S.D.
Tex. 1960) (further rulings on motion).
115. 186 F. Supp. at 684.
116. Id. at 683.
117. Plaintiffs alleged that these individuals "caused the transactions that resulted
in falsification of the financial statements." Id. at 685.
118. Plaintiffs claimed that the reports were deficient in failing to disclose a finan-
cial tie between the reporting firm and the insurance companies which may have com-
promised the independence of the reports. Id. at 696-97.
119. The plaintiffs alleged that these individuals either willfully or negligently co-
operated with a general plan to defraud the plaintiffs (1) by allowing their names to
be used in connection with the sales transaction, (2) by attending board meetings
where decisions were made, and (3) by lending their names and rendering advice and
assistance to the insurance companies in local operations in return for compensation
or the promise of compensation. Id. at 686.
120. The plaintiffs claimed that in exchange for gifts and favors these men joined
in a conspiracy with the other defendants by compromising their review of the succes-
sor corporation, which review should have revealed the insolvency. Id. at 686,
695-96.
121. The plaintiffs alleged that the lawyer, a state senator, obtained a lifting of the
Texas Insurance Code for his client through improper influence. Id. at 696.
122. Id. at 686 (defendant Blanchard); id. at 695-96 (defendant Noad).
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before that board, 23 the district court found the plaintiffs' com-
plaint sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim.' 24 The court held that plaintiffs' allegations ade-
quately pleaded participation of the remaining defendants as sell-
ers or as control persons of sellers. 25
Judge Cashin came to a similar conclusion on the pleadings
before him in Wonneman v. Stratford Securities Co., Inc. 26 The
plaintiff initially sued under sections 12(1) and 12(2) to recover the
consideration he paid for shares in a company known as General
Oil & Industries Inc.127 General Oil was a successor by way of
recapitalization to a dormant company which had been revived in
1958 on the advice and through the efforts of Josephson, an attor-
ney. 28 The plaintiff had purchased the shares in a secondary
transaction from Stratford Securities Co., Inc., a brokerage firm
which sold the General Oil shares to the plaintiff and to others as
principal for its own account. 129 The plaintiff named as defend-
ants in the action Stratford Securities, a husband and wife who
were Stratford's president and secretary-treasurer respectively, the
attorney Josephson, General Oil, and two officers of General Oil
who allegedly provided information about the company to
Stratford. 30
Judge Cashin denied a motion for summary judgment by the
husband and wife.' 3' Quite apart from rebutting possible liability
under section 15 as control persons of the seller, the court ap-
peared to believe that the defendants had to establish that they did
not participate in the sale in order to prevail on their motion.1 32
The court stated that it was not sufficient for the defendants to
merely show that they did not actually sell the securities. 133
Judge Cashin readily admitted the uncertainty inherent in us-
ing participation as the relevant criterion for determining the
boundaries of primary liability under section 12.
The problem is: "What constitutes 'participation' "? Does one
123. Id. at 696.
124. Id. at 684-86, 691, 694-96, 698.
125. Id.
126. [1957-1961 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 90,923 (S.D.N.Y.
June 26, 1959).
127. Id. at 92,962-63.
128. [1957-1961 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 91,034 at 93,460-61
(S.D.N.Y. June 7, 1961).
129. Id. at 93,459.
130. Id. at 93,460-61.
131. [1957-1961 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 90,923 at 92,963-64
(S.D.N.Y. June 26, 1959).
132. Id. For the text of § 15 see supra note 29.
133. Id. at 92,963. "They must show that they did not participate in the sale and
not merely that they did not actually sell the securities to plaintiff."
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who supervises the selling operations "participate" in an indi-
vidual sale? Does one who composes advertising material
"participate" in the sale? Does a director or an officer "partici-
pate" in a sale? 134
Nonetheless, the court left this question as one of fact for resolu-
tion at trial.1 35
Summary judgment was subsequently entered against Strat-
ford Securities, the plaintiffs actual vendor. 136 When execution
on the judgment was returned unsatisfied, trial proceeded against
the remaining defendants. 37 The section 12(2) count was dis-
missed, 38 and the case was tried before Judge Murphy for recov-
ery under section 12(1). 139
Judge Murphy, however, was less receptive at trial to the
plaintiffs participation analysis than Judge Cashin had been on
the motion for summary judgment.140 Judge Murphy began with
the general rule that except as expanded by section 15, a pur-
chaser's right to sue for return of consideration under section 12 is
generally limited to his immediate seller.' 4 ' The court noted:
[Tihe statutes under which plaintiff sues require an element of
privity between the plaintiff-purchaser and defendants. The
defendants must be, for example, the actual seller or one who
negotiated the sale; the owner of the securities sold or a person
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. [1957-1961 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 91,034 at 93,459
(S.D.N.Y. 1961).
137. Id.
138. Id. at 93,458.
139. Section 12(1) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77/(1) (1976) [hereinafter referred
to as section 12(1)], provides that any person who offers or sells a security in violation
of the registration requirements of § 5 of 1933 Act shall be liable to the person
purchasing the security from him for the consideration paid upon tender of the secur-
ity or, in the event the buyer no longer owns the security, for damages. Section 12 is
thus structured in a fashion which makes the privity requirement and remedies com-
mon to both §§ 12(1) and 12(2).
The question of whether anyone beyond the immediate vendor may be deemed a
seller for purposes of section 12 has been litigated in actions under both §§ 12(1) and
12(2). Some commentators have suggested that the concept of "seller" may be open
to a broader construction in the context of § 12(2) than § 12(1), perhaps because
§ 12(2) provides a due care defense unavailable under § 12(1). See, e.g., 5 A. JACOBS,
supra note 17, § 3.01[c] at 1-56. However, most courts and commentators treat the
question in a unitary fashion. See, e.g., Pharo v. Smith, 621 F.2d 656, 665-68 &
nn.6-8 (5th Cir. 1980), discussed infra notes 228-242 and accompanying text; Hill
York Corp. v. American Int'l Franchises, Inc., 448 F.2d. 680, 692 & n. 17 (5th Cir.
1971), discussed infra notes 206-219 and accompanying text. Decisions under § 12(1)
addressing the "seller" question are thus relevant to this Article and have been in-
cluded in the textual discussion and notes.
140. [1957-1961 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 91,034 at 93,459-61
(S.D.N.Y. 1961).
141. Id. at 93,459.
19841
UCLA LAW REVIEW
who in some manner controls the seller.142
Judge Murphy held the husband, who was president of Strat-
ford, liable to the plaintiff under section 15 of the 1933 Act as a
person controlling the seller. 143 However, he rejected as insuffi-
cient the plaintiffs proof against the remaining defendants with
respect to the participation allegations in the complaint.144
The plaintiff argued at trial that these defendants were pri-
marily liable as sellers under section 12 because they "partici-
pated" in the sale within the meaning of that term as used in the
venue provision of the 1933 Act. 145 The plaintiff further con-
tended that participation in this context meant "participation in
any phase of the overall plan to market securities in violation of
the [1933] Act."' 146
While Judge Murphy seemed to stop short of rejecting per se
the notion that the concept of participation might be borrowed
from the venue statute for purposes of determining liability under
section 12, he found the plaintiffs interpretation of that term
overly broad. 147 The court characterized the plaintiffs argument
as an attempt to embrace as defendants all persons connected with
the corporation whose stock is sold, however remote their connec-
tion with facilitating the sale.' 48 Analyzing the activities of the
various defendants, the court held that the plaintiff failed to estab-
lish that any of the remaining defendants participated in the sale
for purposes of liability under section 12.149
The attorney Josephson presented the closest case. He was
instrumental in the recapitalization of General Oil and had rec-
ommended a transfer agent to the company, all with a view to-
ward sales and transfers of General Oil stock. However, the court
noted that his closest contact with the actual sale to the plaintiff
142. Id.
143. Id. at 93,459-62.
144. Id. at 93,460-62.
145. In pertinent part the venue provision of the 1933 Act provides as follows:
"Any such suit or action may be brought in the district wherein the defendant is
found or is an inhabitant or transacts business, or in the district where the offer or sale
took place, if the defendant participated therein ..... Securities Act of 1933,
§ 22(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (1976).
146. [1957-1961 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) $ 91,034 at 93,459
(S.D.N.Y. 1961).
147. Id. at 93,459-60.
148. Id. at 93,460.
149. Id. at 93,460-61. The court characterized the wife who was secretary-treas-
urer of Stratford as playing a purely passive role in the corporation. It stated that
General Oil's only connection to the transaction arose from the fact that it was the
company whose stock was traded. It found that the officers of General Oil who were
named as defendants did nothing more than implement one step of the recapitaliza-
tion and furnish information to Stratford, which actions were irrelevant to the plain-
tiff's claim for failure to register under § 12(1).
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had been an oral opinion rendered to the president.of Stratford to
the effect that resale of the securities by Stratford would be ex-
empt from the registration requirements of the 1933 Act.' 50 The
plaintiff argued that this opinion induced Stratford to offer the
General Oil stock to the public, including the plaintiff. Appar-
ently focusing on the rescissory nature of the relief afforded by
section 12, the court held that while these facts may have been
sufficient to establish venue against Josephson, they demonstrated
that the attorney was "a stranger to the illegal sales to plaintiff'
insofar as the statutory remedy sought by the plaintiff was
concerned. 51
The trial court opinion in Wonneman cut back on the breadth
of the opinion in the motion for summary judgment. However,
notwithstanding its references to the privity requirement, the court
did not outright reject and, indeed, seemed to inferentially en-
dorse participation as a measure of primary liability under section
12. 152 The trial court refused to accept the plaintiff's interpreta-
tion of participation as encompassing anyone involved in the plan
to market securities. However, the court's extensive analysis of
the relationship between the activities of the various defendants
and the sale in question suggests that proof of more direct partici-
pation would have been sufficient to establish liability.
53
The level of participation sufficient to render a collateral
party liable as a seller under section 12 remains as fuzzy as when
the question was first posed by Judge Cashin on the motion for
summary judgment in Wonneman. However, the concept articu-
lated in Zachman and Wonneman that some measure of participa-
tion in a sale may render a collateral party liable as a seller has
taken root in a number of courts. Under a participation analysis,
the attorney in Katz v. Amos Treat & Co.154 fared less favorably
than the attorney in Wonneman.
In that case a sales representative from the brokerage firm of
Amos Treat & Co. approached Dr. Solomon Katz about an op-
portunity to invest in a company known as Delka Research Corp.
The sales representative offered Katz the chance to be an early
purchaser in a proposed new issue of Delka stock, to be registered
by Delka with the SEC and underwritten by Amos Treat & Co.
The salesman enthusiastically promoted the stock, and Katz
purchased some shares from Delka. 55
150. Id. at 93,460.
151. Id. at 93,461.
152. Mr. Rapp's analysis of the Wonneman opinion leads him to much the same
conclusion. See Rapp, supra note 31, at 462.
153. Id.
154. 411 F.2d 1046 (2d Cir. 1969).
155. Id. at 1050-52.
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Earl J. Wofsey was an attorney for Amos Treat & Co. and
special counsel to Delka in connection with the proposed under-
writing of Delka stock. 156 He apparently had no contact with
Katz prior to this first purchase of Delka stock by Katz. 57
In the months following his initial purchase, Katz inquired
several times about the status of the Delka registration statement
and was assured by Amos Treat, the president of the brokerage
firm, that everything was proceeding normally. Treat indicated
that Delka needed more money because business was so good and
urged Katz to raise funds among his friends for the purchase of
additional shares from Delka. Katz raised the money, but before
committing the funds, he sought further assurances about the re-
gistration statement. He was referred to the attorney, Wofsey.. 8
Katz contacted Wofsey several times and inquired about the
status of the registration statement. He also asked Wofsey's opin-
ion regarding certain favorable statements about the offering
which Treat had made to him. After receiving reassurances from
Wofsey, Katz purchased the additional Delka shares. 15 9
The financial statements prepared for inclusion in the Delka
registration statement showed few sales, a large loss, and a nega-
tive working capital ratio.' 60 The registration statement was never
filed.' 6 1 Katz sued the brokerage firm, its president, the sales rep-
resentative in charge of his account, Wofsey, and two officers of
Delka under sections 12(1), 12(2), and 17(a) of the 1933 Act and
section 10(b) of the 1934 Act. 162
The district court dismissed the entire complaint at the end of
the plaintiff's case.' 63 The court's dismissal of the section 12(1)
156. Id. at 1049.
157. Id. at 1050-51. Wofsey's only contact with Katz in connection with the ini-
tial purchase came in correspondence after the fact. In a letter to Katz, Wofsey de-
scribed certain escrow arrangements which would pertain to the shares purchased,
pending effectiveness of the Delka registration statement.
158. Id. at 1051.
159. Id. at 1051-52. Specifically, in response to Katz' first inquiry, Wofsey ini-
tially told him to wait a few weeks. At that time in response to another call, Wofsey
indicated that the registration statement had been worked out in principle such that
Katz could put up half the funds. Katz again contacted Wofsey before paying over
the balance of the monies. In that conversation he sounded out Wofsey's opinion
regarding statements made by Treat that the Delka issue was the greatest offering
Treat had ever underwritten. Wofsey responded that he had heard it was a good one
and knew it was "okay." In response to Katz' questions regarding the registration
statement, Wofsey said that it was ready except for the accountants' report. When
Katz asked if it was safe to put up the remaining funds, Wofsey replied that it "would
help the registration" and that he thought it "would be all right." Id.
160. Id. at 1052.
161. Id.
162. 1d. at 1049.
163. The district court did not file an opinion in support of the dismissal. How-
ever, the dismissal is discussed in a district court opinion denying defendants' motion
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count was apparently premised on the ground that the privity re-
quirement limited Katz to recovery from Delka, his immediate
seller. 164
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the dis-
missal of all counts with respect to the two Delka officers but re-
versed as to the remaining defendants. 165 The court's discussion
of the section 12(1) count is the portion of the opinion most perti-
nent to the seller issue. The court held that the Amos Treat de-
fendants could be liable as sellers under a Cady analysis for
solicitation of an offer to buy.' 66 However, the court could not
quite fit Wofsey into this solicitation framework. As noted above,
Wofsey was not involved with Katz prior to the first sale, and
Katz solicited Wofsey's advice with respect to the second sale. 167
Despite the fact that Wofsey had not initiated contact with
the plaintiff, the court held that Katz had stated a prima facie
claim against him as a section 12 seller.' 68 The court reasoned
that Wofsey had done more than simply respond to Katz's ques-
tions. The court characterized Wofsey as having placed Amos
Treat & Co. in a position "to tackle Katz for the money." 169 Thus,
the court held that a jury could decide that Wofsey was "a party to
a solicitation." 170
The court exonerated the two Delka officers, although one of
the officers had picked up Katz's funds and signed the stock certif-
to assess costs against plaintiff. Katz v. Delka Research Corp. of New Jersey, 295 F.
Supp. 647 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). The trial court dismissed the § 12(2) count and other
fraud claims because it was dissatisfied with the manner in which plaintiff's counsel
responded to questions posed by the court which were designed to pin down the mis-
representations alleged with respect to each of the defendants. Id. at 648-49.
164. The appellate court concluded that the district court's dismissal of the § 12(1)
claim "appear[ed] to have rested on a belief that only the issuer or immediately previ-
ous owner of the shares, in this case Delka, can 'offer or sell' a security, within the
prohibition of § 12(1) . 411 F.2d at 1052.
165. Id. at 1056.
166. Id. at 1053. The firm conceded that it could be liable under § 12(1) if it acted
as a broker for Delka. However, it contended that it was not a broker since it "re-
ceived no commission and was simply helping Katz to get in on a good thing." Id. at
1053. The court rejected this argument. It stated that a jury could have concluded
that the firm acted as a broker notwithstanding the absence of a commission, espe-
cially in light of the firm's interest in the underwriting. Moreover, citing the trial
court opinion in Cady, the court reasoned that the firm would be liable if the jury
concluded that it actively solicited Katz' offer to buy, irrespective of whether or not
the firm functioned as a broker. The Katz court thus focused on the trial court's
solicitation analysis in Cady without regard to the appellate court's focus in that case
on the importance of the agency relationship in reconciling the solicitation analysis
with the concluding language of § 12. See supra notes 39-61 and accompanying text.
167. See supra notes 157 and 159 and accompanying text.




icate on the second sale.' 7 ' The court stated that the officers had
played too minor a role in facilitating the transaction to be held
liable. 172
In analyzing the liability of Wofsey and the Delka officers,
the Katz court uses a participation test as did the courts in
Zachman and Wonneman. All three courts conclude that some
measure of participation warrants imposition of primary liability
under section 12 but offer no guidelines on the quantity or quality
of participation which will trigger "seller" status. Beyond the
courts' visceral reaction to the facts, it is difficult to discern from
the opinions what made the attorney in Katz a party to the solici-
tation but not the officer who was involved in collecting the funds
and issuing the share certificates, or what made the trade reporting
firm and advisory board members in Zachman potentially liable
as participants but the state insurance commissioners and the at-
torney who appeared before the commission too attenuated from
the sale.
The problem arises in large part from the fact that the partici-
pation test, like the other two facilitation tests which follow, is
purely extra-statutory in nature. In a wholesale fashion the courts
in the participation cases substitute the concept of participating in
the sale for the words "offers or sells" in section 12(2), even
though there is no support in the language of the statute for doing
SO. 1
7 3
This extension represents a major analytical leap from the
holding in Cady and creates a gap which is difficult to bridge. The
court in Cady was able to justify broadening section 12(2) to allow
a purchaser to reach a broker because it focused upon the broker's
solicitation activities as falling within the definition of "sell" in
section 2(3). In addition, the Cady court confined its holding to an
agency setting through which this statutory definition of "sell"
could be somewhat reconciled with the remaining language of sec-
tion 12(2).' 74 The courts in the participation cases do neither.
A participation test certainly includes someone who solicits
an offer to buy within the meaning of "offer" as now defined in
171. Id.
172. Id. The court's disposition of the § 12(2) count and the other fraud claims
followed the same lines as its decision with respect to the § 12(1) count. It affirmed
dismissal of the Delka officers but held that the plaintiff had stated a sufficient claim
against the remaining defendants that the alleged misrepresentations were made or
adopted by or on behalf of each of the defendants. Id. at 1055-56.
173. See text of § 12(2), supra note 1.
174. See supra notes 39-61 and accompanying text for a discussion of Cady v.
Murphy, 30 F. Supp. 466 (D. Me. 1938), aeld, 113 F.2d 988 (1st Cir. 1940), cert. de-
nied, 311 U.S. 705 (1940).
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section 2(3). 17  However, it also reaches far beyond the solicita-
tion activities encompassed in the statutory definition of "of-
fer."' 176 As the attorney in Katz could painfully testify, it can
encompass someone who does not initiate contact with the pur-
chaser or make the sales pitch, but who merely responds to ques-
tions from the purchaser designed to elicit information about the
transaction. 177 The trade reporting firm and advisory board mem-
bers in Zachman might even more painfully note that it can also
potentially reach parties who have no direct contact with
plaintiffs. 178
Similarly, a participation test encompasses brokers and other
agents of a seller who fall within a Cady analysis. 79 However, it
can also draw within its sweep a collateral participant who has no
agency relationship with the actual seller.' 80 Denominating such
a collateral party as a person who "offers or sells" on the basis of
some undefined measure of participation in the transaction is diffi-
cult to reconcile with the language making such person liable to
the person "purchasing such security from him" for a recovery
that is essentially rescissory in nature. 18 1
The uncertainty inherent in the participation cases regarding
the degree of activity necessary to trigger liability as a seller under
section 12(2) gave birth to the proximate cause analysis. 82 Like
the participation cases, the proximate cause cases reject a strict
privity approach to section 12(2) in favor of an analysis embracing
some participants in a sale beyond the immediate vendor. 83 The
proximate cause test attempts to delineate the nature of the partic-
ipation which will result in seller status by narrowing the field of
defendants to those participants whose activities are a substantial
factor in causing the purchase. 184 However, like its parent, the
proximate cause analysis shares the same basic defect of being ex-
175. See, e.g., Zachman v. Erwin, 186 F. Supp. 691, 695 (S.D. Tex. 1959), dis-
cussed supra in text accompanying notes 114-125, naming the securities dealer as a
defendant for his role in putting in the field the sales force which made the false
representations to the plaintiffs.
176. For the text of the statutory definition of "offer," see supra note 48.
177. See supra notes 167 and 170 and accompanying text.
178. See supra notes 118-119 and accompanying text.
179. See supra notes 39-61 and accompanying text, discussing the analysis of
Cady v. Murphy, 30 F. Supp. 466 (D. Me. 1939), afl'd, 113 F.2d 988 (1st Cir. 1940),
ceri denied, 311 U.S. 705 (1940).
180. See, e.g., Zachman v. Erwin, 186 F. Supp 691, 696 (S.D. Tex. 1959), discussed
supra in text accompanying notes 114-125, naming the trade reporting firm as a de-
fendant for showing credit reports about the corporate issuer to plaintiffs.
181. See supra text accompanying notes 70-92 for a discussion of the impact of the
concluding language of § 12 on the scope of the prefatory language "offers or sells."
182. See infra notes 186-290 and accompanying text.
183. See infra notes 186-290 and accompanying text.
184. See infra notes 186-290 and accompanying text.
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tra-statutory in nature. It thus presents many of the same
problems in application. 8 5
B. The Proximate Cause Test
Among those courts which reject a strict privity approach to
section 12(2), the most popular test for determining seller status is
the proximate cause analysis. 86 The roots of this approach can be
185. See infra notes 274-290 and accompanying text.
186. See cases cited infra text accompanying notes 187-290. See also Davis v.
Avco Fin. Servs., Inc., 1983 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 91,569 (6th Cir. July 10, 1984)
(trial court judgment affirmed under proximate cause analysis against finance com-
pany whose management promoted sales of securities purchased by plaintiffs through
finance company loans); Admiralty Fund v. Jones, 677 F.2d 1289, 1294-95 (9th Cir.
1982) (summary judgment in favor of cross-defendant attorney on the cross-claim
under § 12(2) reversed; issue of fact presented as to whether the actions of an attorney
who wrote an opinion letter, attended meetings at which the transaction was struc-
tured, and participated in final arrangements for sale, were substantial factors in
plaintiff's purchase); Stokes v. Lokken, 644 F.2d 779, 784-85 (8th Cir. 1981) (sum-
mary judgment in favor of attorney on claim of purchasers of interest in coin scam
affirmed under proximate cause/aiding and abetting analysis; lawyer who gave a
qualifiedly favorable opinion on the non-securities character of a transaction, which
opinion became the basis for a clean audit report later quoted in promotional materi-
als, was not liable to plaintiffs); Lawler v. Gilliam, 569 F.2d 1283, 1287-88 (4th Cir.
1978) (defendants' actions in soliciting investment in note scheme were substantial
factors in causing plaintiff's purchase, thus making defendants liable as "sellers"
under § 12(1)); Ayers v. Wolfinbarger, 491 F.2d 8, 13-14 (5th Cir. 1974) (reversing
judgment for plaintiffs on § 12(2) claim where the evidence was insufficient to estab-
lish that the defendants were the proximate cause of the plaintiffs' purchase; defend-
ants sold stock in a financial corporation to three individuals who, after gaining
control, sold stock in the financial corporation to plaintiffs); McFarland v. Memorex
Corp., 1984 FED. SEC. L. REP. CCH 99,635, at 97,507-08 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 17, 1984)
(on motion for reconsideration, earlier opinion at 493 F. Supp. 631, 647-48 (N.D. Cal.
1980), limiting § 12(2) claim to defendant underwriters under strict privity approach,
is reconsidered; § 12(2) claim is reinstated under proximate cause analysis against
corporate issuer for alleged misrepresentations and omissions in a registered offering
sold by underwriters pursuant to a firm commitment underwriting); Frogner v. Mer-
rill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 1983 FED. SEC. L. REP. CCH 99,504 (N.D.
Cal. Sept. 26, 1983) (motion to dismiss § 12(2) claim against brokerage firm and bro-
ker denied under proximate cause analysis); Van Boeckel v. Weiss, 1983 FED. SEC. L.
REP. CCH 99,648, at 97,589 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 12, 1983) (summary judgment on § 12
claims of purchasers of real estate-related investments granted under proximate cause
analysis in favor of attorney who represented the companies which sold the invest-
ments); Wright v. Schock, 1983 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) $ 99,411 at 96,360-61 (N.D.
Cal. June 30, 1983) (summary judgment granted under proximate cause analysis in
favor of title insurance company and two banks on § 12 claims brought by purchasers
of notes secured by deeds of trust); Hibbard, O'Connor & Weeks, Inc. v. Osborne,
1982 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,815 at 94,174 (S.D. Tex. October 28, 1980) (mo-
tion to dismiss granted with leave to amend to plead with greater particularity proxi-
mate cause theory with respect to non-privity defendants); In re North Am.
Acceptance Corp. Sec. Cases, 513 F. Supp. 608, 619-20, 632-33, 644-45 (N.D. Ga.
1981) (summary judgment granted under proximate cause analysis against purchasers
of thrift notes, thrift certificates and term notes on §§ 12(1) and 12(2) claims against
issuer's law firm, accounting firm and noteholder trustee); Westlake v. Abrams, 504 F.
Supp. 337, 346-47 (N.D. Ga. 1980) (attorney who acted as general counsel to seller of
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found in two district court opinions 8 7 which reached contrary re-
suits in applying a causation test to determine whether partici-
pants in a sale should be characterized as sellers for purposes of
section 12(1).
In Lennerth v. Mendenhall18 8 the plaintiffs sued under section
12(1) to rescind their purchase of unregistered shares in a corpora-
tion which proposed to build an archery center in Cleveland.18 9
The plaintiffs sued the corporation, a selling agent for the corpora-
tion, a vice-president of the corporation, and its president.190 The
district court granted summary judgment against the corporation
as the actual vendor of the shares but also allowed entry of sum-
mary judgment against each of the individual defendants as well,
on the grounds that they too qualified as sellers.' 9'
In its discussion of the liability of the selling agent, the court
shaped the initial contours of the proximate cause test. Comment-
ing on the trial court opinion in Wonneman, it stated:
It is implicit in the Court's reasoning. . . that liability must lie
somewhere between the narrow view, which holds [liable] only
the parties to the sale, and the too-liberal view which would
commodities futures options was not a "seller" for purposes of § 12 under proximate
cause analysis, notwithstanding his knowledge of boiler-room sales tactics used by
seller, his arrangements for registration of the options under state securities laws, his
acquisition of office space for the seller's activities, and his representation of the seller
in proceedings with the telephone company to supply telephones for use in making
sales); Woods v. Homes & Structures of Pittsburg, Kan., Inc., 489 F. Supp. 1270,
1294-95 (D. Kan. 1980) (motion for summary judgment by bond counsel, city attor-
ney, and trustee bank on § 12(2) claims of bond purchasers denied under proximate
cause analysis); Mendelsohn v. Capital Underwriters, Inc., 490 F. Supp. 1069,
1087-88 (N.D. Cal. 1979) (motion for summary judgment by law firms and account-
ing firm on § 12(2) claims of purchasers of real estate limited partnership interests
granted under proximate cause analysis); Plunkett v. Francisco, 430 F. Supp. 235,
240-41 (N.D. Ga. 1977) (under proximate cause analysis the purchaser of a cattle
lease agreement and calf maintenance program from a Florida corporation was
granted summary judgment on § 12(2) claim against a farmer; although plaintiff had
no contact with the farmer prior to the sale, the selling agent for the corporation
showed the plaintiff a warranty letter executed by the farmer which contained various
misrepresentations); Eisenberg v. North Am. Leisure Corp., [1974 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 94,434 at 95,489 (S.D.N.Y. March 7, 1974) (motion for
summary judgment on § 12(1) claim by defendant broker-dealer and registered repre-
sentative allegedly connected with a financial plan for sale of unregistered securities
denied under proximate cause analysis); Canizaro v. Kohlmeyer & Co., 370 F. Supp.
282, 287-88 (E.D. La. 1974), afl'dper curiam, 512 F.2d 484 (5th Cir. 1975) (broker,
who did no more than act as plaintiffs agent in executing a purchase order and who
did not solicit the order or recommend the stock, was not a substantial factor in plain-
tiff's purchase and thus was not liable as a seller under § 12(2)).
187. Nicewarner v. Bleavins, 244 F. Supp. 261 (D. Colo. 1965); Lennerth v. Men-
denhall, 234 F. Supp. 59 (N.D. Ohio 1964).
188. 234 F. Supp. 59 (N.D. Ohio 1964).
189. Id. at 60, 64.
190. Id. at 64-66.
191. Id. at 65-66.
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hold [liable] all who remotely participated in the events leading
up to the transaction. We think that the line of demarcation
must be drawn in terms of cause and effect: To borrow a
phrase from the law of negligence, did the injury to the plaintiff
ow directly and proximately from the actions of this particular
defendant?. . . But for the presence of the defendant Roger in
the negotiations preceding the sale, could the sale have been
consummated?
We so find. . . . In short, he did everything but draw and
sign the contract. The hunter who seduces the prey and leads it
to the trap he has set is no less guilty than the hunter whose
hand springs the snare. We find that the activity of the corpo-
rate defendant's agent Roger is tantamount to that of a "seller"
within the liberal remedial spirit of the securities laws. 192
The district court in Nicewarner v. Bleavins 193 used a similar
causation analysis to exonerate an attorney from liability under
section 12(1) in an action brought by dissatisfied buyers seeking to
rescind purchase of a fractional royalty interest in an automotive
engine timer.194 The plaintiffs sued the selling royalty holder as
their immediate vendor but also named the attorney who drafted
the assignment from the royalty holder to the plaintiffs. The court
held the selling royalty holder liable under section 12(1) for fail-
ure to register the sale of the fractional royalty interest to the
plaintiffs. 95 However, it was unwilling to impose liability upon
the attorney as a seller. 96
The court recited facts showing that the attorney had been
substantially involved in the engine timer project in his capacity
as counsel for the inventor from the very outset of the venture. 197
Moreover, it found that the attorney had advised the inventor and
royalty holder with respect to the tax advantages of assigning frac-
tional royalty interests. 98 The court concluded from these facts
that the attorney had reason to anticipate a public offering of such
192. Id. at 65. In a more abbreviated discussion the court then focused on the
liability of the corporate officers. The vice-president assisted the selling agent at one
of the meetings with the plaintiffs, informed the plaintiffs that they had been selected
as suitable investors, and encouraged them to attend the closing. On the basis of these
actions the court found that the vice-president was indispensable to the final outcome
and thus was liable as a seller. Id. at 65-66. The president's only connection with the
transaction was his execution of the sales contract with the plaintiffs on behalf of the
corporation. The court summarily stated that this act was sufficient to justify imposi-
tion of seller status upon him as well. Id. at 66.
193. 244 F. Supp. 261 (D. Colo. 1965).
194. Id. at 266.
195. Id. at 264-66.
196. Id. at 266.
197. "At every turn in the testing of the timer, in the printing of promotional liter-
ature, in the negotiation for manufacture or distribution of the timer, in Colorado, in





interests and should have known that such an offer would violate
the registration requirements of the 1933 Act.' 99
Notwithstanding this characterization of the attorney's activi-
ties in connection with the sale, the court used a proximate cause
analysis to hold that the attorney was not liable as a seller under
section 12(1).200 The court reasoned that the holdings of the early
brokerage decisions import a causation test into section 12(1).201
Citing those decisions for the broad proposition that a person may
sell what he does not own, the court concluded that in order to
impose liability as a seller upon a non-owner it is necessary to be
able to state that "but for" the particular defendant's conduct,
there would have been no sale.20 2
Applying this test to the facts before it, the court found that
while the sale would not have been consummated without the
services of an attorney, the evidence failed to establish that the
defendant did more than serve in that capacity. 203 Emphasizing
that the attorney's activities were confined to provision of legal
services, the court held that the attorney's conduct did not amount
to offering or selling a security. 2°4 Significantly, the court rejected
the plaintiffs' attempt to establish causation under a theory of
nonfeasance. While the court agreed that the attorney might have
acted to prevent the sale, it stated that his failure to do so did not
render him an offeror or seller.205
In a series of opinions the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Cir-
cuit has more fully developed the causation test first articulated in
Lennerth and Nicewarner. In Hill York Corp. v. American Interna-
tional Franchises, Inc. 206 the Fifth Circuit used the language
quoted earlier from Lennerth to hold two developers of a
franchise promotion scheme liable as sellers under sections 12(1)
199. "In short, Hudson had reason to anticipate a public offering; he knew
that no registration statement was in effect; he should have known that
the assignments were securities; he knew the Nicewarners were from
Illinois and could have foreseen the use of the mails or of interstate
facilities; and he could see that the Nicewarners needed the protection





203. Id. The court rejected the plaintiffs' assertions that they had been induced to
purchase the fractional interest in the royalty by the attorney's optimistic statements
regarding the timer during a visit to the attorney's office. The court found it more
likely that the plaintiffs had already agreed to purchase the interest by the time they
reached the attorney's office, and that the visit with the attorney merely served to
formalize the transaction. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id. "True, he might have prevented the sale, but failure to do so in these
circumstances does not render one a seller or an offeror." Id.




The defendants in Hill York formulated a plan to sell restau-
rant franchises through corporations to be established in various
geographic areas. One such corporation was organized in Florida.
In accordance with their usual mode of operation, the defendants
initially sought out a few local investors to form the Florida cor-
poration and to serve as its officers and directors.20 These officers
and directors then caused the Florida corporation to sell its stock
to the plaintiffs, using the stock sale funds to purchase from the
defendants the right to sell the restaurant franchises in Florida.
20 9
The defendants made none of the actual sales of stock in the
Florida corporation to plaintiffs. Indeed, they never met the
plaintiffs prior to their purchases. However, they assisted the of-
ficers of the Florida corporation in the marketing process by in-
structing them in solicitation techniques and by providing sales
literature.210 The Florida corporation did not register the sale of
its stock with the SEC.211 Officers of the Florida corporation
made numerous misrepresentations to the plaintiffs in connection
with the sales. 21 2
The plaintiffs sued the defendants under sections 12(1) and
12(2) alleging that the defendants' activities amounted to a pyra-
mid scheme to funnel money to themselves from stock sales in the
local corporations.21 3 Since the plaintiffs had no direct contact
with the defendants prior to their purchases, the court might have
had difficulty fitting the defendants into a Cady solicitation analy-
sis for purposes of holding them liable as sellers under section
12.214 Perhaps for this reason the court chose a different route.
Affirming the jury verdict in favor of the plaintiffs, the Fifth
Circuit cited the early brokerage cases as authority for the broad
proposition that the concept of seller is not limited to the person
207. Id. at 695. See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
208. 448 F.2d at 684-85.
209. Id. at 685.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 686.
212. Specifically, the officers of the Florida corporation showed the plaintiffs pro-
motional literature prepared by defendants, told the plaintiffs that one of the defend-
ants was an experienced capitalization consultant, and gave glowing reports on the
success of similar sales centers organized by defendants. No disclosure was made of
state investigations pending against some of these other centers or of an investigation
being conducted by the SEC of a predecessor operation run by the defendants. Id. at
685. The court found that the officers of the Florida corporation who made the sales
to plaintiffs on behalf of the corporation were as ignorant as the plaintiffs concerning
the misrepresentations and omissions. Id. at 696.
213. Id. at 685-86.
214. See supra notes 39-61 and accompanying text for a discussion of the analysis
in Cady v. Murphy, 30 F. Supp. 466 (D. Me. 1939), af'd, 113 F.2d 988 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 311 U.S. 705 (1940).
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who passes legal title. 215 The court adopted the Lennerth proxi-
mate cause test as the applicable standard for determining imposi-
tion of primary liability under either section 12(1) or 12(2).216 The
court viewed the proximate cause analysis as a reasonable middle
ground between what it characterized as an antiquated strict priv-
ity approach and an overly broad participation test which at-
tempts to hold liable as sellers all those who participate in events
leading up to the transaction.217
Applying the proximate cause test to the facts before it, the
court found that the defendants qualified as sellers. 218 The court
stated that the defendants were the motivating force behind the
Florida project and reasoned that the plaintiffs would not have
purchased stock in the Florida corporation if the defendants had
not come to Florida with their bag of promotional tricks. 219
Lennerth, Nicewarner, and Hill York all used a "but for" ap-
proach to causation in drawing the original parameters of the
proximate cause test.220 However, tort law has long recognized
215. 448 F.2d at 692.
216. Id. at 692-93. The court noted that the term "seller" has sometimes been
accorded a broader construction under § 12(2) than § 12(1). Id. at 692 & n. 17. See
supra note 139. However, once the court accepted the proximate cause test as the
applicable standard for liability under § 12(1), it felt comfortable using this test as the
applicable standard for § 12(2) as well, since it found no authority which supported
use of a narrower standard of liability for § 12(2) than § 12(1). Id. at 695. The court
found it unnecessary to decide whether the proximate cause test would be uniformly
sufficient for determining liability under § 12(2) or whether seller liability under
§ 12(2) might sometimes be accorded a broader construction. Id. at 695-96 n. 24.
The Hill York court thus enunciated the proximate cause test as the applicable stan-
dard of liability for both §§ 12(1) and 12(2) but left unanswered the question of
whether or not it might be appropriate to broaden the definition of "seller" in future
§ 12(2) cases.
In Pharo v. Smith, 621 F.2d 656 (5th Cir. 1980), see infra notes 228-242 and
accompanying text, the Fifth Circuit again addressed a case involving claims under
both § 12(1) and § 12(2). The court alluded to the question left open in Hill York.
The Pharo court pointed out that subsequent to Hill York, the Fifth Circuit used the
proximate cause test in Lewis v. Walston & Co., 487 F.2d 617 (5th Cir. 1973), see infra
notes 223-227 and accompanying text, without any indication that the word "seller"
might be given a different reading in § 12(1) than in § 12(2). Therefore, the Pharo
court concluded that it was appropriate to use the proximate cause test as the standard
of liability for both sections. 621 F.2d at 665-68 & nn. 6-8.
217. 448 F.2d at 692.
218. Id. at 693.
219. Id. at 693-94. With respect to the § 12(1) count the defendants were also
held liable as control persons of the officers of the Florida corporation within the
meaning of§ 15 of the 1933 Act. 448 F.2d at 693. See supra note 29 for text of§ 15.
The court found this alternative basis of liability unavailable as to the § 12(2) count.
It felt that since the officers of the Florida corporation were as ignorant of the misrep-
resentations and omissions as the plaintiffs, the officers could not be found guilty of
§ 12(2) violations, and thus the defendants could not be secondarily liable as control
persons. 448 F.2d at 696-97.
220. Lennerth v. Mendenhall, 234 F. Supp. 59 (N.D. Ohio 1964); Nicewarner v.
Bleavins, 244 F. Supp. 261 (D. Colo. 1965); Hill York Corp. v. American Int'l
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the inadequacy of a "but for" approach to causation in the face of
concurrent causes. 22' Thus, when the Fifth Circuit next addressed
the question of seller status under section 12, it refined its formu-
lation of the proximate cause test to the "substantial factor" ap-
proach preferred in torts cases.222
Lewis v. Walston & Co .,223 a case similar on its facts to Katz v.
Amos Treat & Co .,224 involved a multi-count complaint against a
brokerage firm and broker stemming from the broker's activities
in encouraging plaintiffs to invest early in a company expected to
go public.225 Affirming the trial court verdict against the broker
under a section 12(1) theory, the court stated that although the
broker was not a seller within the conventional meaning of the
term, i.e., the person who parts with the stock sold in exchange for
consideration, this fact was not conclusive of the broker's liability
as a seller under section 12(l).226 The court pointed to the proxi-
mate cause test as the proper standard for determining seller sta-
tus. The court found that the broker's actions were a "substantial
factor" in bringing about the plaintiffs' purchases and thus the
proximate cause of those purchases. 227
In Pharo v. Smith 228 the Fifth Circuit was once again called
Franchises, Inc., 448 F.2d 680 (5th Cir. 1971). See supra notes 188-219 and accompa-
nying text.
221. See general,y W. PROSSER, HANDaOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 41 (4th ed.
1971):
Restricted to the question of causation alone, and regarded merely
as a rule of exclusion, the "but for" rule serves to explain the greater
number of cases; but there is one type of situation in which it fails. If
two causes concur to bring about an event, and either one of them oper-
ating alone, would have been sufficient to cause the identical result,
some other test is needed ....
The defendant's conduct is a cause of the event if it was a material
element and a substantial factor in bringing it about ....
Such a formula, for it can scarcely be called a test, is clearly an
improvement over the "but for" rule ....
If the defendant's conduct was a substantial factor in causing the
plaintiffs injury, it follows that he will not be absolved from liability
merely because other causes have contributed to the result, since such
causes, innumerable, are always present.
Id. at 239-40 (footnotes omitted).
222. Id. See infra notes 223-227 and accompanying text.
223. 487 F.2d 617 (5th Cir. 1973).
224. 411 F.2d 1046 (2d Cir. 1969). See supra notes 154-172 and accompanying
text for a discussion of the Katz opinion.
225. 487 F.2d at 619-20. The jury originally returned verdicts against both de-
fendants. The trial judge granted judgment notwithstanding the verdict in the firm's
favor but allowed the judgment against the broker to stand. 347 F. Supp. at 997-98.
The appellate court reversed the judgment in favor of the firm and affirmed the judg-
ment against the broker. 487 F.2d at 624.
226. 487 F.2d at 621-22.
227. Id. The court also found it significant that the plaintiffs testified that they
had relied on the broker. Id.
228. 621 F.2d 656 (5th Cir. 1980).
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upon to determine the liability of a collateral participant as a
seller under sections 12(1) and 12(2). The defendant, Deltec Inter-
national, Ltd., was a creditor of W.L. Smith Poultry Company, a
corporation owned by the Smith family. W.L. Smith Poultry liq-
uidated and reincorporated under the name Smith's Pride Foods,
Inc.229 Shortly after the reincorporation, Deltec accepted a trans-
fer of restricted stock in Smith's Pride from the Smith family in
settlement of the preexisting debt. The Smith family agreed to
buy back the shares over the course of a year for a price
equivalent to the old debt. 230
Following reincorporation, Smith's Pride began preparations
for a public offering. One of the company's officers convinced the
plaintiffs, who were customers of the company, to purchase shares
in Smith's Pride in advance of the public offering with a view to
registering the shares with the public issue and selling out at a
profit when the issue came to market.2 3'
The sales to the plaintiffs were not registered with the SEC.
When the public offering failed to materialize, the plaintiffs filed a
multi-count complaint, which included claims under sections
12(1) and 12(2), against Smith's Pride, various affiliated Smith
companies, the Smith family, and the corporate officer who pro-
moted the stock.232 Smith's Pride went bankrupt during the pro-
ceedings, and the plaintiffs were granted leave to amend their
complaint to add the creditor Deltec as a defendant to each
count.2 33 The trial court subsequently granted summary judg-
ment in favor of Deltec.234 The Fifth Circuit affirmed as to the
federal claims.2 35
With respect to Deltec's status as a seller under sections 12(1)
and 12(2), the plaintiffs argued that Deltec had a motive to en-
courage sales by the Smiths of their Smith's Pride stock in order to
assure that the Smiths had funds for satisfaction of the repurchase
obligation to Deltec. The plaintiffs contended that Deltec knew or
should have known that the checks it was receiving for payment of
the repurchase obligation might have been funded by proceeds
from the illegal sales of Smith's Pride stock to the plaintiffs. The
229. Id. at 659.
230. Id. at 662.
231. Id. at 660-61. Plaintiffs' checks for the stock purchase were made payable to
Smith's Pride. However, the shares sold to plaintiffs actually came from a block of
stock owned by one of the Smith family members. Id.
232. Id. at 661.
233. Id. at 661-62.
234. The lower court opinion in Pharo is not reported but is discussed at 621 F.2d
663.
235. 621 F.2d at 675. The appellate court concluded that the district court's grant
of summary judgment operated as a dismissal without prejudice of the pendent state
claims, which dismissal was properly within the trial court's discretion. Id. at 674-75.
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plaintiffs maintained that Deltec should have acted to stop the
sales. 236 Tracing the development of the proximate cause analysis
through the Hill York 237 and Lewis238 cases, the court stated:
We read Hill York and Lewis as limiting sections 12(1) and (2)
sellers (i) to those in privity with the purchaser and (ii) to those
whose participation in the buy-sell transaction is a substantial
factor in causing the transaction to take place . . . . But be-
yond the words "substantial factor," we have no guideposts
other than the factual situations presented in these two cases to
assist us in determining whether to impose strict liability in a
given case. Accordingly, we shall examine the salient facts
before us to determine whether an analogy with Hill York or
Lewis exists. 239
Reviewing the record before it, the court found no evidence
that Deltec knew ofthe sales to plaintiffs. The court concluded
summarily that the facts before it were not analogous to those in
Hill York or Lewis and that the evidence did not demonstrate that
Deltec played a substantial or integral role in effecting the transac-
tions in question.240 As the court in Nicewarner had done, the
Pharo court rejected the plaintiffs' argument that Deltec's failure
to stop the sales when it should have suspected that they were
taking place was a substantial causative factor in execution of the
transactions. 24'
Given Deltec's attenuated connection to the sales in issue and
the plaintiffs' convoluted attempts to establish a causal connection
based on Deltec's inaction, the holding in Pharo is not particularly
surprising. The most telling portion of the opinion is the court's
admission of the uncertainty connected with application of the
proximate cause test.242 Nowhere is this uncertainty in applica-
tion more apparent than in the contrary results reached on similar
facts in two recent opinions of the Fifth Circuit regarding seller
status under section 12.243
In Croy v. Campbell24 Dr. and Mrs. Croy consulted Winfield
236. Id. at 668.
237. Hill York Corp. v. American Int'l Franchises, Inc., 448 F.2d 680 (5th Cir.
1971). See supra notes 206-219 and accompanying text.
238. Lewis v. Walston, 487 F.2d 617 (5th Cir. 1973). See supra notes 223-227 and
accompanying text.
239. 621 F.2d at 667 (footnote omitted).
240. Id.
241. Id. at 668. See Nicewarner v. Bleavins, 244 F. Supp. 261 (D. Colo. 1965),
discussed supra notes 193-205 and accompanying text. The Pharo court also rejected
plaintiffs' arguments that Deltec could be liable under § 12 as an aider and abettor or
conspirator (see infra note 348 and accompanying text) or liable as a control person
under § 15 of the 1933 Act. Id. at 668-71.
242. Id. at 667. See supra text accompanying note 239.
243. Croy v. Campbell, 624 F.2d 709 (5th Cir. 1980); Junker v. Crory, 650 F.2d
1349 (5th Cir. 1981).
244. 624 F.2d 709 (5th Cir. 1980).
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Campbell, an attorney and certified public accountant, for tax
planning advice. Campbell arranged for the Croys to meet with a
real estate developer whom he had represented on previous occa-
sions to discuss purchase of a limited partnership interest as a tax
shelter. Campbell told the Croys that the project in question was
one of the best investments as a tax shelter that he had ever seen.
He gave the Croys a sales brochure from the developer which con-
tained financial information about the project. Campbell used the
brochure to make estimates and projections with respect to the
Croys' potential tax liability. He reviewed the brochure with them
and told them the method he had used in calculating projected
depreciation. He did recommend that the Croys make an in-
dependent business judgment about the advisability of investing
in the partnership. 245 The evidence indicated that the developer
was to pay Campbell's fee for representation of the Croys. 24 6
Campbell's depreciation projections proved to be inaccurate be-
cause the basis figure which the developer gave him and which
Campbell used in his computations was wrong. 247
Dissatisfied with their purchase, the Croys sued both the de-
veloper and Campbell under section 12(2) of the 1933 Act and
rule lOb-5. 248 The developer settled, and trial proceeded against
Campbell.249 The district court directed a verdict against the
plaintiffs on both counts of the complaint. The court premised its
finding with respect to the section 12(2) count on the ground that
the attorney did not qualify as a seller for purposes of section
12(2).250 The Fifth Circuit affirmed the directed verdict on both
counts. 25'
With respect to the seller issue, the Fifth Circuit stated that
the scope of the term "seller" should be defined with a view to the
245. Id. at 711.
246. Id. Dr. Croy testified that he did not learn of this fee arrangement until after
he and his wife had invested in the project. Only then did he discover that the fee was
contingent upon their decision to invest. Campbell testified that his fee had not been
contingent and that he had disclosed the fee arrangement to the Croys prior to their
investment. Id.
247. Id. at 711-12.
248. Id. at 712.
249. Id. at 711 n.2.
250. The memorandum decision of the district court is unreported but is summa-
rized at 624 F.2d at 712 & n.4. The district court also found that Campbell made no
material misstatements or omissions of fact, that his conduct was not reckless, and
that the plaintiffs were estopped by their own conduct from contesting the adequacy
of Campbell's investigation. Id. at 712.
251. 624 F.2d at 716. Specifically, the appellate court let stand the district court
findings that Campbell was not a seller for purposes of § 12(2), that he had not made
any material misstatements or omissions, and that his conduct was not reckless. Since
these findings adequately disposed of both the § 12(2) count and the rule lOb-5 claim,




purpose of the 1933 Act. The court characterized the 1933 Act as
being designed to insure that potential investors are provided with
all material information concerning public offerings of securities.
It stated that the Act accomplishes this purpose by imposing dis-
closure requirements on those with access to relevant informa-
tion.252 Noting that the 1933 Act should be broadly construed to
effectuate its remedial purpose, the court reiterated its rejection of
a strict privity approach in favor of the proximate cause analysis
outlined in Hill York, Lewis, and Pharo .253
The court of appeals determined that the district court's find-
ings with respect to Campbell's participation in the sale were not
clearly erroneous.254 Applying the proximate cause analysis to
these findings, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's deci-
sion that the attorney was not a seller for purposes of section
12(2).255 In so doing, it again rejected the plaintiffs' attempt to
establish a causal connection based on a theory of the defendant's
nonfeasance. The court held:
Applying these findings to the "seller" concept, as we have de-
fined it, we cannot say that the defendant's participation in this
transaction proximately caused the plaintiffs' injury, or that
they would not have purchased the security "but for" his ac-
tions. The injury was caused by the fact that the figures used
by Campbell in arriving at the depreciable basis were in error.
Plaintiffs contend that he should be held liable for his failure to
investigate these matters thoroughly. This failure to investi-
gate, however, was not a substantial factor in the Croys' invest-
ment decision, and Campbell cannot, therefore, be held liable
under Section 12(2) as a seller of the security. 256
The court confined its decision to the facts before it, noting
that the opinion should not be interpreted to mean that a lawyer
who participates in a transaction can never be liable as a seller for
purposes of section 12.257 Faced with similar facts a year later, the
Fifth Circuit ruled in Junker v. Crory2 58 that an attorney's partici-
252. Id. at 712.
253. Id. at 713-14.
254. Id. at 714. In particular, the district court found: (1) that Campbell made no
representations regarding the operational or construction aspects of the project; (2)
that he did not participate in preparation of the sales brochure; (3) that when he
delivered the sales brochure to the Croys he was acting on their behalf and not on
behalf of the developer; (4) that he did not attempt to persuade the Croys to purchase
the limited partnership interest; (5) that his statement to the effect that the project was
the best investment he had ever seen referred only to projected tax results based upon
the figures he had seen; and (6) that the plaintiffs made a decision to invest in the





258. 650 F.2d 1349 (5th Cir. 1981).
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pation in a sales transaction did render him liable as a seller under
section 12.259
In 1959 James Junker was a vice president and sales manager
of Road Equipment Company, Inc., a corporation engaged in sell-
ing construction equipment. The voting stock of Road was owned
by Walter Crory. Junker and Mr. and Mrs. Crory were also
among the initial shareholders of Reco Investment Corporation.
Reco was organized in 1962 to acquire, improve, and lease indus-
trial property. In 1965 Junker terminated his employment with
Road and started a competitive business. However, he retained
his minority shareholder position in Reco. 260
In April 1973 Junker received notice that a Reco sharehold-
ers' meeting would be held for the purpose of discussing Reco's
indebtedness to Road. The Reco debt was largely a product of the
fact that Road paid less than market rates on property leased from
Reco, and Reco paid excessive management fees to Road.261
Frederik Heisler, an attorney who represented both corpora-
tions and Walter Crory, served as chairman of the meeting and
acted as proxy for the Crorys. Heisler stated that Reco would
either have to borrow money to repay Road or liquidate. The
Reco shareholders approved liquidation over the opposition of
Junker's proxy, who made a number of motions aimed at chal-
lenging the lease arrangement. 262
In July 1973 the Reco shareholders held another meeting.
Heisler was again present, this time as proxy for Mrs. Crory and
another shareholder. He stated that in the opinion of the real es-
tate experts he had consulted, liquidation was not practicable.
Heisler suggested merging Reco into Road on a book value basis
as a means of eliminating the debt. 263 Junker voted in favor of
terminating the liquidation but against the merger.264 However,
the merger received the requisite approval and was consummated
on a book value basis.265
Two months after the merger, Crory wrote all Road share-
holders, which by reason of the merger included Junker, and indi-
cated that Road's 1973 annual report would show a net loss due to
259. Id. at 1360-61.
260. Id. at 1353-56.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 1354.
264. Id.
265. Id. The district court credited the plaintiff's evidence that Reco's shares had
a value in excess of book value due to appreciation in underlying corporate assets,
and that Road's shares had a value less than book value based upon net earning
capacity. Id. at 1354-55.
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large purchases of inventory which had not been sold. 266 No one
had disclosed either the inventory purchases or their potential im-
pact on Road's net income to the shareholders at the time of the
merger.267
Junker filed a multi-count complaint against Road, the of-
ficers and directors of Reco, and Heisler. The complaint included
a claim against all the defendants under section 12 (2) of the 1933
Act.2 68 The Fifth Circuit affirmed the trial court's judgment
against Road as Junker's immediate seller under section 12(2).269
It also affirmed the trial court judgment against the officers and
directors of Reco for breach of fiduciary duties owed to Junker
under state law.270 However, the attorney Heisler was not an of-
ficer, director or shareholder of either Road or Reco. Thus, there
was no pendent state claim on which to premise his liability to
Junker. For this reason, the court addressed Heisler's liability as a
seller under section 12(2).271
Applying the proximate cause analysis, the court concluded
that the level of Heisler's participation differed from that of the
attorney in Croy v. Campbell:
Heisler's role in bringing about the merger in this case dif-
fered significantly from the relatively inactive part played by
the lawyer in Croy. According to Heisler's testimony, he ini-
tially suggested the possibility of a merger to Walter Crory.
The minutes of the Reco shareholders' meeting at which the
merger was discussed reflect that Heisler attended as Chesley
Crory's proxy and advanced the merger as the solution to
Reco's financial problems. He also prepared the merger docu-
ments. Thus, unlike the attorney in Croy, Heisler did attempt to
persuade the Reco shareholders to make the purchase of Road
stock pursuant to the merger. He also made representations at
the Reco shareholders' meeting regarding his investigation into
possible sales of Reco property and the feasibility of a liquida-
266. Id. at 1355.
267. Id.
268. Id. at 1356.
269. Id. at 1361-62. The court noted that since Road issued the shares received by
Junker in the merger, Road was Junker's immediate vendor. Thus, no proximate
cause analysis as to seller status was necessary. The court found that the plaintiff had
established all other elements of his prima facie case under § 12(2) against Road, and
that Road had failed to establish the available due care defense. Id.
270. Id. at 1358. In light of its affirmance of the state law claims, the court did not
find it necessary to reach the federal securities law claims asserted against the officers
and directors. The court noted that some of these issues, in particular (1) the status of
the Reco officers and directors as sellers under § 12(2), (2) the existence of private
cause of action under § 17(a) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1976), and (3)
whether a minority shareholder who votes against a merger can establish reliance on
the officers and directors for purposes of recovery under rule lOb-5, had not been
adequately addressed by the parties. Id. at n. 10.
271. Id. at 1358-60.
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tion of Reco as compared with the merger. The evidence of
Heisler's involvement in the effort to bring about the merger
supports the trial court's finding that he was a key participant
in the transaction. His role was not that of a passive advisor as
was that of the attorney in Croy; rather, he was an active nego-
tiator in the transaction, acting as agent-in-fact as well as attor-
ney-at-law, implementor not counsellor. Therefore, we agree
with the trial court's conclusion that Heisler's actions brought
him within the scope of the seller definition under Section
12(2). 2 7 2
Fine distinctions can no doubt be drawn between the facts in
Croy and Junker. However, one must question the attempt by the
Junker court to justify the differing results of the proximate cause
analysis in the two cases on the grounds that the attorney in Croy
was a mere passive advisor playing a relatively inactive role in the
plaintiffs' investment, as compared to Heisler's role in the Road-
Reco merger. The attorney in Croy put the plaintiffs in touch with
the developer from whom they purchased their limited partner-
ship interest. That developer was a prior client of the attorney,
and he agreed to pay the attorney's fee for representation of the
plaintiffs in the transaction in question. The attorney told the
plaintiffs that the project was the best tax shelter he had ever seen,
and he reviewed the developer's sales literature with them.27
3
These facts hardly seem to support the Junker court's characteri-
zation of the Croys' counsel as passive. This is stated not so much
to challenge or defend the holding in either case, but to emphasize
that the inconsistency and uncertainty which beset the participa-
tion cases plague the proximate cause analysis as well.
As Judge Tjoflat conceded in Pharo v. Smith, 274 apart from
the words "substantial factor," the Fifth Circuit's proximate cause
analysis offers no guidelines for application.275 As evidenced by
the varying results reached by courts which have attempted to ap-
ply the proximate cause analysis, a participant whom one court
judges to be a substantial factor in causing a plaintiff's purchase
might in a slightly different factual setting be denominated as not
significant enough to justify characterization as a seller.276 This
was true in the case which first employed the proximate cause test.
The court in Lennerth v. Mendenha1277 applied its causation anal-
ysis without distinction to impose seller status upon the selling
272. Id. at 1360.
273. See supra notes 244-257 and accompanying text.
274. 621 F.2d 656 (5th Cir. 1980). See supra notes 228-242 and accompanying
text.
275. 621 F.2d at 667. See supra text accompanying note 239.
276. See supra note 186.
277. 234 F. Supp. 59 (N.D. Ohio 1964). See supra notes 188-192 and accompany-
ing text.
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agent who heavily promoted the investment to the plaintiffs, as
well as upon a corporate officer whose sole connection with the
transaction was execution of the purchase contract on behalf of
the corporate issuer.278 The absence of workable guidelines is
equally apparent in the divergeiat holdings in Croy and Junker.
Without any pretext of premise in the statutory definitions of
"offer" and "sell" in section 2(3),279 the Fifth Circuit chooses to
define seller in broad policy strokes by borrowing one of the most
complicated concepts of tort law with all of its attendant
problems.280 The substantial factor formula is considered in torts
a sufficiently intelligible phrase to serve by itself as an adequate
guideline for determining the question of causation in fact. 28
1
However, once it has been established that the defendant's con-
duct was in fact one of the causes of the plaintiffs injury, tort law
has long recognized the inadequacy of the substantial factor test
for determining whether the defendant's conduct was so signifi-
cant and important a cause that the law should extend responsibil-
ity for the conduct to the consequences which have occurred. 282 It
278. Id
279. See supra note 48 (text of § 2(3)). See also supra notes 39-59 and accompa-
nying text (analyzing Cady v. Murphy, 30 F. Supp. 466 (D. Me. 1939), aft'd, 113 F.2d
988 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 705 (1940), and its use of the definitions of "offer"
and "sell" to expand liability under § 12(2)).
280. See supra note 221 for a discussion of the substantial factor test.
281. See W. PROSSER, supra note 221, § 41:
The defendant's conduct is a cause of the event if it was a material
element and a substantial factor in bringing it about. Whether it was
such a substantial factor is for the jury to determine, unless the issue is
so clear that reasonable men could not differ. It has been considered
that "substantial factor" is a phrase sufficiently intelligible to the lay-
man to furnish an adequate guide in instructions to the jury, and that it
is neither possible nor desirable to reduce it to any lower terms. As
applied to the fact of causation alone, no better test has been devised.
Id. at 240 (footnotes omitted).
282. Id. § 42:
Once it is established that the defendant's conduct has in fact been
one of the causes of the plaintiff's injury, there remains the question
whether the defendant should be legally responsible for what he has
caused. Unlike the fact of causation, with which it is often hopelessly
confused, this is essentially a problem of law . . . . [T]his becomes es-
sentially a question of whether the policy of the law will extend the
responsibility for the conduct to the consequences which have in fact
occurred. . . .This is not a question of causation, or even a question
of fact, but quite far removed from both; and the attempt to deal with it
in such terms has lead and can lead only to utter confusion.
As applied to the fact of causation alone, the [substantial factor]
test is of considerable assistance, and perhaps no better guide can be
found. But when the "substantial factor" test is made to include all the
ill-defined considerations of policy which go to limit liability once cau-
sation in fact is found, it has no more definite meaning than "proximate
cause," and it becomes a hindrance rather than a help. It is particularly
unfortunate insofar as it suggests that the questions involved are only
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is this latter question which is at issue in most of the proximate
cause cases discussed above. For purposes of this inquiry, the
substantial factor test lacks any definite meaning.
The courts in the participation cases rejected strict privity in
favor of holding some participants in a sale liable as sellers. How-
ever, they failed to articulate what measure of participation justi-
fies imposition of seller status.283 The courts in the proximate
cause cases attempted to answer this question by narrowing the
field to those whose participation is a substantial factor in causing
the sale. However, the substantial factor formula without more
fails to delineate any guidelines for determining when the defend-
ant's conduct rises to a level of significance sufficient to trigger
seller status, as opposed to a finding that the defendant's conduct
is not integral to the sale.284
The deficiency in both approaches is that the analysis of seller
status has been divorced from the clear language of the statute
and from an examination of section 12(2) in the context of the
total statutory scheme. 285 The plain language of section 12(2)
contemplates rescissory relief restoring the status quo between a
purchaser and his immediate seller. Thus limited in scope, it im-
poses liability on the defendant seller for negligence without proof
of reliance by the purchaser.286 Rule lOb-5 affords relief to a
plaintiff against a defendant irrespective of any privity between
plaintiff and defendant in the transaction in question. However,
thus broadened in scope, it requires the plaintiff to prove other
elements in order to justify imposition of liability upon the de-
fendant. 287 In particular, the plaintiff must prove that he relied on
the misrepresentation or omission alleged and must establish a
state of mind on the part of the defendant greater than
negligence. 288
Having departed from the clear language and intended scope
of section 12(2) to afford relief against some participants collateral
to the sale, it is not surprising that the courts in the participation
questions of causation, obscuring all other issues, and as it tends to
leave to the jury matters which should be decided by the court ....
[T]he 1948 revision of the Restatement has limited its application very
definitely to the fact of causation alone.
Id. at 244, 248 (footnotes omitted). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§§ 431, 433 (1965).
283. See supra notes 113-185 and accompanying text.
284. See supra notes 274-282 and accompanying text.
285. See infra notes 357-379, 391-418 and accompanying text.
286. See supra note 1 for the text of § 12(2). See also supra notes 20-25 and ac-
companying text.
287. See supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text (comparing and contrasting a
§ 12(2) action with a rule lOb-5 action).
288. See supra note 17.
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and proximate cause cases have difficulty drawing lines as to
which defendants have participated to a culpable degree. The
participation and proximate cause cases upset the careful balance
between the privity requirement in section 12(2) and the reduced
culpability standard contained therein. They deem to be sellers
certain collateral participants who should be reachable only under
rule lOb-5 with its greater requirements of proof.289 Indeed, it is
significant that many of the courts in the proximate cause cases
reach their findings regarding whether the defendant played a
causal role in the transaction by importing reliance and scienter
elements into the causation inquiry.290 The Eighth Circuit's defi-
nition of "seller" does nothing to shut this Pandora's box.
C. The Eighth Circuit Test
In Wasson v. SEC29 1 the defendant Wasson, a broker-dealer,
289. See infra notes 391-418 and accompanying text.
290. See, e.g., Davis v. Avco Fin. Servs., Inc., 1983 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
91,569, at 98,919 (6th Cir. July 10, 1984) (although purporting not to introduce reli-
ance as a part of plaintiffs' prima facie case under § 12(2), court remands as to some
members of plaintiff class for findings regarding extent to which purchases were
caused by collateral participant's activities); Pharo v. Smith, 621 F.2d 656, 667-68
(5th Cir. 1980), discussed supra notes 228-242 and accompanying text (in holding that
Deltec was not the proximate cause of plaintiffs' purchases, court emphasized that
Deltec had no knowledge of the illegal sales of Smith's Pride stock being made to
plaintiffs by the Smith family; all that plaintiffs' proof established was that Deltec
should have surmised this and stopped the sales; this was not a sufficient basis for
finding that Deltec was a substantial factor in the sales); Croy v. Campbell, 624 F.2d
709, 714 (5th Cir. 1980), discussed supra notes 244-257 and accompanying text (in
holding that attorney Campbell was not the proximate cause of plaintiffs' purchase,
Fifth Circuit noted district court finding that plaintiffs made a decision to purchase
their limited partnership interest only after viewing the project, speaking with the
developer and obtaining independent advice); Ayers v. Wolfinbarger, 491 F.2d 8, 14
(5th Cir. 1974), see supra note 186 (exonerating the defendants who sold their stock in
a financial corporation under a deferred payment arrangement to three individuals,
who upon gaining control of the financial corporation sold the stock to the plaintiffs;
the court emphasized that there was no evidence that the defendants knew or should
have known that their purchasers would violate the securities laws in the sale of the
secondary issue to plaintiffs); Lewis v. Walston, 487 F.2d 617, 622 (5th Cir. 1973), see
supra notes 223-227 and accompanying text (in holding broker liable as proximate
cause of plaintiffs' purchase, the court pointed to testimony by the plaintiffs that they
had relied upon the broker); Plunkett v. Francisco, 430 F. Supp. 235, 241 (N.D. Ga.
1977), see supra note 186 (farmer, who had no contact with plaintiff prior to plaintiffs
purchase of a tax shelter, was nonetheless a proximate cause of plaintiffs purchase;
court noted that plaintiff had relied heavily upon a warranty letter executed by the
farmer, as well as upon the selling agent's representations that the farmer was a prin-
cipal in the corporation promoting the tax shelter program); Nicewarner v. Bleavins,
244 F. Supp. 261, 266 (D. Colo. 1965), see supra notes 193-205 and accompanying
text (in holding that attorney was not the proximate cause of plaintiffs purchase of
fractional royalty interest, court discounted plaintiffs testimony that they did not de-
cide to purchase until after an office visit with the attorney in which he made optimis-
tic statements about the invention).
291. 558 F.2d 879 (8th Cir. 1977).
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appealed an SEC administrative order issued under section 15 of
the 1934 Act. 292 The order suspended his registration because of
violations of section 5 of the 1933 Act.293 In particular, Wasson
was charged with helping to effectuate sale through a straw man
of a substantial block of unregistered stock in a company known
as S & M. The stock actually belonged to a control person of S &
M and was not freely transferable. 294
Wasson defended the section 5 charges on the ground that he
had not personally executed sale of the unregistered securities. He
acknowledged that decisions involving violation of section 5
under section 12(1) have in some instances broadened the defini-
tion of "sell" to include participants who have no contact with the
purchaser. He argued, however, that the section 12(1) cases are
inapposite to violations of section 5 when prosecuted under sec-
tion 15 of the 1934 Act. Wasson reasoned that the expansive defi-
nition given to the term "sell" in section 12 cases is attributable to
the fact that this section lacks an aider and abettor provision. He
argued that such a broad definition is unnecessary under section
15 of the 1934 Act since section 15 expressly allows sanctions
against aiders and abettors.295
Without drawing any distinction between the SEC discipli-
nary action before the court and rescission actions under section
12, the Eighth Circuit discussed the participation and proximate
292. Section 15 of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78o (1976).
293. 558 F.2d at 882.
294. Id. The actual mechanics of the transaction were as follows: An officer of S
& M was interested in selling certain of his S & M shares in exchange for some
automobiles from a Minneapolis dealership. The officer's attorney contacted Howard
Davidson, a Minneapolis resident, to locate an interested car dealer. Davidson lined
up Samuel Proman, a Minneapolis car dealer, who expressed interest in the exchange.
Proman in turn contacted the defendant Wasson and asked him to follow the price of
S & M stock for awhile. Subsequently Proman agreed to exchange seven cars for
30,000 shares of S & M stock, which stock he intended to resell on the market imme-
diately. The officer of S & M transferred title to the shares into Davidson's name for
purposes of effecting the trade; Proman transferred title to the automobiles, which
served as consideration for the shares, into the name of seven out-of-state residents.
The shares were to be transferred from Davidson's name to the dealership's name for
immediate resale. However, the dealership had no account with Wasson's firm. Was-
son, therefore, opened an account in Davidson's name. The shares were resold on the
open market in Davidson's name, and the proceeds from the resale were assigned by
Davidson to the auto dealership pursuant to an agreement prepared by Wasson. Id.
Wasson knew that Davidson was not the legal owner of the S & M stock being
exchanged for the cars and knew that Davidson was not the recipient of the cars
transferred in the exchange. Wasson apparently did not know that the legal owner of
the shares was a control person of S & M subject to resale restrictions. However, he
was sanctioned because he failed to discover what a simple inquiry of Davidson
would have revealed-that the legal owner was a control person, and because he did
not apprise his superiors of sufficient details regarding the transaction to trigger a
more cautious investigation on their part. Id.
295. Id. at 885.
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cause tests developed in section 12 actions for determining seller
status. 296 Like the Fifth Circuit, the Eight Circuit rejected the par-
ticipation test as overly broad.297 However, the Eighth Circuit
also criticized the Fifth Circuit's proximate cause analysis for fail-
ing to adequately focus on implementation of the disclosure policy
behind the 1933 Act.298 The Eighth Circuit viewed this disclosure
policy as pivotal to the determination of whether a defendant's
conduct qualifies as a "sale" or "offer to sell".299
The court noted that the 1933 Act imposes registration and
disclosure requirements on those with access to information and
frequently ties applicability of these requirements to the point of
sale.300 The court stated that at least theoretically this is the time
at which relevant information can be obtained from the seller and
transmitted to the buyer.301 While conceding that the nature of
securities transactions may sometimes make it impossible to iden-
tify the sales point at which seller contacts buyer, the court
concluded:
We are not suggesting that a sales point must be identified for
each transaction and liability imposed according to each indi-
296. Id. at 885-86. The SEC in its own enforcement of § 5 has long used partici-
pation theories to hold defendants other than the immediate vendor primarily liable
as sellers and has also employed secondary liability theories such as aiding and abet-
ting. See, e.g., SEC v. Holschuh, [1982-1983 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 99,000, at 94,623-27 (7th Cir. November 23, 1982); SEC v. Murphy, 626
F.2d 633, 648-652 (9th Cir. 1980).
In SEC v. Murphy the court juxtaposed the development of participant liability
in SEC enforcement proceedings against the development of the participation and
proximate cause theories in rescission actions under § 12. The court concluded that
the SEC enforcement participation standard is theoretically broader than the substan-
tial factor test, although it concluded that in practice the standards differ little. 626
F.2d at 651-52. See supra note 74 for a discussion of SEC v. Murphy.
The Murphy court noted that the Wasson case is the only decision which, in the
context of an SEC enforcement proceeding, chose to discuss the scope of the term
"sale" in light of § 12 cases rather than in light of the SEC enforcement cases. 626
F.2d at 651 n.21.
The fact that the SEC in an enforcement context uses participation theories to
broaden the scope of primary liability for violation of § 5, as well as secondary liabil-
ity theories such as aiding and abetting, is not dispositive of the scope of civil liability
under § 12. See supra notes 63-92 and accompanying text. See also 3 L. Loss, supra
note 17: "For example, a newspaper which publishes advertisements in violation of
§ 5 becomes itself a violator as an aider and abettor, subject to injunctive and crimi-
nal proceedings. But it is hardly consistent with the statutory purpose that newspa-
pers be subjected to civil liability under § 12." Id. at 1716 n.105 (citations omitted).
For a discussion of the enforcement provisions available to the SEC for violation
of § 5, see supra note 69. For a discussion of the SEC's use of secondary liability
theories in enforcement proceedings, see infra notes 318-319 and accompanying text.






vidual's proximity to that point. However, we do believe that
one factor which ought to be considered in determining the
"sale" or "offer to sell" issue is whether the defendant was
uniquely positioned to ask relevant questions, acquire material
information, or disclose his findings.3° 2
The court had no difficulty concluding that Wasson was a
seller under the standard articulated above.30 3 The court held:
We believe Wasson should be treated as a seller because of his
extensive role in facilitating the sale, because he was made
aware of questionable circumstances surrounding the transac-
tion which should have been investigated more fully and re-
vealed in detail to his superiors, and because his position in the
flow of information made his failure to fully investigate or dis-
close all the more serious.3 °4
As discussed in the analysis of Cady v. Murphy,30 5 a finding
that someone other than the immediate vendor may be liable in
an enforcement context for offering or selling a security in viola-
tion of section 5 does not present the analytical difficulties raised
in a section 12 action. 30 6 The additional language in section 12
making the person who offers or sells a security liable to the per-
son purchasing such security from him for a rescissory measure of
relief is not present in the enforcement context to circumscribe the
terms "offer" and "sell" to the immediate vendor.30 7
However, even in an enforcement setting, the Eighth Circuit's
approach of defining "offer to sell" and "sale" in terms of broad
policy considerations presents problems. Like the participation
and proximate cause tests, the focus of the Wasson court on
whether the defendant's position in the transaction gave him ac-
cess to information or an opportunity to disclose removes the
analysis of seller status from any reference to the statutory defini-
tions of the operative terms in section 2(3).308
The Eighth Circuit seemed to draw no distinction in Wasson
between analysis of seller status in enforcement proceedings and
in section 12 actions. If the Eighth Circuit's approach is applied
in the context of a rescission action under section 12, it has the
potential of expanding the circle of possible defendants even fur-
ther than the participation and proximate cause tests. This is be-
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. Id. at 887.
305. 30 F. Supp. 466 (D. Me. 1939), af'd, 113 F.2d 988 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 311
U.S. 705 (1940). See supra notes 63-92 and accompanying text.
306. See supra notes 63-92 and accompanying text.
307. See supra notes 63-92 and accompanying text.
308. See supra note 48 for the text of § 2(3). The Wasson court briefly mentions
§ 2(3): "The 'sale' term in § 2(3) was meant to be interpreted liberally.., but not so
liberally that all participants in a transaction share liability." 558 F.2d at 886 (cita-
tions omitted).
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cause the Eighth Circuit's emphasis on the defendant's access to
information and opportunity to disclose might result in imposition
of seller status for nonfeasance.
The courts in Nicewarner v. Bleavins,3°9 Pharo v. Smith,310
and Croy v. Campbe 311 all rejected arguments that the defend-
ants should be held liable as sellers because their failure to investi-
gate further and to halt the transactions in question were a
causative factor in the sales. In contrast, the Eighth Circuit held
Wasson liable as a seller not only on the basis of his affirmative
assistance to the transaction, but also for his failure to make addi-
tional inquiries regarding the identity of the actual seller and his
failure to disclose suspicious circumstances to his superiors.31 2
At least two district court cases have subsequently applied the
Eighth Circuit's access to information and disclosure test in the
context of a section 12 rescission action. 313 Both cases absolved
the collateral participants from seller status on the grounds that
their involvement was incidental to the sales in question and that
there was no proof that they were aware of suspicious circum-
stances warranting investigation or disclosure. 314
The participation cases, the proximate cause cases, and the
Eighth Circuit approach each expand the meaning of the term
309. 244 F. Supp. 261 (D. Colo. 1965). See supra notes 193-205 and accompany-
ing text.
310. 621 F.2d 656 (5th Cir. 1980). See supra notes 228-242 and accompanying
text.
311. 624 F.2d 709 (5th Cir. 1980). See supra notes 244-257 and accompanying
text.
312. 558 F.2d at 886-87.
313. Jeffries & Co. v. United Missouri Bank, [1982-1983 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 99,257, at 96,140, 96,144 (W.D.Mo. May 24, 1983); Lingenfelter
v. Title Ins. Co. of Minnesota, 442 F. Supp. 981, 992-93 (D. Neb. 1977). In Hagert v.
Glickman, Lurie, Eiger & Co., 520 F. Supp. 1028, 1035-36 (D.Minn. 1981), see infra
notes 380-382 and accompanying text, the court granted a defense motion to dismiss
but permitted plaintiffs leave to amend their complaint to plead with more particular-
ity the status of certain attorneys and accountants as § 12 sellers under the Wasson
test. Id. at 1035-36.
But cf. Stokes v. Lokken, 644 F.2d 779, 784-85 (8th Cir. 1981), where in connec-
tion with a claim by plaintiffs that an attorney had aided and abetted violations of § 5,
the Eighth Circuit discussed seller liability in § 12 actions in terms of the proximate
cause test without any mention of Wasson. Id. at 784-85.
314. See supra note 313. In Jeffries & Co. v. United Missouri Bank, the court used
the Wasson test to hold that a bank's role in an insider's sale of stock in his company
shortly before its collapse fell short of the involvement needed to transform the bank
into a statutory seller under § 12(1) or § 12(2). [1982-1983 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP (CCH) 99,257, at 96,144. The bank held stock securing the insider's
personal loan. Id. at 96,142. It informed the insider of the number of shares which he
would need to sell in order to close out the loan and on the insider's request directed
the sale. Id. Relying on the Wasson standard, the court characterized the bank's
activities in this regard as amounting to only incidental involvement in the sale. Id. at
96,144. It emphasized that the bank was not aware of any questionable circumstances
which should have alerted it to investigate further. The court noted that no one at the
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"seller" far beyond the confines of the narrow exception for bro-
kerage situations which the court carved out in Cady v. Murphy.3 15
In contrast to the analysis in that decision, which was premised on
the definition of the operative terms in section 2(3), 3 16 the courts'
analyses in the facilitation cases have no basis in the language of
the statute. In the outermost extension of section 12(2), a number
of courts import theories of secondary liability into section
12(2). 3 17 These cases all but sound the death knell of the privity
requirement.
IV. THE EXPANDED SELLER CONCEPT MOVES FULL CIRCLE:
SECONDARY LIABILITY FOR AIDING AND ABETTING
OR CONSPIRACY
Federal securities law cases have often used theories of aiding
and abetting and of conspiracy to support imposition of implied
secondary civil liablity upon peripheral defendants who have not
themselves violated a statute, but who have been connected in
some manner with the primary wrongdoer. 318 These doctrines
bank was a broker, such as Wasson, with a duty to investigate more fully or to report
to superiors. Id.
Similarly, in Lingenfelter v. Title Ins. Co. of Minnesota, the court used the Was-
son test to exonerate a title insurance company and its wholly-owned subsidiary from
liability as sellers under § 12(2). 442 F. Supp. at 992-93. Plaintiffs purchased invest-
ment packages, which consisted of certain evidences of indebtedness relating to real
estate interests, accompanied by title insurance and collection services provided by
the defendant companies. Id. at 987-89. The court held that the provision of such
services did not amount to facilitating sales of the investment packages. Id. at
991-93. The plaintiffs failed to prove that the defendants were aware of questionable
circumstances surrounding the sales which they should have investigated or disclosed.
Id. at 993.
In both cases the court also held that the collateral participants did not aid and
abet violations of § 12(2). Jeffries & Co. v. United Missouri Bank, [1982-1983 Trans-
fer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 99,257 at 96,144 n.6; Lingenfelter v. Title Ins.
Co. of Minnesota, 442 F. Supp. at 993.
315. 30 F. Supp. 466 (D. Me. 1939), aftd, 113 F.2d 988 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 311
U.S. 705 (1940). See supra notes 39-61 and accompanying text.
316. See supra notes 39-61 and accompanying text.
317. See supra notes 241-316 and accompanying text; see infra notes 318-343 and
accompanying text.
318. See generally Ruder, supra note 17, at 620-44; Fischel, supra note 17, at
83-86.
Liability for aiding and abetting generally involves proof of three elements: (1)
that an independent wrong exists; (2) that the aider and abettor knows of the wrong's
existence; and (3) that the aider and abettor renders substantial assistance in effecting
that wrong. See generally A. JACOBS, supra note 17, § 40.02; Ruder, supra note 17, at
620-46.
Securities law cases have not always clearly distinguished between secondary lia-
bility imposed under a theory of aiding and abetting and secondary liability imposed
under a theory of conspiracy. Ruder, supra note 17, at 639-41. However, drawn from
the general law of conspiracy, the elements of securities conspiracy have been defined
as follows:
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first appeared in disciplinary proceedings and injunctive actions
commenced by the SEC. Their development in this context relied
heavily on precedent from criminal law.31 9
The doctrines of aiding and abetting and conspiracy made
their way from use in disciplinary proceedings and injunctive ac-
tions brought by the SEC to use in implied private damage actions
under rule lOb-5. Development of the doctrines in this context
rested in part on the SEC precedents mentioned above, but also
upon extension of the general tort law principles on which courts
had initially relied in recognizing an implied private action under
section 10(b). 320
The essential elements of civil and criminal conspiracy are an
agreement between two or more persons to accomplish an illegal act or
to engage in a legal act by unlawful means, an illegal or fraudulent
overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy, and, in a civil case, damage
to a person not a member of the conspiracy.
A. JACOBS, supra note 17, § 40.03, 2-156-57 (footnote omitted).
Comparing and contrasting liability for aiding and abetting with liability for
conspiracy, Professor Ruder concludes that both doctrines involve existence of an
independent wrong to which the secondary defendant can attach himself and a show-
ing that the secondary defendant knew of the wrong. See Ruder, supra note 17, at
628, 630. Professor Ruder distinguishes the two theories by noting that in aiding and
abetting the secondary defendant's attachment to the wrong takes the form of sub-
stantial assistance to the wrongdoer, whereas under a conspiracy theory the secondary
defendant's attachment to the wrong comes from an agreement with the wrongdoer.
Ruder, supra note 17, at 638-39. For another commentator's comparison and contrast
of aiding and abetting and conspiracy, see A. JACOBS, supra note 17, at § 40.03, 2-160.
319. SEC v. Timetrust, Inc., 28 F. Supp. 34 (N.D. Cal. 1939), injunction granted, 39
F. Supp. 145 (N.D. Cal. 1940),appeal dismissed on stipulation, 118 F.2d 718 (9th Cir.
1941), injunction reversed, 142 F.2d 744 (9th Cir. 1944), illustrates this reliance on
criminal law analogues. In that action the SEC sought to enjoin defendants from
aiding and abetting a violation of § 17(a) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1976).
28 F. Supp. at 36. Section 17(a) is the general antifraud provision of the 1933 Act. It
is roughly analagous to § 10(b) of the 1934 Act, except that it is directed at fraud in
the offer or sale of a security and does not extend to fraud in the purchase of a secur-
ity.
In denying a defense motion to dismiss the complaint, the court noted that if the
action had been brought as a criminal proceeding under the 1933 Act for violation of
§ 17(a), the defendants could have been named as aiders and abettors since the fed-
eral criminal code renders aiders and abettors liable as principals. 28 F. Supp. at 43.
The court reasoned that an injunctive action by the SEC is similar in many respects to
a criminal prosecution, and thus the doctrine of aiding and abetting should be equally
applicable in civil injunctive proceedings. Id.
See generally Ruder, supra note 17, at 624-28; A. JACOBS, supra note 17, at
§ 40.02, 2-146 & nn.l-3.
320. Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp. 673 (N.D.Ind.
1966), aft'd, 417 F.2d 147 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 989 (1970), is perhaps
the best example of this reliance on tort law principles. In that case the defendants
argued that aiding and abetting should not be available under rule lOb-5 because
there is no explicit statutory language in § 10(b) evidencing Congressional intent to
hold aiders and abettors liable. Id. at 675-76. Rejecting the defendants' position, the
court noted that the first case to recognize a private right of action under rule lOb-5,
Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946), did so not on the
basis of explicit statutory language but upon general principles of tort law, in particu-
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However, relatively early in the decisional history of section
12(2), the notion of secondary liability for aiding and abetting or
conspiracy was summarily rejected by a number of courts and for
good reason.321 The criminal and tort law analogues used to sup-
port implication of secondary liability theories in SEC enforce-
ment cases and in implied actions under rule 1Ob-5 are not present
in the express cause of action provided under section 12(2).
With respect to the criminal law origins of the doctrines, sec-
tion 12(2) stands in marked contrast to other sections of the 1933
and 1934 Acts in which theories of aiding and abetting or conspir-
acy have been used.322 Section 12(2) neither defines a violation
nor purports to make any act illegal. It merely imposes civil liabil-
ity on a seller in favor of an aggrieved purchaser. Thus, it cannot
serve as a premise for a disciplinary proceeding or civil injunctive
action by the SEC.323 As noted above, SEC actions are the con-
text in which secondary civil liability theories traditionally devel-
oped by way of analogy to criminal prosecutions. 324
With respect to the tort law origins of the doctrines, section
lar RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 286 (1939). 259 F. Supp. at 680. The court found it
appropriate to continue to use general principles of law to shape the development of
federal common law remedies under the rule. The court held that recognition of an
aiding and abetting theory as formulated in RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 876 (1939)
and in the SEC precedents mentioned above was a logical and natural complement to
the Kardon doctrine. Id.
See generally Ruder, supra note 17, at 620-23; A. JACOBS, supra note 17, at
§ 40.02, 2-146 & nn.4-5.
321. See, e.g., Kramer v. Scientific Control Corp., 365 F. Supp. 780, (E.D. Pa.
1973); 452 F. Supp. 812, 814-15 (E.D. Pa. 1978); Fershtman v. Schectman, [1970-1971
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 92,996 at 90,678 (S.D.N.Y. April 9,
1971), afd as modified, 450 F.2d 1357 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1066
(1972); Barlas v. Bear, Steams & Co., [1964-1966 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) $ 91,674 at 95,477-78 (N.D. I11. March 31, 1966); Zachman v. Erwin, 186 F.
Supp. 681, 686 (S.D. Tex. 1959), discussed supra notes 114-125 and in accompanying
text.
322. Compare § 12(2), supra note 1, with § 5 of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77e
(1976), discussed supra note 67 and in accompanying text, with § 10(b) of the 1934
Act, the text of which appears supra note 5.
323. See A. BROMBERG, supra note 11 at § 8.5 (315):
A conceptual barrier to the adoption of aiding-abetting and con-
spiracy notions for § 12(2) is that the provision merely imposes a liabil-
ity. It does not (like [Securities Act] § 17(a) or Rule lOb-5) define a
violation or make an act unlawful. Aiding-abetting and conspiracy,
with their criminal origins, are more conformable to a violation section
than to an express liability section.
Id. § 206.7.
See also Rapp, supra note 31, at 490 & n. 157, in which the author concedes this
point but goes on to conclude that pragmatic and policy considerations favor recogni-
tion of secondary liability theories in the context of § 12(2). Id. at 489-501.
324. See supra note 319 and accompanying text.
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12(2), unlike rule lOb-5, is an express cause of action. 325. It de-
rives its existence from the explicit language of the statute, and
that language serves to define its scope. Section 12(2) did not orig-
inate as an implied cause of action from tort law principles, and it
is inappropriate to employ such principles in determining its pa-
rameters. 326 The statute contains a privity requirement on its face.
This limitation in scope is broadened only by the controlling per-
sons provision in section 15.327 Given this framework, the absence
of explicit statutory language imposing liability for aiding and
abetting or conspiracy is controlling in the context of section
12(2), in contrast to the analysis of many courts with respect to
rule lOb-5. 328
The machinations in the expanded seller cases may well have
begun as a response to the fact that courts could not rationalize
the use of implied theories of secondary liability in the face of the
1933 Act's tightly constructed statutory scheme with its system of
express actions explicitly defining the scope of defendants. Faced
with conceptual barriers to the development of secondary liability
theories in the context of section 12(2), these courts chose instead
to reach collateral participants by expanding the concept of who
may be treated as a seller for purposes of primary liability under
section 12(2).329 In so doing, the expanded seller cases bring in as
325. Compare § 12(2), supra note 1, with § 10(b) and rule lOb-5, supra notes 5 and
7.
326. In contrast, initial recognition of an implied cause of action under rule lOb-5
was premised in part upon tort law principles. The first court to imply a private cause
of action under rule lob-5 relied heavily on the tort law principle that a person in-
jured by violation of a statute designed for his benefit is entitled to a remedy. Kardon
v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 513-514 (E.D. Pa. 1946). See A. JACOBS,
supra note 17, at § 40.02, 2-146 & nn.4-5.
327. See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
328. Compare the analysis of the court with respect to rule lOb-5 in Brennan v.
Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp. 673, 680 (N.D. Ind. 1966), af]'d, 417
F.2d 147 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 989 (1970), discussed supra note 320,
with the approach of the court in Zachman v. Erwin, 186 F. Supp. 681, 686 (S.D. Tex.
1959), rejecting secondary liability for conspiracy in the context of § 12(2):
The Securities Act only imposes liability for selling a security under
Section 77/ and for controlling a seller under Section 77o. . . . The
Securities Act has no provision for liability of parties on the ground of
conspiracy. Any allegation of liability of Blanchard on the basis of con-
spiracy to violate the Securities Act, therefore, is insufficient to state a
claim in this action.
186 F. Supp. at 686.
329. This approach is exemplified by the holding in Zachman v. Erwin, 186 F.
Supp. 681 (S.D. Tex. 1959). The Zachman court dismissed a defendant whom the
plaintiffs sought to reach under a conspiracy theory, id. at 686. The court rejected
secondary liability for conspiracy in light of the structure of § 12(2) and § 15 and the
absence of a specific provision in the 1933 Act imposing liability for conspiracy. See
supra note 328. However, it sustained the plaintiffs' complaint against a variety of
other non-privity defendants, who were alleged to have "participated" as sellers or as
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primary defendants collateral participants who would frequently
be classified as secondary defendants under aiding and abetting or
conspiracy theories if rule lOb-5 was involved. 330
In the most far-reaching extension of section 12(2), the ex-
panded seller concept moves full circle. A number of courts have
begun to embrace theories of secondary liability for aiding and
abetting and conspiracy in the context of section 12. 33 1 In re
Caesars Palace Securities Litigation332 is the decision most fre-
control persons of sellers, 186 F. Supp. at 686. See supra notes 114-125 and accompa-
nying text.
See Rapp, supra note 31:
The early rejections of purely secondary liability under section 12
probably contributed to the expansion of primary liability under that
section through the expanded definition of seller. It seems that a real
impetus for that intensified development was the recognition that a ba-
sic privity element would remain in section 12. Without a recognition
of secondary liability, a broadened interpretation of privity became the
only way for the courts to enlarge the scope of section 12 liability.
Id. at 486.
See also Hagert v. Glickman, Lurie, Eiger & Co., 520 F. Supp. 1028, 1033-37 (D.
Minn. 1981), discussed infra notes 380-382 and in accompanying text, in which the
court dismissed the aiding and abetting claim under § 12(2) as inconsistent with the
statutory scheme of the 1933 Act, but granted the plaintiff leave to amend that portion
of the complaint which sought to reach the same defendants as sellers under § 12(2),
id.; Wasson v. SEC, 558 F.2d 879, 885 (8th Cir. 1977), discussed supra notes 291-312
and in accompanying text, in which the defendant argued that the expansive interpre-
tation given to the concept of "seller" in § 12 actions was attributable to the absence
of an aider and abettor provision, id.
330. See Phillips and Hanback, supra note 31:
The courts' expansionary position with respect to the privity re-
quirement and the definition of "sell" for purposes of section 12 has
many of the characteristics of the aider and abettor theory that the
courts have used effectively to broaden the scope of potential liability
under rule lob-5 and other provisions of the federal securities laws.
Id. at 956.
See also PLI, Ninth Annual Institute on Securities Regulation, supra note 8, in
which the commentators note in the course of their discussion on erosion of the priv-
ity requirement in § 12: "The courts have gone further, however, and have extended
liability to persons who were really not much more than aiders and abettors." Id. at
350.
331. See, e.g., Brick v. Dominion Mortgage & Realty Trust, 442 F. Supp. 283, 306
(W.D.N.Y. 1977) (denying motion to dismiss); Sandusky Land, Ltd. v. Uniplan
Groups, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 440, 443-44 (N.D. Ohio 1975) (denying motion to dismiss);
In re Caesars Palace Sec. Litig., 360 F. Supp. 366, 378-83 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (denying
motion to dismiss). But see the following recent cases rejecting theories of secondary
liability in the context of § 12(2): Hokama v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 566 F. Supp. 636,
641-42 (C.D. Cal. 1983) (rejecting aiding and abetting liability under § 12(2) but ac-
cepting possibility of expanded primary liability under proximate cause analysis);
Hagert v. Glickman, Lurie, Eiger & Co., 520 F. Supp. 1028, 1033-34 (D. Minn. 1981)
(rejecting aiding and abetting liability under § 12(2) but accepting possibility of ex-
panded primary liability under standard of Wasson v. SEC, 558 F.2d 879 (8th Cir.
1977); In re Equity Funding Corp. of Am. Sec. Litig., 416 F. Supp. 161, 181 (C.D.
Cal. 1976).
332. 360 F. Supp. 366 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
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quently cited for this position. In that case the court used the ex-
tension of primary liability in the expanded seller cases as
justification for repudiating the early precedents which had re-
jected secondary liability in section 12 actions. 333
In Caesars Palace the plaintiffs purchased securities in regis-
tered offerings made by Lum's Inc. Lum's used the proceeds of
the offerings to acquire Caesars Palace.334 The plaintiffs sued
Lum's and numerous individuals affiliated with Caesars Palace in
a multi-count complaint which included a claim under section
12(2). 335 The plaintiffs alleged among other things that there were
misstatements and omissions in the Lum's registration state-
ments.3 36 The plaintiffs further alleged that the defendants associ-
ated with Caesars Palace had aided and abetted or conspired with
Lum's in this regard.337 The Caesars Palace defendants moved to
dismiss the section 12(2) count on the grounds that such theories
of secondary civil liability could not support recovery under sec-
tion 12(2).338
The District Court for the Southern District of New York
sustained the sufficiency of the section 12(2) claim against the
Caesars Palace defendants. 339 In doing so, the court pointed to
the remedial nature of the 1933 Act and the need to adopt a lib-
eral interpretation of the statute in order to effectuate its pur-
poses. 340 It also reasoned that civil liability for aiding and
abetting and conspiracy should be recognized under sections 11
and 12 because such theories are used in criminal prosecutions
under sections 5 and 17(a). 341
However, the court rested its analysis most heavily upon the
cases expanding the concept of who could be primarily liable as a
seller for purposes of the privity requirement in section 12(2).
Tracing the development of the seller concept through Cady v.
Murphy, the participation cases, and the proximate cause deci-
sions, 342 the Caesars Palace court concluded:
Therefore, as a result of Katz, Hill York, and related deci-
sions in this area, it would be nothing more than an exercise in
semantic hair-splitting for this Court to attempt to delineate a
legally cognizable distinction between those categories of per-
sons who have previously been exposed to liability under
333. Id. at 379-81.
334. Id. at 373, 385.
335. Id. at 375.
336. Id.
337. Id. at 378.
338. Id.
339. Id. at 383.
340. Id. at 382-83.
341. Id. at 381. But see supra notes 322-324 and accompanying text.
342. Id. at 379-80.
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§ 12(2) and those persons charged with aiding and abetting and
conspiring in the violation of § 12(2). No one of these formula-
tions is a "magic word"; in effect, each of them indicates partic-
ipation to one degree or another. Determination of the extent
of this participation and whether or not it is sufficient to impose
liability u on the secondary defendants must obviously awaitdiscovery. 3,43
If one accepts the premise that the expanded seller analysis
may have developed because of the difficulties surrounding use of
secondary liability theories in private express actions under the
1933 Act, then the court's reasoning in Caesars Palace represents
the ultimate bootstrap. Faced with obstacles to the development
of theories of aiding and abetting and conspiracy in the context of
section 12(2), some courts chose to broaden the meaning of seller
to encompass various collateral participants as primary defend-
ants.344 The Caesars Palace court then argues that in light of this
expansion of primary liability, it would be little more than word
games to refuse to recognize liability under section 12(2) for aid-
ing and abetting and conspiracy. 345
A few commentators applaud the forthright approach of the
Caesars Palace decision. 346 They admit the conceptual problems
surrounding application of secondary liability theories in the con-
text of express actions under the 1933 Act. However, these au-
thors argue that given the penchant of numerous courts to erode
the privity requirement through the various facilitation tests, sec-
ondary liability represents a more direct and coherent way to ap-
proach the problem of collateral participants. 347
Such arguments, however, beg the question. It is true that by
drawing in collateral participants as primary defendants, the ex-
panded seller cases extend the reach of section 12(2) to a point
roughly equivalent to that which results from the use of secondary
liability theories.348 However, the fact that the extension of pri-
343. Id. at 380 (footnote omitted).
344. See supra note 329 and accompanying text.
345. 360 F. Supp. at 380.
346. See Rapp, supra note 31, at 482-501; Comment, Attorneys and Participant
Liability under § 12(2) ofthe Securities Act of1933, supra note 31, at 550-77. But see
Fischel, supra note 17, at 109-10.
347. See supra note 346.
348. See supra note 330. This rough equivalence between the expansion of pri-
mary liability through a broadened interpretation of "seller," and the use of secon-
dary liability theories such as aiding and abetting and conspiracy, is exhibited in a
number of cases which seem to equate the two concepts.
The discussion of the Fifth Circuit in Pharo v. Smith, 621 F.2d 656 (5th Cir.
1980), discussed supra notes 228-242 and accompanying text, is illustrative in this
regard. After finding under a proximate cause analysis that Deltec was not primarily
liable as a § 12 seller, the court went on to reject plaintiffs' contention that Deltec
could be liable as an aider and abettor:
1984]
UCLA L4W REVIEW [Vol. 31:921
mary liability in the expanded seller cases often resembles a kind
of backdoor aiding and abetting argues not in favor of adopting
theories of aiding and abetting or conspiracy, but in favor of rec-
ognizing that the expanded seller cases are wrongly decided.
349
Courts long ago correctly recognized that adoption of the concepts
of aiding and abetting and conspiracy, in the context of the private
express actions under the 1933 Act, would be inconsistent with the
language of the statute and the statutory scheme.350 It is precisely
because the courts in the expanded seller cases bring in as defend-
ants individuals who are frequently little more than disguised aid-
ers and abettors that they too distort the language of the statute
and the statutory scheme.
V. ANALYSIS OF THE 12(2) EXPANDED SELLER CASES AND
SECONDARY LIABILITY OPINIONS IN LIGHT OF
RECENT SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
The Supreme Court's opinions in the area of federal securi-
ties law prior to the mid-1970s tended to favor plaintiffs and to
expansively interpret the securities statutes in light of their reme-
dial purpose.351 Since the mid-1970s, however, the Supreme
Court has taken a more restrictive approach towards interpreta-
tion of the federal securities laws. 352 The decisions of the Burger
Court exhibit a concern that the federal securities laws not be-
come a panacea for every disappointed investor. More often than
A participant in a sale of stock that transgresses section 12 could be
an aider and abettor, as defined at common law .... The panel in
Hill York was faced with fashioning a test for determining which par-
ticipants, out of the universe of possible participants, in a section 12 sale
should be subjected to liability as sellers. A test was developed and, as
augmented by Lewis, states the law of this circuit. In finding, under
that test, that Deltec's participation in plaintiffs['] transactions was in-
sufficient to incur section 12 liability, we have in effect found that
Deltec could have no liability as an aider and abettor.
Id. at 669.
The equivalence is also apparent in a number of § 12 decisions which blur their
discussions of primary liability under § 12 and secondary liability for aiding and
abetting and conspiracy. See, e.g., Stokes v. Lokken, 644 F.2d 779, 784-85 (8th Cir.
1981), discussed supra note 313; Sandusky Land, Ltd. v. Uniplan Groups, Inc., 400 F.
Supp. 440, 443-44 (N.D. Ohio 1975) (which is criticized in this regard by Rapp, supra
note 31, at 474).
But see infra note 419 and accompanying text for a discussion of distinctions
between the expanded seller approach to § 12(2) and an aiding and abetting analysis.
349. See Phillips and Hanback, supra note 31, in which the commentators coin the
phrase "backdoor" aiding and abetting to describe how the expansionary § 12 cases
erode the privity requirement. With a thesis similar to the one underlying this Article,
the authors question the validity of these cases in light of the restrictive tenor of the
Supreme Court's recent securities law opinions. See id. at 956-57.
350. See supra note 321 and accompanying text.
351. See supra note 11.
352. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
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not, recent Supreme Court opinions narrowly construe the cover-
age and protection of the 1933 and 1934 Acts, displaying a heavy
orientation in favor of defendants. 35 3 To support these narrower
holdings, the Court has returned to more traditional principles of
statutory construction.354 The Court tends to focus on the explicit
language of the statutory section in question, its legislative history,
and its interrelationship with other provisions of the federal secur-
ities laws.355
The Supreme Court has not yet reviewed any decision ex-
panding the concept of who may be treated as a seller for purposes
of primary liability under section 12(2), or any decision purport-
ing to apply theories of aiding and abetting or conspiracy to sec-
tion 12(2). However, if these cases are examined under the
interpretative principles used by the present Supreme Court, their
analysis fails.356
A. The Language of the Statute
The Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that the starting
point in every case involving construction of the federal securities
laws is the language of the statute itself.357 The precise language
of section 12(2) and the rescissory nature of the remedy afforded
therein support the existence of a relatively strict privity require-
ment. Except as expanded by the controlling persons provision in
section 15, the explicit language of section 12(2) contemplates re-
covery by a purchaser only from his immediate seller. 358
353. See supra note 12.
354. See supra note 13.
355. See supra note 13. See generally Fischel, supra note 17, applying these three
tools of statutory construction to conclude that secondary liability under § 10(b) of
the 1934 Act is no longer viable in light of recent Supreme Court opinions strictly
construing the federal securities laws.
356. See cases cited infra note 358. See also Fischel, supra note 17, at 109-10.
357. See, e.g., Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 472 (1977); Ernst &
Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 197 (1976); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug
Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 756 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring).
358. See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text. See, in particular, Collins v.
Signetic Corp., 605 F.2d 110, 113-14 (3d Cir. 1979) (citing recent Supreme Court
decisions, the Third Circuit affirmed under a strict privity approach the trial court
finding that a complaint failed to state a claim under § 12(2) against a corporate issuer
and its parent for alleged misrepresentations and omissions in a registered offering
sold by underwriters pursuant to a firm commitment underwriting; court found that
plaintiffs failed to proffer an aiding and abetting case against defendants and thus
chose not to deal definitively with its prior decision in Monsen v. Consol. Dressed
Beef Co., 579 F.2d 793 (3rd Cir. 1978), in which it had reinstated a jury verdict
against a defendant as an aider and abettor over a j.n.o.v.); Benoay v. Decker, 517 F.
Supp. 490, 494 (E.D. Mich. 1981) (granting motion to dismiss § 12(2) claim against
non-privity defendants under strict privity approach). But see McFarland v. Memo-
rex, 1984 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 99,635, at 97,507-08 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 17, 1984)
(on motion for reconsideration, earlier opinion at 493 F. Supp. 631, 647-48 (N.D. Cal.
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There may be some room in the statute for the exception
carved out in the early brokerage decisions, which broaden the
concept of seller to include brokers or other selling agents who
engage in solicitation of an offer to buy.359 The inroad against the
privity requirement in these cases is tied to an analysis of the bro-
ker's activities as falling within the statutory definitions in section
2(3).360
As discussed earlier, such analysis is not without its problems.
Arguably, it focuses on the opening language "[any person who
. . . offers or sells" without giving proper weight to the remaining
language in section 12(2), which makes the offeror or seller liable
to the person "purchasing such security from him" for a rescissory
measure of relief.36' This remaining language may be interpreted
as limiting the scope of the phrase "[a]ny person who. . . offers or
sells" as used in section 12(2) to the plaintiffs immediate
vendor.362
However, while not free from question, the expansion of the
seller concept to encompass brokers or other selling agents who
engage in solicitation of an offer to buy is at least somewhat de-
fensible. The analysis is premised on the statutory definitions in
section 2(3).363 Moreover, so long as it is confined to the agency
context in which it was articulated, it does not distort the operative
terms "sell" and "purchase" beyond all recognition in ordinary
usage. 3M Finally, the agency setting helps undercut some of the
theoretical problems involved in granting a purchaser rescission
against someone other than the party who actually received the
sale proceeds. Common law agency recognized the propriety of
imposing rescission on an agent in some circumstances, even
though the agent had not beneficially received the sale pro-
ceeds. 365 Common law agency may also provide a framework for
adjusting the rights between the agent against whom rescission is
granted and his principal, the actual vendor.366
In contrast, the later expanded seller cases are an unwar-
1980), limiting a § 12(2) claim to defendant underwriter under a strict privity ap-
proach, is reconsidered; § 12(2) claim reinstated against corporate issuer under proxi-
mate cause analysis for alleged misrepresentations and omissions in a registered
offering sold by underwriters pursuant to a firm commitment underwriting).
359. See supra notes 39-61 and accompanying text for a discussion of Cady v.
Murphy.
360. See id.
361. See supra text accompanying notes 62-92 (criticizing the holding in Cady v.
Murphy).
362. See supra text accompanying notes 62-92.
363. See supra notes 39-61 and accompanying text.
364. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
365. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
366. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
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ranted extension of the clear language of section 12(2). The courts
which have developed the facilitation tests approach the issue of
who may be primarily liable as a seller under section 12(2) as if
they were writing on a tabula rasa. They frame the question not
as one which should be resolved in terms of statutory construc-
tion, but rather as one which may be answered with broad reme-
dial policy strokes. 367
The courts in the later expanded seller decisions graft onto
section 12(2) concepts of participation, proximate cause, and ac-
cess to information as the relevant tests for determining seller sta-
tus without any basis in the language of the statute and without
any reference to the statutory definitions of the operative terms
"offer" and "sell" in section 2(3).368 While these tests encompass
some collateral participants whose activities might survive analy-
sis under the statutory definitions in sections 2(3), they bring in
other defendants as well.369
Moreover, the facilitation tests give no consideration to the
remaining language in section 12 making the offeror or seller lia-
ble to the "person purchasing the security from him" for a rescis-
sory measure of relief.370 As the facilitation tests move outside the
brokerage context to include collateral participants who are not
selling agents of the vendor, it becomes more and more difficult to
square their findings of seller status with the purchase language of
the statute.37' Additionally, the conceptual problems associated
with awarding rescission against a non-vendor become more com-
plex. For example, in cases such as Lennerth v. Mendenhall,372
Hill York Corp. v. American International Franchises, Inc., 3 7 3 and
Junker v. Crory,374 application of the proximate cause analysis re-
sulted in judgments for rescissory relief against the immediate
vendor and one or more collateral participants with no indication
of the respective rights of the defendants vis-A-vis each other.375
When Congress intended that an express action under the
367. See supra text accompanying notes 95-100, 109-112, 173-181, 274-290, and
308-312, criticizing the various facilitation tests. See, in particular, the reliance of the
courts on policy arguments in Croy v. Campbell, 624 F.2d 709, 712 (5th Cir. 1980), at
supra notes 252 and 253 and accompanying text; Wasson v. SEC, 558 F.2d 879, 886
(8th Cir. 1977), discussed supra notes 297-302 and in accompanying text.
368. See Wasson v. SEC, 558 F.2d 879, 886 (8th Cir. 1977).
369. See supra note 112.
370. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
371. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
372. 234 F. Supp. 59, 65-66 (N.D. Ohio 1964). See supra notes 188-192 and ac-
companying text.
373. 448 F.2d 680, 685-86, 692-94 (5th Cir. 1971). See supra notes 206-219 and
accompanying text.
374. 650 F.2d 1349, 1358-62 (5th Cir. 1981). See supra notes 259-272 and accom-
panying text.
375. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
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1933 Act encompass various participants in the sales process, it
had no difficulty articulating that intention. Section 11 provides
an express cause of action for damages to a person acquiring
shares pursuant to a registration statement which misstates or
omits to state a material fact.376 Section 1 (a) explicitly delineates
multiple categories of participants involved in the registration pro-
cess who may be sued as defendants. 377 Section 11(f) expressly
addresses the nature of the defendants' respective liability and
their rights to contribution vis-A-vis each other.
378
The language of section 12(2), making "[a]ny person who
. . . offers or sells a security" liable to the "person purchasing
such security from him," stands in stark contrast to the multiple
defendant scheme of section 11. 379 In expanding the concept of
seller in section 12(2) to encompass multiple defendants, the facili-
376. 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1976) [hereinafter referred to as section 11].
Section 11 provides a civil remedy for false or misleading statements in a regis-
tration statement. The remedy is afforded to any purchaser of a registered security
who can trace the security to the registration statement in question, whether or not the
purchaser acquired the security in the distribution process or in the aftermarket. JEN-
NINGS & MARSH, supra note 18, at 757.
The statute expressly states the parties who may be sued as defendants. These
persons include: (1) the issuer; (2) all directors of the issuer, including all persons who
are named in the registration statement as about to become directors; (3) the chief
executive officer, the chief financial officer and the chief accounting officer of the is-
suer; (4) the underwriters; and (5) any expert who is named as having prepared or
certified any part of the registration statement. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1976).
The purchaser need not establish reliance, unless he purchased after the issuer
had made generally available to its security holders an earnings statement covering a
period of at least one year beginning after the effective date of the registration state-
ment. Even in this circumstance, the purchaser may establish reliance without proof
that he read the registration statement. Any defendant may escape liability if it can
be established by way of affirmative defense that the purchaser knew of the untruth or
omission at the time of purchase. JENNINGS & MARSH, supra note 18, at 757.
Similarly, the purchaser need not establish causation. However, the extent of
liability of any defendant may be reduced if that defendant establishes that all or any
portion of the damage did not result from the defective registration statement.
Finally, the purchaser is not required to show anything regarding the defendants'
state of mind. All defendants but the issuer have a reasonable care defense. Id. at
753-57.
377. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1976). See supra note 376.
378. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(f) (1976):
All or any one or more of the persons specified in subsection (a)
shall be jointly and severally liable, and every person who becomes lia-
ble to make any payment under this section may recover contribution
as in cases of contract from any person who, if sued separately, would
have been liable to make the same payment, unless the person who has
become liable was, and the other was not, guilty of fraudulent
misrepresentation.
Id.
379. Professor Loss acknowledges this problem, although he ultimately appears to
embrace some of the expanded seller cases. 3 L. Loss, supra note 17, at 1716.
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tation tests torture the plain meaning of the privity requirement in
the statute.
Similarly, those cases which import theories of secondary lia-
bility into the express cause of action under section 12(2) do vio-
lence to the statutory language. As the court stated in Hagert v.
Glickman, Lurie, Eiger & Co .380 in rejecting the position of In re
Caesars Palace Securities Litigation:381
In recent cases, the Supreme Court has made it clear that a
determination of the standard of liability under the various
provisions of the federal securities laws must begin with and
rest primarily on the language of the statutes. . .. In line with
this reasoning, we believe the greater and better weight of au-
thority on the issue of aiding and abetting liability under Sec-
tions 11 and 12(2) is that expressed in In re Equity Funding
Corporation of America Securities Litigation, 416 F. Supp. 161,
181 (C.D. Cal. 1976):
[W]here a statute specifically limits those who may be held
liable for the conduct described by the statute, the courts
cannot extend liability, under a theory of aiding and abet-
ting, to those who do not fall within the categories of po-
tential defendants described by the statute. To impose
such liability would circumvent the express intent of Con-
gress in enacting these statutes that proscribe narrowly de-
fined conduct and allow relief from precisely defined
parties ....
Section 11 and 12(2) are express liability provisions, as
contrasted to Sections 17(a) and [sic] the 1933 Act and Section
10(b) of the 1934 Act which define violations or make certain
acts unlawful. The concept of aiding and abetting, with its ori-
gin in the criminal law, is a more proper adjunct to the viola-
tion sections. 382
B. Legislative History
Where the language of a statute is sufficiently clear in its con-
text, the Supreme Court has indicated that the language controls
and there is no need to resort to tools of statutory interpretation
such as legislative history.383 While somewhat inartfully drafted,
the language of section 12(2) is sufficiently clear in its context to
be dispositive with respect to the privity requirement.384 The lan-
guage of section 12(2) clearly limits a purchaser to an action
380. 520 F. Supp. 1028 (D. Minn. 1981).
381. 360 F. Supp. 366 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). See supra notes 332-343 and accompany-
ing text.
382. 520 F. Supp. at 1034 (citations omitted).
383. Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 472 (1977); Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 105, 201 (1976).
384. See supra note 1 for the text of § 12(2).
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against his immediate vendor in the sales transaction.3 15  How-
ever, even if the legislative history of section 12(2) is examined, it
lends no support to the expanded concept of "seller" which has
been developed by the lower courts or to implication of secondary
liability for aiding and abetting or conspiracy.
In the first case to consider the scope of the term "seller"
under section 12(2), the district court in Cady v. Murphy conceded
that no references in the legislative history of section 12(2) address
this issue.386 Indeed, the original legislative history of section
12(2), in contrast to section 11, is quite sparse. 387 The few specific
385. Id.
386. 30 F. Supp. 466, 469 (D. Me. 1939), af'd, 113 F.2d 988 (1st Cir. 1940), cert.
denied, 311 U.S. 705 (1940), see supra note 46 and accompanying text.
387. The House Committee Report discusses civil liability under § 12(2) in only
two instances. At first blush the initial reference might appear to support a concept of
participant liability. However, on closer reading, it becomes clear that this language
is attributable to the fact that the Report was discussing § II and § 12 in the conjunc-
tive under the general heading of "Civil Liabilities," and that the references to partici-
pant liability refer only to actions under § 11:
Sections 11 and 12 create and define the civil liabilities imposed by
the act and the machinery for their enforcement which renders them
practically valuable. Fundamentally, these sections entitle the buyer of
securities sold upon a registration statement including an untrue state-
ment or omission of material fact, to sue for recovery of his purchase
price, or for damages not exceeding such price, those who have partici-
pated in such distribution either knowing of such untrue statement or
omission or having failed to take due care in discovering it. The duty of
care to discover varies in its demands upon participants in security dis-
tribution with the importance of their place in the scheme of distribu-
tion and with the degree of protection which the public has a right to
expect ....
The Committee emphasizes that these liabilities attach only when
there has been an untrue statement of a material fact or an omission to
state a material fact in the registration statement or the prospectus-the
basic information by which the public is solicited. All who sell securi-
ties with such a flaw, who cannot prove that they did not know--or who
in the exercise of due care could not have known-of such misstate-
ment or omission, are liable under sections 11 and 12.
H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1933).
The fact that the references to participant liability are clearly tied to fraud in a
registration statement makes it apparent that although §§ 11 and 12 are discussed
together, the references apply only to § 11 actions, not to actions under §§ 12(1) and
12(2). Section 11 provides relief against various participants in the registration pro-
cess for fraud in a registration statement. See supra note 376. Section 12(1) provides
relief for violation of the registration requirements, including a failure to register. See
supra note 139 for a discussion of § 12(1). Section 12(2) provides relief for misrepre-
sentations or omissions in the course of a sale whether by means of a prospectus or
oral communication and without regard to the registered status of an offering. See
supra note I for the text of § 12(2) and supra note 18 for a discussion of the coverage
of § 12(2).
The only other reference to § 12 in the House Report speaks of § 12 alone. H.R.
REP. No. 85, 73rd Cong., 1st Sess. 23-24 (1933). In this abbreviated explanation of
§ 12, no mention of participants is made:
If any person (1) sells a security in violation of section 5, or (2) sells
a security, whether or not exempted by section 3, by the use of the in-
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references to section 12(2) seem to indicate that Congress used the
operative terms "purchase" and "sale" in their ordinary con-
texts.3 88 The references to section 12(2) which appear in the legis-
lative history are at best ambiguous and thus do not support the
expansionist theories developed by the lower courts for imposing
seller status or secondary liability on collateral participants.3 89
struments of interstate or foreign commerce or of the mails by means of
a prospectus or oral communication which includes an untrue state-
ment of a material fact or omits to state a material fact (the purchaser
not knowing of such untruth or omission) and does not sustain the bur-
den of proof that he did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable
care could not have known, of such untruth or omission, he is made
liable to the person purchasing such security from him. . . . The com-
mittee has deemed this shift in the burden of proof as both just and
necessary, inasmuch as the knowledge of the seller as to any flaw in his
selling statements or the failure of the seller to exercise reasonable care
are matters in regard to which the seller may readily testify, but in re-
gard to which the buyer is seldom in a position to give convincing
proof.
Id.
Nowhere in the Report is the term "seller" defined, suggesting that the Commit-
tee used this word in the above-quoted passage in its ordinary sense. The Report's
commentary on § 2(3) discusses the term "sale" as "broadly" defined to include every
attempt at disposition. However, the remarks which follow seem to indicate that this
is done in an effort to control offers to buy by dealers in the period prior to the effec-
tive date of the registration statement, as opposed to any intent to broaden the class of
persons considered to be sellers. H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 11-12 (1933).
See also Comment, Attorneys and Participant Liability under § 12(2) of the Securities
Act of 1933, supra note 31, at 534.
Thus, taken as a whole, the House Committee Report lends no support to the
expanded concept of "seller" which has been developed by the lower courts or to
implication of secondary liability theories.
The Senate Report on the companion Senate bill, S. 875, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., 77
CONG. REC. 2979-82 (1933), says virtually nothing about § 12(2). The Senate Com-
mittee on Banking and Currency seemed concerned only with liability of directors. S.
REP. No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 4-6 (1933). Under the heading of "Personal Re-
sponsibility," the report makes clear that directors who sign an inadequate registra-
tion statement may be civilly liable for return of the money which the purchaser paid
for the security. Id. at 5.
The Conference Committee, which met to reconcile the differences between the
House and Senate bills, chose to use the House Bill as their working draft. See Lan-
dis, The Legislative History of the Securities Act of 1933, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 29,
45 (1959). The Conference Committee Report summarizes the differences between
the House bill and the Senate amendments thereto and then reconciles these differ-
ences. The Report, in discussing civil liability, makes no reference to the meaning of
"seller" in § 12(2). H.R. REP. No. 152, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 26-27 (1933).
In sum, the legislative history of § 12(2) provides no support for expanding the
concept of "seller" beyond its plain and ordinary meaning or for implying theories of
secondary liability in the context of § 12(2).
388. See supra note 387.
389. Id. Moreover, while it is somewhat dangerous to read too much into congres-
sional inaction, it may be of some significance that in 1959 Congress declined to enact
a provision which would have expressly prohibited aiding and abetting any violation
of the 1933 Act. H.R. 5001 and S. 1178, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959); H.R. 5001 and S.
3770, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960). For differing views on the import of Congress'
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In the face of relatively unambiguous language in a statute
and without clear evidence of congressional intent in the legisla-
tive history to support an expansionist approach, the Supreme
Court has been unwilling to extend the reach of a statute beyond
its plain meaning.3 90 In the analysis of section 12(2), the applica-
tion of these same principles supports a strict privity approach.
C. The Statutory Scheme
When called upon to construe various provisions of the fed-
eral securities laws, the Supreme Court in recent decisions has fo-
cused not only on the language and legislative history of the
particular section in question, but also on its place in the total
statutory framework. 39' Viewed under this tenet of statutory con-
struction, the expanded seller cases and secondary liability opin-
ions do not support an interpretation of section 12(2) consistent
with its place in the overall scheme of antifraud provisions.
In bypassing the privity requirement, the courts in the ex-
panded seller cases disrupt the statutory scheme because they al-
low a plaintiff to enjoy the reduced burden of proof available
under section 12(2) without the concomitant limitation on who
may be a defendant. 392 Where a plaintiff seeks redress against a
collateral participant with whom he is not in privity for misrepre-
sentations or omissions in acquisition of a security, the appropri-
ate remedy is an action under rule lOb-5 with its higher burden of
proof.393
failure to enact this provision, compare Fischel, supra note 17, at 98 n.103 (failure
significant) with Comment, Attorneys and Participant Liability under § 12(2) of the Se-
curities Act of 1933, supra note 31, at 555 & nn. 187-190 (failure insignificant).
390. See, e.g., Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 473-74 (1977); Ernst &
Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 214 (1976).
391. See, e.g., SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103, 112-14 (1978); Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 206-11 (1976); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,
421 U.S. 723, 733-36 (1975).
392. See infra notes 394-418 and accompanying text.
393. See infra notes 399-418 and accompanying text.
Professor Steinberg hinted at this connection between the scope of parties de-
fendant and the relative burden of proof in the context of a comparison of §§ 12(2)
and 17(a) of the 1933 Act. See Steinberg, Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933
after Naftalin and Redington, supra note 18, at 178-82.
Section 17(a) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1976), is the general antifraud
provision of the 1933 Act. It is roughly analogous to rule lob-5 of the 1934 Act except
that it is limited to fraud in the offer or sale of a security and does not extend to fraud
in the purchase of a security.
Professor Steinberg argued that even in the wake of recent restrictive Supreme
Court opinions (see supra note 12), there may be room for implication of a private
cause of action under § 17(a). However, in light of the Supreme Court's admonition
in Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 574 (1979), that a court should be
reluctant to imply a remedy significantly broader than an express remedy which Con-
gress has provided, Professor Steinberg concluded that implied liability under § 17(a)
[Vol. 31:921
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On their face section 1 I and section 12(2) of the 1933 Act
limit the scope of defendants. 39 4 A plaintiff may bring an action
under section I for misrepresentations or omissions in a registra-
tion statement only against those directly involved in the registra-
tion process-the issuer, its board of directors, certain officers
signing the registration statement, the underwriters, the account-
ants and other experts contributing to the registration state-
ment. 395 Section 12(2) limits a purchaser to recovery from his
seller.3 9 6 In both cases the narrowness in scope is accompanied by
imposition of a relatively minimal burden of proof upon a plain-
tiff.397 Both sections generally eliminate any requirement that the
plaintiff show reliance, allocate the burden of proof regarding
state of mind to the defendant, and impose liability on the defend-
should require proof by a plaintiff of reckless or intentional conduct in contrast to
§ 12(2). He found this result necessary because of the difference between § 12(2) and
§ 17(a) in scope of parties defendant.
Section 12(2) requires privity between the defendant and the pur-
chaser and specifically provides a defense if the seller proves that he
exercised reasonable care; the section, therefore, imposes liability for
negligent culpability. Because section 17(a) has no privity restriction,
liability should only be imposed under it for misconduct that is more
culpable than that addressed in section 12(2), that is, for intentional or
reckless misconduct.
Steinberg, Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 after Naftalin and Redington,
supra note 18, at 178-79 (footnotes omitted).
Professor Steinberg noted that given the privity requirement in § 12(2), a con-
trary rule allowing implied liability for negligent misconduct under § 17(a) would
impermissibly broaden the express remedy which Congress provided in § 12(2). Id.
at 179 n. 126. The author spoke of the imposition of liability for negligence under
§ 12(2) as being balanced by the privity requirement. He thus reasoned that an im-
plied remedy under § 17(a), which has no privity limitation, should require a greater
showing of culpability. Id. at 182 n. 140.
Subsequent to Professor Steinberg's article, the Supreme Court held in Aaron v.
SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 695-701 (1980), that the SEC must establish scienter as an element
of a civil enforcement action to enjoin violation of§ 10(b), rule lOb-5 or § 17(a)(1), 15
U.S.C. § 77q(a)(1) (1976), but need not establish scienter to enjoin a violation of
§ 17(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77(q)(a)(2) (1976), or § 17(a)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(3) (1976),
because of differences in language in the latter two subsections. The Court's decision
in Aaron leaves unanswered the question of whether a private cause of action may be
implied under § 17(a) and, if so, what the required state of mind for liability should
be.
However, Professor Steinberg's correlation between the scope of parties defend-
ant and the state of mind requirements can be applied analogously to a comparison of
§ 12(2) with rule lOb-5. The expanded seller cases upset the careful balance between
the privity requirement in § 12(2) and the reduced culpability standard by deeming
collateral participants to be sellers who should only be reachable upon a greater
showing of culpability.
394. See supra note 376 for a discussion of § 11. See supra note 1 for the text of
§ 12(2).
395. See supra note 376 for a discussion of § 11.
396. See supra note 1 for the text of § 12(2).
397. See infra note 398 and accompanying text.
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ant for mere negligence. 398
In contrast, section 10(b) of the 1934 Act and rule lOb-5 en-
compass any person who engages in the manipulative or deceptive
activity proscribed therein in connection with the purchase or sale
of any security. 399 Concomitant with this greater sweep, the claim
for relief which the courts imply thereunder requires a greater
showing of proof by a plaintiff.4°° A plaintiff suing under rule
lOb-5 bears the burden of establishing reliance, as well as the bur-
den of proving a state of mind greater than negligence on the part
of the defendant. 40'
The analysis of the Supreme Court in its recent decision in
Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston40 2 underscores this relation-
ship between the difference in scope of the express remedies in the
1933 Act compared with rule lOb-5, and the corresponding differ-
ence in the burden of proof borne by plaintiffs suing thereun-
der.4°3 In that decision the Court rejected a contention that
availability of an express cause of action under section 11 of the
1933 Act bars relief under rule lOb-5.4°4 The court focused on the
differences between the two provisions to support its conclusion
that the statutory framework envisions a cumulative construction
of the remedies available under the 1933 and 1934 Acts. 4
05
398. See supra note 376 for a discussion of the elements of a § 11 claim and the
affirmative defenses thereto. See supra text accompanying notes 16-30 for a discus-
sion of the elements of a § 12(2) claim and the affirmative defenses thereto.
399. See supra note 5 for the text of § 10(b). See supra note 7 for the text of rule
lOb-5.
400. See infra note 406 and accompanying text.
401. See supra note 17 for a discussion of the elements of an implied claim under
rule 10b-5.
402. 103 S. Ct. 683 (1983).
403. In Huddleston the plaintiffs brought a class action on behalf of themselves
and other purchasers of securities in a 1969 registered offering floated by Texas Inter-
national Speedway, Inc. Plaintiffs sued most of the participants in the offering, in-
cluding an accounting firm, Herman & MacLean, which had prepared the financial
statements and a pro forma balance sheet included in the registration statement.
Plaintiffs alleged violations of rule lOb-5. At trial the jury returned a verdict in favor
of plaintiffs on certain submitted issues of liability, operating under instructions re-
quiring proof by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 685.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that a cause of action
may be maintained under § 10(b) even though the conduct might also be actionable
under § 11 of the 1933 Act. However, the Court of Appeals disagreed with the trial
court regarding the appropriate standard of proof. The Court of Appeals held that a
plaintiff in an implied action under § 10(b) must prove his case by clear and convinc-
ing evidence. Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d 534, 540-43 (5th Cir.
1981).
The Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court ruling with respect to the inter-
relationship between § II of the 1933 Act and rule lOb-5. However, it reversed as to
the applicable standard of proof. 103 S. Ct. 683, 686 (1983).
404. 103 S. Ct. at 690.
405. 103 S. Ct. at 687-89.
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Comparing and contrasting section 11 and rule 1Ob-5, the
Court noted:
Although limited in scope, Section 11 places a relatively
minimal burden on a plaintiff. In contrast, Section 10(b) is a
"catchall" antifraud provision, but it requires a plaintiff to
carry a heavier burden to establish a cause of action. While a
section 11 action must be brought by a purchaser of a registered
security, must be based on misstatements or omissions in a re-
gistration statement, and can only be brought against certain
parties, a Section 10(b) action can be brought by a purchaser or
seller of "any security" against "any person" who has used
"any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance" in con-
nection with the purchase or sale of a security. However, a sec-
tion 10(b) plaintiff carries a heavier burden than a section 11
plaintiff. Most significantly, he must prove that the defendant
acted with scienter, i.e., with intent to deceive, manipulate, or
defraud. 4
0 6
In light of the differences which exist between section 11 and
rule 1Ob-5, the court in Huddleston found no basis for holding that
section 11 provided the exclusive remedy available to the plain-
tiff.40 7 The Court noted that its conclusion in this regard was rein-
forced by the reasoning in its 1976 opinion in Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder .408 In Hochfelder the Court ruled that private actions
under section 10(b) require proof of scienter and do not encom-
pass negligent conduct.409 The Huddleston court pointed out that
Hochfelder necessarily assumed a cumulative construction of rem-
edies since it rested in part on an analysis that a contrary result
would have allowed plaintiffs to nullify the procedural restrictions
on the 1933 Act's negligence remedies by suing under rule lOb-
5.410
The Supreme Court's analysis in Huddleston of the relation-
ship between section 11 and rule 1Ob-5 applies with equal force to
section 12(2).4 11 Limited in scope by the privity requirement, sec-
406. 103 S. Ct. at 687-88 (notes and citations omitted, emphasis in original).
407. 103 S. Ct. at 688.
408. 103 S. Ct. at 688 (citing Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 185).
409. 425 U.S. at 214-15.
410. 103 S. Ct. at 688-89.
411. Indeed, although Huddleston addressed only the relationship between § 11
and rule 10b-5, at several points in the decision, the Court in dicta characterized the
express remedies of the 1933 Act in the aggregate as being cumulative with the im-
plied remedy available under rule lOb-5. For example, the Court stated:
This cumulative construction of the remedies under the 1933 and
1934 Acts is also supported by the fact that, when Congress comprehen-
sively revised the securities laws in 1975, a consistent line of judicial
decisions had permitted plaintiffs to sue under Section 10(b) regardless
of the availability of express remedies.
Id. at 689.
See also the following post-Huddleston decisions in which the courts have relied
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tion 12(2) imposes a relatively minimal burden of proof upon a
plaintiff, as compared with the greater burden required under the
broader aegis of rule lOb-5. 412 The courts in the expanded seller
cases sidestep the privity requirement in section 12(2) and expose
collateral participants in a sales transaction to liability for negli-
gence without proof of reliance by the plaintiff. They thus allow a
defrauded purchaser to nullify the difference in scope between
section 12(2) and rule 1Ob-5 and circumvent the reliance and sci-
enter requirements of rule 1Ob-5.
The courts in the expanded seller decisions frequently justify
their extension of section 12(2) on the ground that it is necessary
to expand the concept of seller to include collateral participants in
order to accomplish the broad remedial purposes of the 1933
Act.41 3 This analysis is based on the mistaken assumption that a
plaintiff will otherwise be left without redress against such parties.
In fact, a plaintiff does have a claim against such parties, but the
appropriate cause of action is under rule lOb-5, not under section
12(2). 4 14 When a purchaser seeks to broaden his reach on defend-
ants and affix liability on someone peripheral to the sales transac-
on the Huddleston analysis to hold that the availability of a remedy under § 12(2)
does not preclude an implied action under rule lOb-5: Amunrud v. Taurus Drilling
Ltd., 1983 FED. SEC. L. REP. CCH 99,649, at 97,596 (D. Mont. Dec. 23, 1983); In re
Longhorn Sec. Litig., 1983 FED. SEC. L. REP. CCH 99,630 at 97,481 (W.D. Okla.
Sept. 28, 1983).
412. See supra notes 16-27 and accompanying text for a discussion comparing and
contrasting the elements of proof under § 12(2) and rule 10b-5.
413. See supra note 367 and accompanying text for expanded seller cases exempli-
fying this broad remedial policy approach. This approach is somewhat open to ques-
tion in light of the focus of recent Supreme Court opinions on language, legislative
history, and statutory structure. See, e.g., Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 695 (1980), in
which the Court warned against the use of generalized references to the remedial
purposes of the securities laws to justify reading a provision more broadly than the
language of the provision, its legislative history, and the statutory scheme reasonably
permit. But see Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 103 S. Ct. 683, 690 (1983), in
which the Court cited the need for flexible construction of the securities laws in order
to effectuate their remedial purposes in support of its cumulative construction of § 11
of the 1933 Act and rule lOb-5.
414. Compare the text of § 10(b), supra note 5, and the text of rule lOb-5, supra
note 7, which apply to "any person" who engages in the conduct proscribed therein,
with the text of § 12(2), supra note 1, which makes "[a]ny person . . . who offers or
sells a security" under the circumstances described therein liable to the "person
purchasing such security from him."
In a footnote to the decision in Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 103 S. Ct.
683, 690 n.22, the Supreme Court makes a somewhat analogous argument. The Court
noted that if it accepted the defendant's contention that purchasers in a registered
offering were confined to a remedy under § 11 of the 1933 Act, then such purchasers
would have no recourse against those individuals who play a part in preparing the
registration statement, but who are not among the parties specified in § 11 (a) as
proper defendants in a § 11 action. The Court stated that a construction of § 11 as
exclusive would leave such parties immune from federal liability for their fraudulent
conduct even though § 10(b) extends to "any person" who engages in fraud in con-
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tion, he should be required to meet the higher proof requirements
of rule 1 Ob-5 in order to justify imposition of liability on the col-
lateral participant.
The relationship between the scope of defendants and the re-
liance/state of mind requirements is vividly demonstrated by the
difficulty which the courts in the expanded seller cases have once
they abandon the privity requirement and attempt to determine
what level of participation by a collateral participant justifies a
finding of culpability. 415 A number of courts in the expanded
seller cases, in particular those in the proximate cause decisions,
ultimately resolve this issue based on findings phrased in terms of
a plaintiff's reliance and/or a defendant's scienter.416 However,
there is no statutory basis for importing these elements into sec-
tion 12(2). 4 17 Moreover, there is no uniformity among the courts
nection with the purchase or sale of a security. Id. The Court's holding implicitly
rejects such a result.
Applying the rationale of this footnote in Huddleston to § 12(2), if § 12(2) were
exclusive, then a purchaser would be without recourse against collateral participants.
However, by analogy to Huddleston, it appears that the numerous lower court deci-
sions which construe § 12(2) as cumulative with rule lOb-5 because of the increased
burden of proof under the latter provision, are correctly decided. See the lower court
decisions in this regard collected at 1 A. BROMBERG & L. LOWENFELS, supra note 11,
at § 2.4(220), (420)-(426). This cumulative construction is further supported by dicta
in IHuddleston which speaks collectively of the cumulative nature of the express reme-
dies in the 1933 Act with rule lOb-5. See supra note 411. See also the following post-
Huddleston decisions in which the courts have relied on the Huddleston analysis to
hold that the availability of a remedy under § 12(2) does not preclude an implied
action under rule lOb-5: Amunrud v. Taurus Drilling Ltd., 1983 FED. SEC. L. REP.
CCH 99,649, at 97,596 (D. Mont. Dec. 23, 1983); In re Longhorn Sec. Litig., 1983
FED. SEC. L. REP. CCH 99,630 at 97,481 (W.D. Okla. Sept. 28, 1983). Thus, while a
purchaser may only reach his immediate seller under § 12(2), he has a remedy against
his seller and collateral participants in the sale under rule 10b-5, provided that he is
able to meet the heavier burden of proof under the rule.
415. See supra notes 274-290 and accompanying text.
416. See supra note 290 and accompanying text. See also 3 L. Loss, supra note 17.
Professor Loss concludes:
There would still be a distinction under § 12 between the liability of the
seller proper and the liability of these other persons, in that the seller
proper would have the burden under the statute of proving his inno-
cence but the plaintiff obviously would have the burden of proving that
the other persons had participated in an unlawful sale, a burden which
(at least under § 12(2) as distinguished from § 12(I)) would almost in-
evitably involve proof by the plaintiff of some sort of scienter on their
part.
Id. at 1716.
417. See supra notes 16-30 and accompanying text discussing the differences be-
tween the elements of a § 12(2) claim and an implied claim under rule lOb-5 and
noting that under § 12(2): (1) plaintiff is not required to prove reliance; (2) plaintiff is
not required to prove the defendant's state of mind; and (3) the burden of proof re-
garding state of mind is allocated to the defendant who will be held liable if he fails to
establish his own due care.
See also Rapp, supra note 31. Mr. Rapp criticizes the decision in Sandusky
Land, Ltd. v. Uniplan Group, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 440 (N.D. Ohio 1975), in which the
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in doing so. 418
The courts in the expanded seller cases create the dangerous
possibility of allowing plaintiffs to circumvent the statutory
scheme. The Supreme Court may find that it has tightened the
elements of a plaintiffs cause of action under rule lOb-5 only to
have lower courts read out the privity requirement in section 12(2)
and allow purchasers to recover against collateral participants
through the back door of section 12(2) with its reduced burden of
proof.
The cases adopting theories of secondary liability in the con-
text of section 12(2) may be less of an end run of the scienter re-
quirement in rule lOb-5 than the expanded seller decisions.
Traditionally, aiding and abetting and conspiracy have both en-
tailed proof by the plaintiff of scienter on the part of a secondary
defendant.41 9 However, the secondary liability opinions are dis-
ruptive of the tightly constructed statutory scheme of the 1933 Act.
Section 12(2) is an express liability provision which on its
face contains a privity requirement. 420 It is not a violation section
or an implied cause of action. It thus lacks the criminal and tort
law analogues relied on by courts to support implication of secon-
court denied a motion to dismiss a § 12(2) claim brought against an accounting firm.
Mr. Rapp characterizes the decision as blurring discussion of primary and secondary
liability and defining the scope of the term "seller" in terms of a scienter requirement.
Mr. Rapp correctly notes that requiring a plaintiff to establish scienter on the part of a
collateral participant to prove seller status for purpose of the privity requirement in
§ 12(2) conflicts with the statutory due care defense in § 12(2). Id. at 478-81.
418. Thus, while the cases cited supra note 290 made some mention of notions of
reliance and scienter in their causation inquiry (generally for purposes of exonerating
the collateral participant), numerous other proximate cause decisions do not. See,
e.g., Junker v. Crory, 650 F.2d 1349 (5th Cir. 1981), discussed supra notes 258-272
and in accompanying text. There, the attorney Heisler was held primarily liable as a
seller under a proximate cause analysis (1) where he failed to establish that in the
exercise of reasonable care he could not have been aware of the misstatements and
omissions, and (2) where the plaintiffs vote against the merger might have presented
the plaintiff with difficulties if proof of reliance had been required. Id. at 1358 n. 10,
1361.
419. See supra note 318 regarding the elements of an aiding and abetting claim
and the elements of a conspiracy claim. See also Davis v. Avco Fin. Servs., Inc., 1983
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 91,569, at 98,917 (6th Cir. July 10, 1984), in which the
Sixth Circuit stated in dicta that distinguishing between the expanded seller approach
and an aiding and abetting analysis is not a mere semantic exercise, as had been
suggested by the court in In re Caesars Palace Sec. Litig., 360 F. Supp. 366, 380
(S.D.N.Y. 1973). The court intimated that this is because of the difference in the state
of mind requirements associated with the two approaches. 1983 FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 191,569, at 98,917. In light of the fact that the district court had found neither
deliberate fraud nor recklessness on the part of the collateral participant. The court
felt that it was doubtful that aiding and abetting could be proven. Id. at 98,916.
However, the court affirmed the district court judgment against the collateral partici-
pant under a proximate cause analysis since the defendant had failed to carry the
burden of proof with respect to the due diligence defense. Id. at 98,917-19.
420. See supra note I for the text of § 12(2).
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dary liability in the context of rule lOb-5. 421 Courts have long
recognized that the tightly knit scheme of the 1933 Act with its
system of express actions explicitly defining the field of potential
defendants does not support implication of secondary liability for
aiding and abetting or conspiracy. 422 As the court held in In re
Equity Funding Corp. of America Securities Litigation,423 recogni-
tion of such theories offends the scheme of express actions in sec-
tion 11 and section 12 of the 1933 Act, which proscribe narrowly
defined conduct and allow relief from precisely-defined parties.424
CONCLUSION
A significant number of lower court opinions have seriously
eroded the privity requirement which arises from the plain lan-
guage of section 12(2) of the 1933 Act. Under a variety of ratio-
nales, these cases expand the concept of who may be deemed a
"seller" for purposes of primary liability under section 12(2) to
include various collateral participants in a sales transaction. In
the outermost extension of section 12(2), some courts have recog-
nized the possibility of implied secondary liability in a section
12(2) action for aiding and abetting or conspiracy.
The courts in the expanded seller cases and secondary liabil-
ity opinions significantly extend the availability of relief under
section 12(2) by circumventing what is otherwise the section's
most serious substantive limitation-the privity requirement.
However, the expanded seller decisions and secondary liability
opinions cannot withstand analysis under the principles of statu-
tory interpretation used by the present Supreme Court. The pre-
cise language of section 12(2), its legislative history, and its place
in the overall scheme of antifraud provisions provide no support
for an expansionist approach to the privity requirement.
Section 12(2) on its face creates a tightly knit and internally
consistent cause of action. A purchaser can recover from his im-
mediate seller the consideration which he paid to that seller if
there were misrepresentations or omissions in the sale with respect
421. See supra notes 322-328 and accompanying text.
422. See supra note 321 and accompanying text.
423. 416 F. Supp. 161 (C.D. Cal 1976).
424. 416 F. Supp. at 180-81. See also the following recent cases in which theories
of secondary liability for aiding and abetting and/or conspiracy have been rejected in
the context of § 12 actions: Hokama v. E.F. Hutton Co., 1983 FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 99,415 at 96,382-84 (C.D. Cal. June 15, 1983) (rejecting aiding and abetting
liability under § 12(2) but accepting possibility of expanded primary liability under
proximate cause analysis); Hagert v. Glickman, Lurie, Eiger & Co., 520 F. Supp.
1028, 1033-34 (D. Minn. 1981) (rejecting aiding and abetting liability under § 12(2)
but accepting possibility of expanded primary liability under standard of Wasson v.
SEC, 558 F.2d 879 (8th Cir. 1977)).
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to which the seller was at least negligent. Because the scope of
parties is confined to the vendor and purchaser and because the
nature of the relief is limited to rescission, a plaintiffs burden of
proof is minimal. The courts in the expanded seller decisions and
secondary liability opinions read out the privity requirement and
disrupt the internal consistency of section 12(2), as well as its place
in the overall statutory scheme.
Without proof of reliance by the purchaser, a collateral par-
ticipant in a sales transaction who was merely negligent can be
required under the expanded seller rationale to repurchase shares
which he never owned and the proceeds of which he never re-
ceived. The secondary liability opinions under section 12(2) pre-
sumably require a showing by the plaintiff of a state of mind
greater than negligence. However, these decisions still lead to the
anomaly of imposing rescission on someone who was not a party
to the original sale in the face of a statutory provision which on its
face leaves no room for implied theories of liability.
The courts should enforce the privity requirement contained
in the plain language of the statute and thus end the inconsistency
and uncertainty wrought by the expanded seller decisions and the
secondary liability opinions under section 12(2). A dissatisfied
purchaser should only be allowed to reach a collateral participant
in a sales transaction by suing him as a primary or secondary de-
fendant in an implied action under rule lOb-5.
[Vol. 31:9211002
